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Envisioning technology through discourse: 
A case study of biometrics in the National Identity Scheme 
in the United Kingdom 
Abstract 
Around the globe, governments are pursuing policies that depend on 
information technology (IT). The United Kingdom’s National Identity Scheme 
was a government proposal for a national identity system, based on 
biometrics. These proposals for biometrics provide us with an opportunity to 
explore the diverse and shifting discourses that accompany the attempted 
diffusion of a controversial IT innovation. This thesis offers a longitudinal case 
study of these visionary discourses. 
 
I begin with a critical review of the literature on biometrics, drawing attention to 
the lack of in-depth studies that explore the discursive and organizational 
dynamics accompanying their implementation on a national scale. I then 
devise a theoretical framework to study these speculative and future-directed 
discourses based on concepts and ideas from organizing visions theory, the 
sociology of expectations, and critical approaches to studying the public’s 
understanding of technology. A methodological discussion ensues in which I 
explain my research approach and methods for data collection and analysis, 
including techniques for critical discourse analysis. After briefly introducing the 
case study, I proceed to the two-part analysis. First is an analysis of 
government actors’ discourses on biometrics, revolving around formal policy 
communications; second is an analysis of media discourses and 
parliamentary debates around certain critical moments for biometrics in the 
Scheme. 
 
The analysis reveals how the uncertain concept of biometrics provided a 
strategic rhetorical device whereby government spokespeople were able to 
offer a flexible yet incomplete vision for the technology. I contend that, despite 
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being distinctive and offering some practical value to the proposals for 
national identity cards, the government’s discourses on biometrics remained 
insufficiently intelligible, uninformative, and implausible. 
 
The concluding discussion explains the unraveling visions for biometrics in the 
case, offers a theoretical contribution based on the case analysis, and 
provides insights about discourses on the ‘publics’ of new technology such as 
biometrics. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
A biometric is a unique identifying physical characteristic. Examples 
include facial recognition, iris patterns and fingerprints. (Home Office 
2004c, p.36)  
 
The above quotation is as seemingly straightforward and simple a definition of 
biometrics as one will find. It appeared in a United Kingdom (UK) government 
consultation document on identity cards, published in April 2004 by the Home 
Office1, prior to six years of drawn-out and highly visible public and 
parliamentary debates on the merits and shortcomings of a national biometric 
identity system. Government officials provided other descriptions of the 
technology before and after the consultation, in various government policy 
documents and public statements. This one describes biometrics as ‘unique’, 
‘identifying’, and ‘physical’, while explaining them in terms of ‘characteristics’. 
Accompanying the definition is a series of common examples of biometrics, 
which presumably are listed to help elucidate what is a new and uncertain 
concept. At first glance there appears nothing problematic about this basic 
explanation of a novel technology. 
 
However, an informed and critical interpretation of the quotation reveals a 
number of perplexities. What if biometrics were not always unique? Would 
they still be effective? What if their ability to identify an individual was not a 
                                            
1The Home Office is the UK government department responsible for immigration control, 
security, and policing. 
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given, but rather a complex and uncertain outcome, dependent on both high 
technology and considerable organizational resources? Would they be more 
dependable than other means of identification and authentication? And could 
biometrics also include non-physical dimensions (e.g., behavioral 
measurements)? In short, we might ask ourselves: could biometrics be 
otherwise?2 
 
These initial rhetorical questions raise a subset of questions and concerns 
that this thesis aims to address. How do organizational actors, and in 
particular government spokespeople, communicate details of new technology 
in innovation processes? How do we capture important aspects of technology 
in policy discourses such that their nuances and uncertainties can be more 
fully appreciated, debated, and deliberated? More generally, what is the role 
of technological language in modern policy initiatives? 
 
The aim of this study, therefore, is to explore how the UK government 
portrayed the role of multiple biometrics in its proposals for a national identity 
system. It examines the organizational and discursive dynamics attending the 
commencement, legislation, and implementation of biometrics in the UK’s 
National Identity Scheme (NIS) – one of the official names given to the 
government’s program for biometric identity cards. Motivated by innovative 
                                            
2 I return to these and related questions in the analysis and discussion chapters. 
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research approaches for studying technological controversies and social 
movements (Bauer 2002), this project draws on data from multiple sources, 
including discourses from the policy and media arenas. In particular, I critically 
analyze the visionary, promissory, and expectations-laden discourses on 
biometrics from a wide range of government policy texts, including official 
reports, legislative documents, public speeches, and other formal and informal 
communications. I also incorporate into the analysis both mass media 
discourses (from national broadsheet, business, and tabloid newspapers) as 
well as the discourses that emerged during the extended debates in 
Parliament about the government’s identity cards program. 
 
My overarching aim is to problematize common understandings of a specific 
technology (i.e., ‘biometrics’) in order to expose inherent tensions in the 
concept, and in doing so question how such concepts are leveraged in policy 
discourses comprising innovative information technology (IT) projects. I hope 
to contribute to academic understandings of technological innovation and 
policy processes around new technology. To achieve these goals, I conducted 
a longitudinal qualitative case study of a biometric identity system that 
eventually failed through the currents of political change. As fate would have 
it, this analysis was completed as the failed IT system actually underwent its 
demise. This study of the now-abandoned NIS in the United Kingdom thus 
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serves as an opportunity to explore the diverse, contested, and politicized 
discourses that escort certain kinds of government IT. 
 
The timing of the development of the case was such that the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition government scrapped the NIS as I was finishing my 
analysis and writing up the results. This provided me with an important and 
unusual degree of hindsight. Normally, a PhD study has to guess at 
evaluation; however I was able to view the unexpected outcomes of the NIS 
as they emerged during the completion of the thesis. As it were, the 
technological expectations that constituted the case were never held to 
account and so the complete story of implementing multiple biometrics on a 
national scale remains to be told. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter I introduce contemporary debates about 
identity and identification (ID) in the information society. Afterwards I review 
some of the information technologies that are being introduced to address 
these problems. Focusing on biometrics, I then ask how researchers may go 
about creatively studying a technology that is often invisible to the public. 
Following this initial methodological reflection, I provide some detail on the 
history of national ID in the UK, the case of the NIS itself, and the broader 
research context, before transitioning into a critical review of the academic 
literature on biometrics. 
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1.1 Identity, policy, and technology 
With the advent and popularization of the Internet and global diffusion and 
adoption of information and communication technologies, there are increasing 
concerns about the interrelated problems of identity, trust, and access on-line. 
These issues include concerns about the misuse of personal information by 
malicious or rogue actors, the development of reliable mechanisms for 
building trust relationships and facilitating trustworthy transactions in mediated 
environments, and attempts to restrict access to services only to those who 
are indeed entitled to them. ‘Identity management’ is also important in 
facilitating international mobility. Governments gather considerable amounts 
of personal information from citizens and visitors and issue identity documents 
to facilitate travel, based on internationally agreed standards and 
technologies. 
 
However, behind these various scenarios lie fundamentally different problems 
and different levels of risk, which require different policy responses and, 
following from these policies, different technologies. An identity system for 
regulating access to a municipal swimming pool, for example, is likely 
inappropriate for international travel purposes. 
 
In particular, there are important differences between the concepts of identity, 
identification, and authentication. Lyon distinguishes between identity and 
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identification. While acknowledging that, in practice, we tend to treat the terms 
as synonyms, he understands the former concept as deeply personal and 
relational and the latter as connoting more technological concerns (2009, 
pp.8-12). Whitley and Hosein (2010) further distinguish between identification 
and authentication. Identification is understood as a process by which a 
person’s identity is revealed (e.g., “This is Aaron Martin”). This is different 
from authentication, although in the common vernacular the two concepts are 
often conflated. Authentication strictly involves the confirmation of a request or 
granting of access to something and, importantly, does not require the 
revelation of an identity or personally identifiable information. For example, 
some typical authentication requests include: 
• “Is this person a British citizen?” (e.g., at a border crossing), 
• “Is this young person at least 18 years old?” (e.g., when proving 
whether someone is of legal age to consume alcohol), 
• “Is the person an inhabitant of Camden Council?” (e.g., when 
accessing a restricted local service). 
 
At no point in these requests does the person’s identity (or components 
thereof – i.e., his or her name, ID number, or date of birth) need to be 
revealed. Authentication is therefore, fundamentally, a ‘yes/no’ type of request 
(i.e., it relies on the minimal disclosure of personal information in a 
transaction). Identification and authentication are thus distinct activities – 
motivated by different policy drivers – and need to be treated differently by 
systems that manage identity information. The over-identification of users, 
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especially in contexts in which only authentication is required, can over time 
lead to the creation of extensive data profiles (or ‘data doubles’ (Haggerty & 
Ericson 2000; Lyon 2007)), which include information on people’s behaviors, 
activities, preferences, and future prospects, thereby triggering public 
concerns about unwarranted surveillance (Clarke 1994b).  
 
Governments are trying to leverage new tools for identity management. 
Among these tools of identification and authentication are a range of different 
technologies and techniques – some well-established, others still emerging. 
The most obvious examples are the identity documents that most people are 
accustomed to, including identity cards, visas, and passport credentials. This 
paper documentation of yesteryear is being enhanced with new information 
technologies such as machine-readable zones, computer chips, and radio 
frequency identification (RFID) technologies (DHS 2006). Supported by 
encryption techniques (such as digital certificates and public key infrastructure 
(PKI)), these new ‘smart’ cards are said to be more reliable and secure than 
traditional paper documents, enabling better government identity 
management. They also require extensive technical infrastructures and 
organizational routines to be effective, as well as co-operation amongst 
government authorities. Moreover, there are internationally co-ordinated 
efforts to include biometrics in these documents in order to further secure 
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government identity systems. What are we, as scholars, to make of these fast-
moving and technologically complex efforts? 
1.2 The dawn of a biometric era? 
The widespread introduction and diffusion of biometrics into society by way of 
a compulsory national identity scheme, as was proposed in the UK, would 
arguably represent a sea change in identification. For one, unlike other 
identification technologies, biometric systems require the capture and 
digitization of analogue signals of the human body. This sort of bodily 
information is qualitatively different from, for example, the information that is 
used in a bar coding scheme to keep inventory at the local grocer. Its use also 
implicates various ethical concerns (Alterman 2003). Some argue that 
biometrics are highly personal information, the breach of which would present 
novel problems. Unlike stolen national insurance, social security, or credit 
card numbers, compromised biometric data are virtually irreplaceable: 
fingerprints cannot be cancelled or reissued in the case of theft.3 Moreover, a 
government-sponsored scheme for biometrics brings with it an unavoidable 
political dimension, which most non-governmental identification systems lack. 
These politics are particularly important to the current case study, where 
government surveillance and data collection became especially high-profile 
                                            
3 There are technical mechanisms to alleviate some of these issues related to privacy and 
revocability. I discuss them in the next chapter. 
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issues during the research study, and which were frequently reported on in 
the mainstream press (Whitley 2009). 
 
As these debates play out, popular business journals are steadily generating 
excitement around and interest in the use of biometric technologies. For 
example, a 2009 Business Week report entitled “The Dawning of the 
Biometric Age” implores readers to “say goodbye” to personal identification 
numbers (PINs) and old, photo-based ID cards. As evidence of this new era, 
the article points to the case of Switzerland, where in a 2009 national 
referendum voters decided in favor of including digital fingerprints in passports 
(Gibson 2009). (The article fails to note that the final result of the vote was 
extremely tight: 50.1% of the population voted in favor of the motion and 
49.9% against). 
 
Despite such journalistic enthusiasm, the technologies and techniques of 
biometrics are by no means proven or completely mature. Recently, they were 
subject to skepticism by a research body in the US. A National Academies 
report on biometrics, published in September 2010, illustrates the relevant 
concerns about the state of the art. Among the principal findings of this 
extended policy analysis were reminders that biometric systems are 
“inherently probabilistic” and “inherently fallible”, and that “the chance of error 
can be made small but not eliminated”. The report also argues that the 
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scientific basis for biometrics is relatively weak and that more comprehensive 
evaluations are needed, which test not just technical aspects, but also 
operational and social dimensions of systems (Pato & Millett 2010). When 
these findings were first publicized the biometrics industry promptly 
responded, taking issue with some of the report’s claims and providing its own 
evidence of the “real world” successes of biometrics implementations 
(International Biometrics & Identification Association 2010). Such ongoing 
impressions management is reminiscent of other controversial industries, 
such as biotechnology, in which public relations and corporate 
communications serve an important function in setting the public agenda 
(Bauer 2002, p.148). These controversies also set the stage for this research 
project. 
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1.3 How to study biometrics? 
These ongoing debates about biometrics lead us to wonder about how social 
scientists may go about researching them. As marketers, vendors, and 
journalists tell us that biometrics are a technology whose time has come – that 
they are ‘ready for prime time’ –, and as critics contest the readiness, 
reliability, ethics, and motivations behind their use, on what basis can we 
study these innovations? Outside of the emergent and inconclusive findings 
from laboratory-based technical research, it is not clear what we actually know 
about biometrics. Minimal non-experimental empirical research on biometric 
technologies has been undertaken; in particular, the empirically based social 
science literature is especially bare. 
 
There is a partial explanation for this: biometric systems are often spoken 
about, but rarely experienced. This is partly to do with their novelty as well as 
the difficult political and technological environments in which they are usually 
pursued. While politicians speak with excitement about the possibilities of 
biometrics in achieving varying policy objectives, and technologists busily try 
to build the perfect environments for their solutions, few systems actually see 
the light of day in large-scale, real-world implementations. These are complex 
technologies that require vast technological, human, and operational 
resources to operate seamlessly. As a result, there are few cases of 
biometrics being used ‘in the wild’ and, therefore, the social science-based 
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investigations that typically study such systems once they are up and running 
have failed to materialize in substantial numbers. When biometrics are 
actually implemented, typically in immigration applications (e.g., the United 
States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) system, 
which collects the biometrics of foreigners entering the United States; the Iris 
Recognition Immigration System (IRIS) operating in select UK airports; or iris 
biometric systems in use at UAE ports of entry) there is a void of information 
about their effectiveness and impacts, excluding the somewhat zealous press 
releases from the companies awarded the contracts to build the systems. 
 
How then can we study such ‘invisible’ technologies? One way is to instead 
focus on the discourses around the proposals, rather than waiting for the 
systems themselves to appear. These discourses can tell us a lot about the 
beliefs, desires, and motivations of the actors involved, as well as how the 
technologies are conceptualized and understood in particular socio-political 
contexts. Previous critical research on the public’s understanding of science 
and the sociology of expectations provides approaches and concepts on 
which to initiate such a pursuit. These studies show us how to capture and 
analyze the invisible and imaginary. 
 
To situate these thoughts on researching biometrics, I now provide some 
important historical background to the study. The case of biometrics in the NIS 
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cannot be meaningfully presented without at least a minimal consideration of 
the history of identity cards in the UK. It is this history that fed much of the 
social and political resistance to the most recent Scheme. 
 
1.4 A brief history of identity cards in the UK 
 
The former Labour government’s proposals for identity cards were not the first 
instance of an identity program in the UK. Historians note that ID cards were a 
reality well before former Home Secretary David Blunkett’s pursuit of them. 
During both the First and Second World Wars, Britain introduced a form of 
national identity card. Agar (2005) explores these experiences and their 
relevance to the more recent proposals for the NIS. 
 
According to Agar, the first ever national identity card and population register 
in the UK was a failure. It was introduced during the First World War as a 
means of determining the extent of the male population in the country. 
Existing government records were considered incomplete and ineffective for 
the purposes of developing a policy for conscription. Once the count had been 
completed and the government knew how many men were available to serve, 
political interest in national registration and identification cards waned, and the 
system was soon abandoned. 
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However, as Agar notes, the promise of a national identification system was 
not forgotten by the civil service, who during the Second World War re-
introduced the idea of identity cards, primarily as a way of identifying aliens 
and managing the allocation of food rations. 
Crucial to the operation of the second National Register was its intimate 
connection to the organisation of food rationing. In order to renew a 
ration book, an identity card would have to be produced for inspection at 
a local office at regular intervals. Those without an identity card, would 
within a short period of time no longer be able, legally, to claim rationed 
food. This intimate connection between two immense administrative 
systems was vital to the success of the second card - they were not 
forgotten by members of the public - and provides one of the main 
historical lessons. (Agar 2005) 
 
As identity cards became a facet of everyday life, they started being used for 
additional purposes (a phenomenon negatively referred to as ‘function creep’), 
including identity checks by police officers. This use continued even after the 
war had ended. Eventually, liberal-minded citizens began questioning these 
practices and, in 1950, a man named Clarence Willcock disputed the police’s 
routine check of ID cards. Willcock’s legal challenges were not successful, but 
in the case’s written judgment Lord Goddard (the Lord Chief Justice) criticized 
the police for abusing identity cards. And by 1952 Parliament had repealed 
the legislation that made national identity cards a reality in the UK. 
 
As many observers have noted, including some civil society groups (Privacy 
International 1997), the civil service has since been regularly captivated by the 
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idea of re-introducing national identity cards in the UK, with the aim of solving 
a diversity of policy problems, ranging from streamlining tax administration to 
‘fixing’ immigration, among others. By the early 2000s they had tried again. In 
2002, the Labour government, under Prime Minister Tony Blair, proposed a 
new national ‘entitlement card’ scheme. This proposal was then re-branded as 
a national ‘identity card’ scheme in 2004. Following failed attempts to pass the 
legislation, as well as a general election in the UK (in which the Labour party 
was again victorious), Parliament passed the Identity Cards Act 2006 on 30 
March, which enabled the first national identity card program since the 
Second World War.  
 
However, this new Scheme was different from previous ones in several ways. 
The proposals were for a system of unprecedented size and complexity, 
comprising a centralized National Identity Register (NIR) (the electronic 
database on which the population’s identity data would be held), the collection 
and recording of over 50 pieces of personal information from individuals, and 
the issuing of identity cards and passports based on a new technology called 
“biometrics”. 
 
Moreover, a number of features distinguished this Scheme from those in other 
countries. These features included the extensive use of biometrics both for 
enrolment (to ensure that no individual was entered onto the Register more 
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than once) and verification; the proposed use of a single identification number 
across government and the private sector (Otjacques et al. 2007); and an 
‘audit trail’ that was expected to record details of every instance that an 
identity was verified against information stored on the Register.4  
 
The successful implementation of the Scheme, therefore, would have required 
technological expertise in the development of large scale, highly secure 
databases, advanced computer chip technologies for ID cards, sophisticated 
data collection mechanisms for the ‘biographical footprint’ checking during the 
enrolment process, system integration skills to combine all the different 
aspects of the Scheme, and specialist skills in biometric enrolment and 
verification. 
 
The government’s program for identity cards went through various 
transformations after the Bill became law. The configuration of the NIR, for 
example, underwent several changes. In its original conception, the NIR was 
to be a brand new, central store of data. This changed in December 2006 
when the Identity and Passport Service (IPS) – the sub-department of the 
Home Office responsible for implementing the Scheme – released its Strategic 
Action Plan and set out a revised database schema for the Register. The idea 
was to separate the biographic, biometric, and administrative information, and 
                                            
4 This requirement for a personal audit trail would prove to be particularly controversial 
amongst activists, who viewed it as a dangerous tracking device. 
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store them on different databases. The stated reasons for this segregation 
were to improve security and make use of “the strengths of existing systems” 
(IPS 2006c, p.10). However, some argued that this change was a poorly 
disguised attempt to reduce costs. The government’s proposals for ID cards 
went through various other changes over the course of Scheme’s lifespan, 
primarily motivated by concerns about managing costs and achieving 
observable successes. I will return to this discussion in chapter 5, focusing in 
particular on the history of biometrics in the Scheme, as these are the main 
focus of the analysis. 
 
For now it suffices to observe how impressive and audacious the 
government’s plans were for the Scheme and biometrics. The collection of 
multiple biometrics, including fingerprints and irises, from tens of millions of 
citizens and foreigners was a project that had not been undertaken before as 
part of a national identity system. The plans for real-time, on-line biometric 
identification against a centralized, government-managed database were also 
a major innovation. While other countries already operated their own national 
ID systems, the proposed use of these biometrics, in this way – and on this 
scale – was something that had not been attempted before. 
 
Before outlining the structure of the research thesis, I want to provide a brief 
overview of the wider social and political context in which the debates on, and 
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activities for, the National Identity Scheme took place. This discussion 
exposes some important external factors that affected the trajectory of 
discourses in the case. 
 
1.5 Broader research context 
This research project was further motivated by a number of developments that 
relate to the particular period and place in which the NIS was proposed and 
pursued. On the one hand, these contextual factors complicated the empirical 
project, but on the other hand they also enriched it. 
 
First, there were countless other e-government systems that were proposed 
and implemented contemporaneously as the NIS. Many of these programs 
incorporated similar techniques and technologies (such as identity verification 
or biometrics) and generated similar levels of public debate and resistance. As 
one followed these various debates in policy discourses and media coverage, 
it was sometimes difficult to determine exactly what policies or technologies 
were being talked about and disputed. For example, in certain media reporting 
the relevant issues were often lumped together as a general critique of 
government surveillance or poor data security practices. Drawing a line 
around the ‘case’ required effort and care. Indeed, even on the issue of 
identity cards the Home Office often blurred the distinction between identity 
cards for foreign nationals (which are, in fact, just detached visas, and fall 
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under different legislation – I explain this fact in detail later on) and the identity 
cards that British nationals were invited to adopt. 
 
Here I list just a few of the many e-government systems that were concurrent 
to the Scheme.5 
 
• e-Borders – a Home Office system for recording information on 
everyone who enters and exits the UK 
• Biometric residence permits for non-EEA foreign nationals (informally 
known as ‘identity cards’ for foreign nationals) 
• Iris recognition immigration system (IRIS) – the iris biometrics-based, 
registered passenger program in place in certain UK airports  
• National DNA Database – a forensic database that holds DNA 
information on those convicted or suspected of certain classes of 
crimes, plus volunteer samples 
• ContactPoint – a national index of all children under the age of 18 in 
England 
• Communications Database – a database of communications 
surveillance created under the Interception Modernisation Programme 
• National Childhood Obesity Database – a UK government database for 
tracking overweight and obese children 
• National Health Service’s National Programme for IT, which involved 
the centralization of patient records 
• Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) systems – a video 
surveillance method that uses optical character recognition to read the 
license plates on vehicles 
 
Second, concurrent with the rise in government systems and databases, there 
was an increasingly vocal public debate about whether and to what extent the 
                                            
5 For an extended list and discussion on these systems see the Database State report (2009). 
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UK is becoming a “surveillance society” (Ball et al. 2006; Surveillance Studies 
Network 2010). It was, and still is, not uncommon to see these debates 
represented on the front pages of national broadsheets and tabloid 
newspapers (Whitley 2009), including most recently national scandals 
involving voicemail and phone hacking. The topics of government surveillance 
and privacy are thus entering the mainstream like never before. The 
Conservative Party even made it a point to take a political stand on these 
issues, releasing a paper prior to the general election of 2010 entitled 
“Reversing the rise of the surveillance state” in which, among other things, 
they called for the abolition of the National ldentity Register. And following the 
demise of the NIS, activist groups are now rallying around the larger fight 
against the “database state”, which lends credence to the argument that the 
information and communication technologies central to these systems are 
appearing in political discourses in a qualitatively different manner than in the 
past. 
 
In situating this case study, one also should not underestimate the extent to 
which regular government data breaches contributed to critical debates 
around the government’s use of citizens’ data. Public controversy following 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs’ (HMRC) loss of two computer discs 
containing the personal details of all families in the UK with a child under the 
age of 16 (totaling 25 million records) led to unprecedented public debates 
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around data security and even entered discussions about the future of the NlS 
and the role of biometrics therein. Following the announcement of the lost 
discs, it was suggested by officials that the inclusion of biometric identifiers in 
the HMRC dataset would have prevented or lessened the impact of the 
security breach. The main point for now is that the case of the NIS cannot be 
treated in isolation, but rather must be appreciated as part of a larger socio-
political context in which privacy, surveillance, and security were increasingly 
salient themes. 
 
1.6 Overview of the research 
The remainder of this research thesis is structured as follows: 
  
Chapter 2 presents a critical review of the extant literature on biometrics, 
spanning computer science, the social sciences, and information systems and 
management studies. These disparate fields naturally approach the study of 
biometrics in dissimilar ways and offer different insights on the technologies 
and the organizations that pursue them. After noting the relative strengths and 
weakness of each body of literature, I draw attention to a lack of longitudinal 
case studies, and particularly ones that explore the discursive and 
organizational dynamics that accompany the implementation of multiple 
biometrics on a national scale. 
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In chapter 3 I devise a theoretical framework for studying the speculative and 
future-directed discourses that constituted the case. This framework 
incorporates aspects of the discursive processes of framing, and draws on 
concepts from organizing visions theory, the sociology of expectations, and 
critical approaches to studying the public’s understanding of science. These 
provide a conceptual path for an extensive analysis of the stock of public 
discourses that accompanied the roll-out of biometrics in the Scheme.  
 
With this framework in place, I pose three inter-related research questions: 
1. How did government spokespeople portray a vision for biometrics in 
the National Identity Scheme, and to what extent did this vision 
organize efforts and mobilize actors to innovate? 
2. How did policy debates and media reportage discursively capture 
biometrics, and what were the limitations of these technological 
discourses in revealing the complexities and perplexities of biometrics? 
3. How were the ‘publics’ of biometrics portrayed in these discourses? 
 
Chapter 4 is a methodological discussion in which I justify and explain my 
research strategy (i.e., the case study strategy), tell the story of my 
methodological experiences, review my data collection methods (exploratory 
focus groups interviews and methods for collecting policy communications 
and media reports), and flesh out my analysis technique, namely critical 
discourse analysis. 
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Chapter 5 initiates the analysis by briefly re-introducing the case study, 
describing the range of actors involved and focusing, in particular, on the 
critical moments in the short-lived history of biometrics in the NIS. These six 
critical or ‘watershed’ events mark important moments in the Scheme’s roll-out 
when either the system as a whole, or the biometric component specifically, 
was subject to increased public scrutiny and debate. In one instance, the 
designated critical moment marks a ‘non-event’ (that is, the gradual, 
discursive withdraw of iris biometrics in the Scheme, which goes unremarked 
for quite some time). 
 
In chapters 6 and 7 I present the two-part critical discourse analysis. Chapter 
6 includes the analysis of the government discourses on biometrics found in 
formal communications, such as policy documents, legislative texts, and 
public presentations. This presentation of government discourses is structured 
around seven dimensions of new technology as outlined by Orlikowski and 
Gash (1992). These dimensions are 1) organizational philosophy towards 
technology, 2) issues around initiation, 3) implementation concerns, 4) issues 
concerning use, 5) success criteria, 6) perceived impacts, and 7) relations 
with other players in the computing social world. 
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Chapter 7 offers an analysis of media discourses and parliamentary debates, 
which is presented around the previously identified critical moments for 
biometrics in the Scheme. These data provide another prospective with which 
to understand the discursive dynamics that shaped the biometric concept in 
the case study. 
 
The final chapter reflects on the major findings from the analysis, including the 
reasons for problematic visions for biometrics in the case. It extends 
organizing visions theory in light of the findings from the case analysis, 
focusing on the themes of the ontology of visions, temporality, and resistance. 
It also offers insights about discourses on the publics of new technology. It 
concludes by reflecting on the limitations of the case study and looking 
forward to new research opportunities emerging from the dissertation. 
  
 38
Chapter 2: Critical literature review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I review the wide-ranging and multi-disciplinary literature on 
biometrics. This critical literature review highlights the strengths of the existing 
research on biometrics and exposes some important shortcomings; 
specifically, the lack of an extensive, longitudinal study of the development of 
discourses about biometrics in a specific context, and how these discourses 
interplay to constitute a vision for new technology. 
 
The academic literature relating to biometrics can be categorized under three 
main rubrics. These are 1) computer science and electrical engineering 
explorations of biometrics, biometric techniques, and related technologies, 2) 
social science and ethical analyses of biometrics, which are often focused on 
surveillance, privacy, and security concerns, and 3) studies of user 
acceptance of biometric technologies, usually undertaken by management 
and information systems scholars. These acceptance studies are uniformly 
set within the context of a business organization or corporation, and typically 
neglect the larger social forces that influence perceptions and acceptance of, 
or resistance to, biometrics. 
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Of course, these rubrics are convenient categorizations that overlap 
significantly; by no means are they meant to be mutually exclusive. For 
example, studies of biometrics acceptance inevitably enter into discussions on 
privacy, surveillance, and security. Broadly speaking however, these accounts 
clearly differ from more sociologically inclined treatments in terms of their 
point of departure, analytical focus, and intellectual objectives.  
2.2 Techniques and technologies of biometrics 
A thorough literature review on biometrics cannot escape a voluminous and 
important body of technical research. Although this thesis is more concerned 
with the social implications of introducing biometrics on the national scale, it is 
prudent to begin this review with this literature as biometrics are, at base, 
impossible without these technologies. Therefore the following review 
addresses this technical literature, doing so critically, while suspending 
judgment about any claimed certainties about biometrics. 
 
The vast majority of the academic literature on biometrics originates in the 
inter-related fields of computer science, human-computer interaction, and 
electrical engineering. In the pragmatic tradition of applied mathematics and 
statistics, this literature seeks to improve upon the perceived problems facing 
existing biometric methods, technologies, and applications. Researchers work 
to solve various technical problems ranging from faults in pattern recognition 
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software (Jain et al. 2000), to fusing multiple (multi-modal) biometrics (Ross & 
Jain 2004), to improving the efficiency of biometric database search (Mhatre 
et al. 2005), among various other research areas. 
 
Scope limitations prevent an exhaustive review of this literature. Moreover, the 
highly technical nature of this corpus does not lend itself to an overtly social 
science focused analysis of biometric identity schemes. Exploring such 
technical minutiae for several different biometric methods (e.g., fingerprinting, 
iris scanning, and facial recognition) would distract us.6 However, certain work 
from this literature should be reviewed in detail, so as to inform a general 
discussion about biometrics, their strengths, and the various problems and 
uncertainties that surround the technologies.  
 
Basics of biometrics 
Dictionary definitions of biometrics invariably state that they are physiological 
or behavioral measurements meant to identify someone or verify an identity. 
The former type of biometric includes facial geometry (facial recognition), 
fingerprinting, hand geometry, vein pattering, iris patterning, and DNA 
profiling, among an array of other emerging and prospective techniques such 
as ear and nose biometrics (Burge & Burger 2000; Moorhouse et al. 2009). 
Behavioral biometrics include techniques such as signature recognition, 
                                            
6 For readers interested in a comprehensive introduction to the different biometric modes, see 
Bowyer et al. (2008) for iris biometrics; Jain et al. (2010) for fingerprinting; and Bowyer (2004) 
for facial recognition. 
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keystroke dynamics recognition, gait recognition, and speech or voice 
recognition7, and have been referred to in the literature as “behaviometrics” 
(Nisenson et al. 2003, pp.363-364). Unlike conventional methods that rely on 
what you know (such as passwords, personal identification numbers (PINs) or 
cryptographic keys) or what you possess (e.g., identity tokens or access 
cards), biometrics depend on facets of the human body, specifically what you 
are and what you do (O'Gorman 2003), and are thus believed to be stronger 
or better technologies as they cannot be forgotten or misplaced. 
 
Within the literature it is generally agreed that a bodily measurement must 
satisfy certain requirements before it can qualify as a ‘biometric’: it must be 1) 
universal, 2) distinct, 3) relatively permanent, and 4) collectable (Jain et al. 
2004, p.4).  
 
‘Universality’ means that all participants in a given population possess the 
characteristic. Otherwise, not everyone can use the system. If a certain 
biometric is not universal across a population of users, then multiple 
biometrics might be used, as was originally proposed in the National Identity 
Scheme (NIS) (with at least four different biometrics (i.e., iris, face, fingerprint, 
and signature) considered). 
 
                                            
7 Usually characterized as a behavioral biometric, voice does have an underlying 
physiological component (O'Gorman 2003). 
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The ‘distinctiveness’ requirement aims to avoid cases in which more than one 
individual shares the same characteristic. For example, to rely solely on height 
as a biometric identifier would make it difficult to distinguish between 
otherwise unique people. ‘Permanence’ is important because a rapidly 
changing identifier would result in a live biometric not matching its stored 
record, thus requiring the regular re-enrollment of biometric information. This 
could undermine the system wholesale, depending on its scale, as large 
numbers of re-enrollees could prove administratively burdensome, and regular 
re-enrollment unacceptable to users. ‘Collectability’ is understood as the 
quantitative measurability of a characteristic (Jain et al. 2004, p.4). An 
immeasurable bodily feature cannot be used as a biometric. Most biometric 
measurements are of external characteristics and thus are easily measured, 
but biometrics may also use internal features of the body such as measuring 
the vein patterns inside one’s hands.  
 
Enrollment 
A basic process applies to all systems that seek to identify individuals using 
biometrics. This is the enrollment process. These steps include the initial 
capture of biometric data, the subsequent processing or conditioning of these 
data for storage purposes, the extraction of certain features in the data, and 
the generation of a biometric template. A template can be defined as “a 
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study – while circumvention refers to the susceptibility of the system to 
fraudulent use (Jain 2004, p.4). 
 
System errors 
There are multiple ways that a biometric system can malfunction. Imperfect 
imaging conditions (e.g., a dirty sensor) may prevent a true match from being 
recognized as such. Ephemeral physiological changes may also affect data 
capture and template matching, such as when a cut or bruised finger prevents 
a system from enrolling or authenticating a fingerprint record, or when a week-
old beard confuses a facial recognition system. The role of ambient conditions 
such as room temperature and humidity must also be taken into consideration 
when assessing a system’s performance, along with the inevitable vagaries 
and inconsistencies of users’ interactions with a scanner or sensor (Jain et al. 
2004, p.6). 
 
For a study of public discourses about biometrics, we should review the 
different types of system error that may occur as a result of the 
abovementioned issues and other performance problems. No biometric 
system is ever perfect; exploring the various ways in which biometrics may not 
work is a crucial benchmark without which we cannot fully appreciate or 
comprehend public discourses of how they are supposed to work. The 
impossibility of perfect identification is an oft-repeated criticism aimed at 
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governments that try to use biometrics to uniquely identify everyone. 
However, errors are inescapable. It is thus important to see how actors 
interpret and talk about these errors. As Prabhakar et al. (2003) remark, the 
“lack of understanding of the error rates is a primary source of confusion” 
about biometrics (p.35). 
 
Enrollment errors 
As previously stated, before someone can use a biometric system s/he must 
first be enrolled. This involves providing the appropriate biometric identifiers 
for storage on either a database or some other storage device such as a 
‘smart’ card. During this phase, a user’s biometric characteristic is scanned 
and that information is usually converted into a digital representation of the 
original input. The representation is quality checked to ensure that it can be 
reliably processed at successive stages. Further processing takes place to 
generate a compressed but expressive representation, known as a template 
(Jain et al. 2004, p.6). 
 
Enrollment is vulnerable to two types of error: failure to capture (FTC) errors 
and failure to enroll (FTE) errors. FTC errors result when a system cannot 
read a physical characteristic because it cannot locate a signal of satisfactory 
quality (Jain et al. 2004, p.7). FTE errors generally arise when a system 
rejects an input because it is deemed to be of poor quality. A system’s FTE 
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rate represents the frequency with which users are unable to join a system. 
Importantly, enrollment failures of this sort present numerous socio-economic 
problems related to inclusion and exclusion, which are discussed throughout 
this thesis.  
 
Matching errors 
FTE errors relate to two further types of error: false matches (also known as 
false acceptances or false positives) and false non-matches (alternatively 
called false rejections or false negatives). A false match is when a system 
mistakenly accepts the biometric input of one person by identifying them as 
somebody they are not. False matches involve mistakenly accepting a person 
who has no previous record in the database or matching a previously enrolled 
user to someone else’s record. On the other hand, a false non-match is when 
a system mistakenly reports that someone’s biometric is not in its records, 
when in fact it is – false non-matches dispute that you are you. Each of these 
errors is associated with a probability that a given user will be incorrectly 
accepted or rejected – falsely identified either way. These are known as false 
match rates (FMRs) and false non-match rates (FNMRs), respectively. 
 
If one plotted the FMR and FNMR to a graph, what is known as the ‘threshold 
value’ would be the point at which decision-makers find the prevalence of both 
acceptable for a given biometric system. The higher the threshold value is set, 
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the higher the FNMR becomes and the more secure the system is said to be. 
In this case, the system will occasionally reject an enrolled user, aiming to err 
on the side of caution, and is less likely to accept a fraudulent input as valid. If 
the threshold value is lowered and the system is made less sensitive - more 
tolerant of input variations and noise – the FMR grows. Low threshold value 
systems are often preferred in low-security environments, where the nuisance 
of a false rejection outweighs the consequences of a false match. Ultimately, 
decision-makers take a stand on this tradeoff based on the system’s 
requirements and intended purpose.  
 
One final piece of technical vocabulary worth presenting is what is known as a 
matching score: a value produced by the system estimating the likelihood that 
two biometric inputs originate from the same user. This is always a measure 
of probability. Jain et al. graphically depict the relationship between the FMR, 
FNMR, threshold value, and matching score (see Figure 2.4). 
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with age, or faces, which might change drastically with wrinkles or facial hair, 
irises were for life and thus could potentially solve the permanence problem 
permanently (Miyazawa et al. 2008; Monro et al. 2007; Thornton et al. 2007).  
Recent research by Bowyer et al. (2009), however, calls into question this and 
other “accepted truths” of biometrics. 
 
The previous consensus held that normal aging does not noticeably affect an 
iris biometric template, preventing the need for periodic re-enrollment. 
Because re-enrollment would require users to prove their identity 
independently again, at their own inconvenience, and also adds to the 
administrative cost of the system, a one-time, permanently valid biometric 
would make biometric systems exponentially more practicable (Bowyer et al. 
2009). However, Bowyer et al. find that the FNMR of iris biometrics might 
increase over time, potentially indicating that irises are not as unchanging as 
was previously thought. 
 
Bowyer et al. dispel other “accepted truths” of iris biometrics, including the 
effects of pupil dilation on a system’s ability to correctly match iris biometrics 
to the appropriate user’s identity record and whether wearing contact lenses 
can affect the accuracy of iris recognition. In both cases, the accepted truth 
(i.e., that neither pupil dilation nor wearing contact lenses affect system 
accuracy) turned out to be false. These emerging findings on the limitations of 
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biometrics reflect the ongoing uncertainty of the science and technical 
methods involved. The policy implications of these uncertainties are significant 
and merit further exploration, especially considering ongoing attempts by 
governments around the world to employ biometric techniques in large-scale 
civil implementations. We must also consider how such uncertainties manifest 
themselves in public discourses on biometrics, as many of these discourses 
feed into policy processes. 
 
Other anomalies find their way into technical evaluations of biometric systems. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recently tested the 
performance of two-dimensional still-image facial recognition algorithms – the 
largest public evaluation of the performance of facial recognition systems ever 
conducted (Grother et al. 2010). Of the report’s many peculiar findings: men 
were more easily recognized by facial recognition systems than women; 
heavier people were easier to recognize than more slender subjects; and 
Asians were more easily recognized than Caucasians. Furthermore, certain 
algorithms had difficulties recognizing young people as compared to elderly 
people, whereas for other algorithms the opposite was true (Grother et al. 
2010). The implications of this technological unreliability – and its exclusionary 
effects – are explored in the next section on sociological interpretations of 
biometrics. 
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Images versus templates 
As noted, the literature explains that featured-extracted templates of biometric 
images are stored. These digital approximations, rather than actual biometric 
images, are used to identify users. Many systems collect and store 
information about, or a representation of, the fingerprint, facial measurements, 
or a binary iris code, rather than collecting and storing an entire image of the 
finger, face, or iris. This distinction matters because it is commonly argued 
that using templates or representations, rather than actual images, is more 
privacy-friendly and secure. If these data are lost, then users need not worry 
about being falsely impersonated, it is said. 
 
However, depending on the application, biometric systems do not rely 
exclusively on templates. For example, forensic applications store original 
images (Faundez-Zanuy 2005, p.14). For expansive and complex systems 
like nation-wide biometric identification schemes, it may be necessary to 
record and retain original images to prevent the need for wholesale re-
enrolment in the event that decision-makers choose to switch to another 
system in the future, or make significant changes to their existing 
infrastructure (including updating algorithms, templates, scanners, 
middleware, and databases). The lack of generally accepted biometric 
standards means that new templates would have to be reprocessed from the 
original images. 
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Innovations in biometrics 
Though the practice is largely untested, recent computer science research 
has shown that it might be possible to reconstruct or regenerate fingerprint 
images from the stored biometric templates. Following work that tried to 
reverse engineer facial biometrics from their accompanying templates (Adler 
2003), Ross et al. (2007) were able to demonstrate a technique for rebuilding 
fingerprints with only the so-called minutiae points of the template. While not a 
perfect recreation (i.e., more information is needed to reconstruct the 
fingerprint image entirely), such demonstrations do speak to outstanding 
concerns about the potential privacy concerns around new biometric 
technologies – if ‘raw’ inputs could be manufactured from stored biometric 
templates, then stolen templates would suddenly acquire colossal value for 
identity thieves everywhere. One could steal a template, recreate an original 
image, and ‘be’ somebody they are not.  
 
In response to these and related concerns, other researchers have attempted 
to design what they call ‘cancellable’ biometrics (Bolle et al. 2002). One of the 
main criticisms of biometrics is that people have a limited number of biometric 
identifiers (i.e., most of us only have two eyes, ten fingers, and one face). In 
the event that biometric data are compromised, it would be very difficult if not 
near impossible to revoke these data. Unlike a credit card number or national 
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identity number, which can be replaced, if lost or stolen, a biometric 
compromised is a biometric neutralized: it cannot be replaced and so it cannot 
be used any longer. Thus, one of the properties that make biometrics so 
attractive for identification or authentication purposes (i.e., that that they are 
relatively permanent and do not change over time) is also one of their 
drawbacks. 
 
The idea behind cancellable biometrics is to intentionally distort recorded 
biometrics, systematically and repeatedly. If for whatever reason a stored 
variant of the original biometric is compromised, a new variant of the same 
biometric can be produced, the change documented, and the identity re-
secured. These researchers also aim to make the transformation technique 
non-invertible so the original biometric image cannot be recovered even with 
full knowledge of the distortion process (Bolle et al. 2002, p.2735). The 
authors argue that this method could be applied to all biometrics. See Figure 
2.5 for an example using face biometrics. 
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include hacking (Faundez-Zanuy 2004) – having to hack multiple biometric 
sensors is more difficult than hacking just one; spoofing (Matsumoto et al. 
2002) – multi-modal systems increase the volume and difficulty of the forger’s 
travails; and the non-universality of particular biometric features in a 
population (Jain & Ross 2004, pp.37-38). Thus, someone without hands who 
is obviously incapable of providing fingerprints might present her/his irises to a 
biometric reader instead, so long as both options are available.  
 
Multi-modality has also been heralded as a pro-privacy innovation. Faundez-
Zanuy argues that certain privacy concerns may be resolved by “using a multi-
modal biometric system, where the user can freely decide between several 
biometric identifiers, and reject the system that he considers may reveal 
private information” (2005, p.15). This, of course, assumes a degree of choice 
in the operation of the systems, and that the user knows enough to make a 
sound judgment about which system is less vulnerable than the alternatives. 
Making some biometrics optional for cultural or religious reasons, for example, 
would also have an impact on the performance and security of an identity 
system, as not all biometrics perform the same, nor are they equally immune 
to hacking. 
 
Technical research on multi-modal biometrics continues. The apparent 
solution to the limitations of biometrics is to collect and use more of them. 
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However, added volume begets added complexity, and its lifelong 
companions: vulnerability, the potential for privacy violations and identity 
fraud, and other forms of exploitation. Given the well-established 
imperfections of biometric systems discussed above – technological error, 
vulnerability, and trade-offs that affect the accuracy of systems – the prospect 
of buttressing biometrics in with more biometrics raises the specter of trying to 
solve a problem by expanding, emboldening, and invigorating the problem 
itself; but is more always better? 
2.3 Biometrics in the social science literature 
Apart from the technical writings, another major category of literature is a 
rapidly expanding corpus of social science scholarship on biometrics. Within 
this broad category of research I include those accounts that emphasize 
sociological, political, ethical, cultural, or economic issues pertaining to the 
general use of biometrics in society and the implications of biometrics-based 
identity systems.  
 
We might begin by considering work by van der Ploeg (2003), inspired by the 
science and technology studies (STS) tradition, on how biometric technologies 
are strategically portrayed by different actors in public debates. While van der 
Ploeg is primarily concerned with the privacy component of portrayals of 
biometrics (i.e., whether they are a violation or enhancement of privacy), her 
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arguments can be applied to a broader, more meaningful discussion about the 
characteristics or values of biometrics. Instead of taking a side in the privacy 
debate, van der Ploeg aims to understand how differing public assessments of 
biometrics contribute to their continuous social construction. She argues that 
Such diverging assessments of biometric technology involve different 
conceptualizations and constructions of the technology in terms of its 
delineation as a stabilized object. The presumed nature of the 
technology varies, first, according to the imagined, assumed, feared, or 
hoped-for practical and material configurations of which the technology 
will become part, and, second, it varies according to where the boundary 
is drawn between the technology as a stabilized object and the 
contingent environment in which it is situated. (2003, p.88) 
 
She observes that there is a politics to the conceptualization of biometrics 
(2003, p.99), for those who view the technology as an embryo of contingency 
– an ongoing work in progress – and also for those who see it as a stable set 
of artifacts, products, specifications, and properties – as something ready-
made. Van der Ploeg argues that the perceived possibility of intervention and 
influence in a technological trajectory varies depending on the degree to 
which a technology is perceived as stable, and as well as on how people 
(such as activists or government officials) attribute agency to a socio-technical 
network (2003, p.100). 
A construction of technology stressing human agency and the 
heterogeneous nature of technological practices and developments is 
more enabling and empowering for those wanting to influence and steer 
the direction of technological development, whereas the reified version of 
technology, with its attribution of agency to technology rather than people 
or other causal factors, renders it a deterministic force happening upon 
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us and to which any attempt to resist (or support as the case may be) 
appears futile. (2003, p.100)  
 
One might worry that this sort of interpretive flexibility about biometrics (cf. 
Pinch & Bijker 1984) leaves the technology insusceptible to evaluation, 
criticism, or political engagement. Indeed, this is a classic dilemma in science 
and technology studies. Yet van der Ploeg argues that “the extent to which a 
certain technology can be evaluated, criticized, or even talked about, depends 
to a significant extent on the degree to which it can be identified as a stable 
object, or fixed practice” (2003, p.100). She stresses that the reification of a 
particular stabilized form of biometric technology, while temporarily sidelining 
important complexities, does facilitate meaningful discussion about it. She 
appears to be advocating a sort of local or case-based assessment of 
biometrics, avoiding general, hypothetical debates about the technology. 
These initial points on the politics of theorizing biometrics lead us into diverse 
analyses and critiques of biometrics by social scientists. 
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Biometrics and identity: the machine-readable body 
One such critique, offered by van der Ploeg herself (1999), concerns the 
philosophical relationship between the body, biometrics, and identity. She 
argues that the use of biometrics prioritizes the body in matters of identity, 
identification, and information technology. The body becomes the ultimate 
source of truth, supposedly containing a complete record of who we are and 
what we intend to do. 
 
There is an important and unresolved empirical debate about whether 
biometrics are qualitatively different from other means of bodily identification. 
We have always relied on the body to help us recognize friend or foe. For 
example, there is a long history of the police branding criminals, thereby 
tattooing a social condition and a personality trait directly onto the body for all 
to see forevermore. And there is, of course, the spotted history of 
anthropometry, a system of criminal identification devised by Alphonse 
Bertillon in the late 1800s, which relied on various “scientific” bodily 
measurements and markers (cf. Lyon 2001, pp.291-292). Nose 
measurements and tattooing in Nazi Germany provide another example in the 
ugly history of biometrics. Torpey argues that the difference between these 
techniques and new methods lies in the degree of sophistication and 
reliability. 
Techniques for ‘reading off the body’ have become more and more 
sophisticated over time, shifting from unreliable subjective descriptions 
 63
and anthropomorphic measurements to photographs (themselves at first 
considered unreliable by police), fingerprints, electronically scanned 
palm-prints, DNA fingerprinting, and the retina scans dramatized in the 
recent film version of Mission: Impossible. (1999, p.17). 
 
Indeed, modern biometrics rely on computers and information technology to 
identify subjects. Van der Ploeg argues that the academic literature on identity 
inadequately theorizes biometrics, for the centrality of the body in biometrics 
and the embodied nature of subjectivity are rarely taken into account. She 
stresses that we must better understand “what kind of body the biometric body 
is” (van der Ploeg 1999, p.43, emphasis added). She believes it is a body that 
does not and cannot exist independently of technology. 
Unlike the body rendered knowable in the biomedical science, biometrics 
generates a readable body: it transforms the body’s surfaces into digital 
codes and ciphers to be read by a machine… [T]he meaning and 
significance of the biometric body will be contingent upon context, and 
the relations established with other texts… [W]e might say that the 
contexts giving meaning to biometrics are constituted by the practices it 
is part of, while its meaning in an intertexual sense will be brought about 
by the data to which it is going to be linked electronically (van der Ploeg 
1999, p.43). 
 
Thus one may argue that, in this sense, modern biometrics are different from 
previous, non-computerized methods of bodily identification. Biometrics easily 
link the body to dispersed sets of information stored across innumerable 
databases; only then do digital biometrics ‘mean’ anything. 
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Biometrics privacy-enhancing or privacy-eroding? 
If people’s primary identity in a biometric society must be verified by machines 
in order to be ‘true’ – if we are not ourselves without mechanical confirmation 
that our codified bodies match some previously recorded information – then 
repeated validation of our corporeal specifications becomes an increasingly 
important activity in social life. This is a process of expansive and expanding 
disclosure. It is for this reason that several authors have considered the 
relationship between biometrics and privacy and civil liberties (Davies 1998; 
Zorkadis & Donos 2004; Johnson 2004; Anonymous 2007a; Liu 2009; 
Sprokkereef & De Hert 2007). These articles usually discuss whether and how 
biometric systems threaten privacy. More often than not, these are broad-
stroked critiques of biometrics, which are removed from context and ignore 
the important contingencies and local realities that van der Ploeg implores us 
to consider when assessing the technologies. We can understand the central 
thrust of this branch of the literature by reviewing two of its more well-known 
contributions in depth: namely the writings of Clarke (2001) and Alterman 
(2003). 
 
In his overview of biometrics and privacy, Clarke (2001) argues that biometric 
technologies threaten to remove society’s last remaining protection against 
governments and corporations: their systemic inability to reliably and 
consistently identify citizens and customers, respectively. If biometric 
identification ever becomes a universal and normal requirement of everyday 
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life, he argues, this final bulwark would collapse. Clarke outlines ten specific 
threats to privacy posed by biometric technologies. 
1. Privacy of the person. Biometrics necessarily involve the collection of 
information of the person, which Clarke argues is particularly sensitive. 
2. Privacy of personal data. Collecting biometrics in conjunction with other 
personal data enhances the risk of increased control over a population. 
3. Privacy of personal behavior. Monitoring people’s movements and 
actions through biometrics increases the transparency of their behavior 
to organizations. This fear is about biometrics being the missing link in 
a ubiquitous surveillance society. 
4. Multi-purpose and general-purpose identification. Because biometric 
identification schemes are expensive, organizations are motivated to 
share costs by using the systems for multiple purposes, thus 
threatening privacy through increased data-sharing. 
5. Denial of anonymity and pseudonymity. With the advent of biometric 
technologies, the capacity to associate identities with previously 
anonymous or pseudonymous activities is increased. 
6. Masquerade. Imposters might produce means to trick biometric 
devices. 
7. Permanent identity theft. While masquerading is a single event, a thief 
could theoretically pose as another person indefinitely. The aura of 
accuracy and reliability surrounding biometrics would make it difficult 
for rightful owners to reclaim their identities. 
8. Automated denial of identity. Using biometrics, organizations could 
deny those who are deemed suspicious access to certain facilities or 
services, based on any characteristic they choose to exclude. 
9. Effect on freedom and democracy. The use of biometrics runs counter 
to the freedoms and liberties of an open and democratic society. 
10. Dehumanization. The use of biometrics can be seen as treating human 
beings as simple objects, manufactured goods or livestock, with no 
other distinguishing or individuating characteristics of relevance other 
than their bodies. 
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In response to these perceived threats to individual privacy, Clarke considers 
five potential safeguards against biometric intrusion. The first of these, self-
regulation, he discounts as insufficient considering the current business and 
security environment in which governments – both traditionally repressive and 
sophisticatedly security-conscious types – seek out vendors to supply them 
with technologies to serve their purposes. Suppliers almost never object on 
principle. Or worse, as Lyon argues, technologies companies are actively 
pursuing governments to pitch their wares. These are what he calls ‘card 
cartels’ (Lyon 2009, chap.3). Equally trivial are attempts to outline an industry 
code of conduct. Another safeguard against malignant uses of biometrics 
could be a compulsory social impact assessment. According to Clarke, this 
would require: 
• full public disclosure of the technologies of interest and their envisaged 
applications; 
• a suitably funded social impact analysis; 
• publication and consultation of results; 
• active public participation during the design phase; and 
• in-built controls. 
 
Clarke seems to envision these impact assessments as pre-emptive 
mechanisms to mitigate the privacy concerns of emerging biometric 
applications, and to do so in the full light of day. However, as he notes, very 
few countries require such social impact assessments. In the United States, 
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the Office of Technology Assessment served this function until 1995, when it 
was disbanded as part of government cutbacks. 
 
A third potential safeguard – existing privacy and data protection law – also 
fails to satisfy Clarke. Such generic laws are “far too naïve and weak to 
represent any kind of curb on the explosion of biometric technologies” (Clarke 
2001). Alternatively, legislators might choose to regulate biometrics 
specifically, based on a number of principles. These are: 
• the storage of encrypted biometric templates, instead of actual 
biometric images (a version of this recommendation was included in an 
influential government-initiated report on identity assurance in the UK 
(Crosby 2008, p.7)); 
• the prohibition of centralized storage of biometric information; 
• privacy-sensitive design standards for biometric devices; 
• the legal prohibition of manufacturing or using non-compliant devices; 
• a practice of continuous compliance auditing; and 
• two-way device authentication (so that information is not transmitted to 
devices without users’ knowledge). 
 
Failing this, Clarke argues for a moratorium on the application of biometrics 
until a comprehensive set of design requirements and privacy protections is in 
place. However, this moratorium has yet to materialize, and, considering the 
current state of biometric technologies across the globe, we would be wise not 
to expect its arrival anytime soon. 
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Alterman (2003) distinguishes between two “ethical” issues related to 
biometric identification, both concerning privacy. He asks: Are biometrics 
immune to the privacy vulnerabilities that plague other forms of identification? 
And are there any privacy concerns that are specific to biometric 
identification? 
 
In reply to the first question, Alterman considers four arguments which are 
often put forth to defend biometrics against accusations of privacy–
infringement.  
1. Technical limitations argument. Large user populations mean that the 
technology will often fail in practice. 
2. Balkanization argument. A lack of standards and poor system 
interoperability mean that data remain localized and restricted. 
3. Co-operation argument. Abuse is difficult because biometric technology 
typically requires the co-operation of users. 
4. Security argument. The algorithms for biometric templates are secure 
because technology vendors have a vested commercial interest in 
protecting their proprietary knowledge. This is basically the “security 
through obscurity” argument, which has repeatedly been criticized (see 
Mercuri & Neumann 2003). 
 
Alterman holds that the technical limitations argument is weak because 
biometric systems are subject to “rapid technological advances” (p.141). We 
cannot rely on biometric systems remaining faulty forever. Likewise, the 
industry is slowly de-balkanizing, especially with organizations like the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) making great efforts to 
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harmonize standards (Hosein 2004) and the US National Institute of Science 
and Technology promoting common file formats to all vendors. 
 
The co-operation argument is more convincing; in their current state 
biometrics still, by and large, require user co-operation to work properly. This 
is changing, however. New innovations like automated facial recognition 
software are gradually entering the market (National Police Improvement 
Agency 2006), and some vendors are promising to deliver systems that 
perform iris recognition “at-a-distance” or “on-the-move” (Sarnoff Corporation 
2010), without user consent or co-operation. Gait recognition, still a zygotic 
technology in terms of its large-scale deployment, would also defeat the co-
operation argument if successfully developed in the future. 
 
Alterman also finds faults with the security argument: that biometric 
technologies are secure because vendors have a proprietary interest in 
protecting their assets. He imagines a variety of nightmare scenarios involving 
the leakage of biometric data: 
• The unauthorized and unethical sale of biometric data by those 
responsible for overseeing the databases; 
• a data breach resulting from a technical error that releases decrypted 
biometric data from a corporate network; 
• a disgruntled member of the IT staff altering data so that colleagues’ or 
customers’ biometrics are rejected by a system; 
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• law enforcement agencies demanding the disclosure of biometric data 
and the associated algorithms from private companies; and 
• computer hackers gaining access to sensitive data and posting them 
online (Alterman 2003, p.142). 
 
Alterman thus concludes that biometrics are, in fact, not immune to the normal 
threats to information privacy that face other personal data. 
 
Having shown that biometrics are probably vulnerable to the same privacy 
concerns as other identity technology, Alterman moves on to biometric-
specific privacy concerns: privacy issues brought about by biometric 
technologies that go above and beyond the complex vulnerabilities of normal 
identification. Viewing the concept of privacy as control over how and when 
information about us is presented to others, Alterman picks up on key three 
dimensions in particular: property, embodiment, and self-representation. He 
claims that as moral agents we have a greater interest in controlling 
representations about our body as opposed to indexical data (such as identity 
numbers, home addresses, etc.), as bodily information has an internal relation 
to the embodied person. 
 
A complicating factor to such an argument, however, is photography. 
Alterman claims that while photography has its own share of important ethical 
issues (pornography and video surveillance among them), biometrics are 
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qualitatively different from photographs because they “are unique to the 
individual and positively identify that individual, within an ever larger 
population as the technology improves” (p.145). He claims that biometrics are 
more irreversible, more reliable, and more efficient than photographs, and so 
they are logically distinguishable and present their own unique set of ethical 
and privacy problems. 
 
The problem with this and similar assessments is that they uncritically accept 
what is a relatively arbitrary distinction between photography and biometrics. 
For example, face biometrics are, in many ways, simply digitized versions of 
facial photographs, subject to certain data standards. Iris biometrics rely on 
photos of the eyes; fingerprints are visual representations of information from 
the fingers. Granted, information technology plays an important role in 
contemporary biometrics implementations, without which large-scale systems 
would be impossible. Perhaps this helps to distinguish between photography 
and biometrics but in some cases a ‘biometric check’ might not require any 
computing technology at all, such as when a border agent compares a 
passport holder’s face with the image printed on the document. For now, 
rather than try to establish decisively the differences between ‘traditional’ 
photography and ‘modern’ biometrics for the sake of grounding an ethical 
critique, it suffices to acknowledge this conceptual tension. It will re-emerge in 
later sections, as actors in this case study strive to makes sense of biometrics. 
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Biometrics and the politics of security 
Since identification technologies are most often used in international and 
domestic security contexts, biometrics feature occasionally in academic 
writing on international relations and political science: Hosein (2004; 2005) 
critically analyzes the international mechanisms through which policy 
decisions regarding biometric travel documents are being made and the 
politics behind the development of the US-VISIT biometric program; Zureik 
and Hindle (2004) address governance mechanisms relating to biometrics; 
Amoore (2006) and Epstein (2007) tell about biometrics and borders; 
Liberatore (2007) details the processes of pluralistic debate and deliberation 
about biometrics in the EU; and Gates (2005; 2006) explores the connection 
between biometrics and security from a cultural studies perspective. Here I 
review one of her recent articles. 
 
Gates (2006) explores the emergence of facial recognition technology (FRT) 
as a hi-tech solution to the difficult security problem of international terrorism 
following the attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11). She asks why biometric 
technologies such as FRT were deemed a solution to these problems. How 
did they arrive on the political agenda? She also explores what had to be 
neglected or glossed over about facial recognition technology for it to be seen 
as an appropriate security solution to the complex and multi-faceted problems 
of combating terrorism (p.418). 
 73
 
Gates identifies and traces three main factors that contributed to the rush to 
adopt FRT immediately after 9/11. First she considers the “securitization of 
identity” (Rose 1999, p.240), which preceded 9/11 by decades, and was 
escalated suddenly in a virtually unprecedented embrace of high-technology 
initiatives, including the implementation of identification technologies such as 
biometrics. Identity was seen as a problem in need of a technological solution. 
Technology companies were more than willing to sell their wares as a key 
component of the new standard of security being implemented, and the press 
gave considerable coverage to the topic of biometrics and to those groups 
pitching solutions. Gates argues that rather than just being offered as a 
solution to identifying terrorists, these technologies soon served to define the 
concept of ‘homeland security’, with “political and governmental problems of 
security provision [being] defined in technical terms, tightly articulated to 
specific technical solutions” (Gates 2006, p.423). 
 
Second, as biometrics vendors promised that FRT could identify suspect 
individuals at a distance and in real-time, government homeland security 
objectives soon began stressing that the prevention of future attacks relied on 
the ability to identify terrorists at a distance and in real-time.  That is, the 
solution began to define the threat. Some vendors and politicians even went 
so far as to argue that automated facial biometrics could have prevented the 
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9/11 attacks (Gates 2006, p.424). However, such proclamations ignored the 
very experimental nature of the technologies in question, and also eschewed 
“a realistic accounting of tensions and contradictions that such a technology 
would have to embody in order to work effectively in practice” (Gates 2006, 
p.426). What is worrying for Gates is that these technologies can also be seen 
as the latest manifestation of ongoing attempts to tame the fundamentally 
unstable social construct of individual identity and stabilize it as a simple 
constant. 
 
Finally, she picks up on the rhetoric surrounding ‘the faces of terror’. Political 
rhetoric often describes terrorism as an asymmetric, unidentifiable threat. Yet, 
following the attacks of 9/11, the media abounded with mug shots of the 
accused. These and other images of suspected and accused Islamic terrorists 
led to the impression that terrorism is a visible quality. Abu Hamza al-Masri, 
the former imam of the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, was one such 
symbol of supposedly visible evil. His portrait – glass eye, hook hand and all – 
was almost invariably appended to news items reporting on the vitriolic 
sermons that ultimately landed him in jail. These images were seen to 
embody the previously amorphous and unidentifiable terrorist threat by giving 
it a more or less fixed image, fetishizing it as something that could be 
pinpointed and prevented with the right technology: in this case, facial 
recognition systems. Gates’ contribution is to document how policy problems 
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and their supposed technological solutions are not sequentially ordered, but 
are rather subject to a chicken and egg dilemma of the most intransigent kind.  
 
Biometrics as digital surveillance 
Lyon provides us with important academic work on biometrics and their 
potential surveillance capacities. He sees the use of biometric technologies, 
particularly in identity documents and as part of larger identity systems, as a 
means of “social sorting”. With biometric ID cards on the mind, Lyon argues 
that 
[n]ew ID cards are part of a large-scale trend towards ‘social sorting’—
classifying and profiling groups of people in order to provide different 
services, conditions or treatment. Specifically, new ID cards are intended 
to include those designated as ‘eligible members’ of nation-states and to 
exclude undesirable others. (Lyon 2004a, p.2) 
 
In this sense, biometrics are a tool for executing an intentional process of 
categorization and discrimination. Lyon understands the increased uptake of 
biometrics as part of the erection of internal boundaries, or as he puts it, 
“ubiquitous borders” (Lyon 2004b), in which there is a perceived need to 
identify potentially threatening individuals and treat them differently. 
 
Elsewhere, Lyon (2001) undertakes a social-historical account of biometrics 
as a means of bodily surveillance. While acknowledging that bodily 
surveillance is nothing new, he points out the subtle increase in the 
technological sophistication of modern biometric systems and the growing 
number of applications of biometric technology: from identifying potentially 
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criminal individuals to categorizing and sorting general populations of citizens 
and consumers. Lyon contends that these technologies turn the body into a 
“password”, and make it both a site of surveillance and a source of 
surveillance data. 
 
Arguably, the use of digital technologies like biometric identity systems 
represents a striking change in surveillance techniques. Analogue methods 
and technologies, such as the first generation of closed-circuit television 
(CCTV) cameras, are being replaced and upgraded with digital systems 
whereby information can be stored affordably and indefinitely and recalled and 
reprocessed based on a limitless number of discriminatory criteria. 
Elaborating this point, Graham and Wood (2003) critically explore the 
implications of digital technologies on the so-called “new surveillance” (Marx 
1998; 2004). The digitization of surveillance is considered a significant 
development for two reasons. First, it facilitates the watching, prioritization, 
and categorization of people and things over great geographical spaces and 
without significant time delay (Graham & Wood 2003, p.228). This collapsing 
of space-time distanciation involves interconnecting and integrating databases 
so that various data can be stored and compared. Second, digitization 
facilitates the automation of sorting, identifying, prioritizing, and tracking 
subject populations, in terms of their bodies, behaviors, and characteristics. 
As a result, the role of the human operator in the surveillance mission shifts 
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from direct watching and decision-making based on local cues, to the design, 
programming, management, and maintenance of pseudo-autonomous 
technological systems (Graham & Wood 2003, p.228). They argue that when 
the move to automation involves the incorporation of algorithmic software, 
further ethical questions arise in relation to the removal of human discretion 
from surveillance. 
 
Graham and Wood review the use of algorithmic facial recognition software in 
video surveillance cameras. In spite of the historically poor performance of 
such systems in preventing and solving crimes, the authors observe that 
official justifications for the continued investment in and use of these systems 
now, more than ever, resort to arguments about how they can deter crime. 
And while Graham and Wood view these performance issues as important 
topics of debate, for them there is an even greater need for informed debate 
about the ways in which facial recognition systems and other biometric 
systems reinforce the categorization of certain socio-spatial risks such as high 
crime neighborhoods, known criminals, or ‘dangerous’ groups (p.237). They 
call for further research on the ways social and political assumptions become 
embedded into the algorithmic software that facilitates post-human 
surveillance. 
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Introna and Wood (2004) respond to this call in their investigation of the 
politics of algorithmic surveillance. Inspired by the work of Winner (1980), 
Latour (1991), and Introna and Nissenbaum (2000), they assert “that the silent 
nature of information technology makes it difficult for society to scrutinize it” 
(2004, p.184). Analyzing the ‘biases’ in the software algorithms of facial 
recognition systems, they show how certain ‘political’ values can be 
embedded into the biometric artifact itself, including, for example, a propensity 
to over-identify men compared to women, older people compared to younger 
people, and Asian and black people compared to white people (c.f. Givens et 
al. 2003). These biases resemble the aforementioned ‘anomalies’ in the 
recent NIST report on facial recognition, which was reviewed in the section on 
the technical research on biometrics. 
 
Interpreting these anomalies, Introna and Wood argue that biometric artifacts 
cannot be understood in isolation, but rather as objects embedded within 
larger socio-technical networks in which their micro-politics may be multiplied 
and seized upon in a multitude of implementations and practices. 
 
Last, drawing on feminist and post-structuralist theories in the social sciences, 
Ball (2005) develops a politics of resistance to biometric surveillance in the 
workplace. She wants to challenge the fixities assumed and engendered by 
bodily surveillance (2005, p.104). She argues that, by neglecting the body’s 
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continuous reconstitution and inherent instability, proponents of biometric 
surveillance cannot justifiably defend digital surveillance as a source of 
authenticity and truth. 
 
Ball offers strategies of resistance to what she clearly sees as a problematic 
practice, including “disrupting flows of information from the body to the 
information system, disrupting the time it takes to encode the body, coding the 
body in an alternative way, and moving the interface/boundary between the 
body and surveillance system” (2005, p.104). In practice, this might mean 
intentionally altering one’s typing pattern to confuse keyboard recognition 
biometrics or devising ways of resisting drug tests given at the workplace. In 
closing, Ball concedes that bodily surveillance at the workplace or elsewhere 
need not always be viewed negatively. Rather it is when it goes unquestioned 
and unchallenged locally that such techniques of resistance become 
necessary (2005, p.105). 
 
Biometrics and social inclusion and exclusion 
As with other questions related to the supposed values of biometrics, whether 
biometrics are inclusionary or exclusionary is ambiguous. Recall that 
researchers within the computer science tradition see biometrics as a means 
of reducing exclusion, particularly through multi-modal biometrics, with the 
hope that if enough different biometrics are enrolled in an identity system, 
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everyone will be able to participate in it and redundancy will keep the system 
going if one biometric process malfunctions. Lyon, on the other hand, sees 
biometrics as a form of social sorting which is inherently exclusionary.  
 
From Lyon’s description of how biometrics affect social systems emerges 
obvious questions of ethics: is this exclusion morally justifiable? Wickins 
(2007) argues that it is unequivocally unethical, though he admits that with the 
increasingly widespread use of biometric technology, social exclusion is 
inevitable. Wickins understands social exclusion as “any unfair restriction or 
removal of access to the range of social goods and activities that other 
members of that society do, or could, take for granted” (2007, p.52). These 
goods and activities include healthcare and social security, among others. 
Among those most likely to be disadvantaged by the use of biometrics are 
people with physical or learning disabilities, people with mental illnesses, the 
elderly, people of certain races, people of certain religious groups and the 
homeless (2007, pp.50-51). He dismisses arguments in favor of biometric 
identity cards based on the idea that they promote the public interest, noting 
that “almost anything can be justified by saying that the rights of the many 
outweigh the rights of a few” (2007, p.52). 
 
The problem, however, is that his ethical critique (and others like it) is 
technologically deterministic (“biometrics is a field whose time has come” 
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(Wickins 2007, p.46)) and ignores many important subtleties of biometrics. 
Wilkins speaks of biometrics as though they were a single thing, when in fact 
they are a series of different technologies and techniques that pose different 
scientific and ethical quandaries. This case study will expose many of these 
uncertainties and explore their policy and ethical implications.  
2.4 Biometrics in the information systems literature 
Somewhat predictably, the information systems literature on biometrics is 
dominated by research on user acceptance and surveys of public perceptions 
of biometrics. As previously noted in the review of the technical literature, the 
acceptance of biometric systems by targeted user groups is considered by 
many authors to be an important requirement for “successful” systems. It is 
believed that without user acceptance, perfectly functioning systems are 
doomed to fail. As technology acceptance is one of the more well-established 
streams of research within information systems, many projects have sought to 
identify these enablers and barriers to user acceptance. I will review these 
acceptance studies shortly, but first I summarize the modicum of exceptions to 
this research trend. 
 
Of the few studies within the field that do not focus on end-user acceptance, 
work by Scott et al. (2005) that explores the applicability and potential future 
use of biometrics for e-government services is particularly relevant to the 
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current case study. They examine the attitudes of management personnel 
within the Irish Department of Communications, Marine, and Natural 
Resources, who are responsible for making policy decisions about biometrics. 
In particular, Scott et al. are interested in managerial attitudes towards the 
feasibility of using biometrics to deliver e-government services. They find that 
officials consider the accuracy, strength, effectiveness, and usability of 
biometrics, as well as privacy, trust, and international developments, as 
important factors influencing their possible deployment (2005, p.280). Scott et 
al. call for further research on citizen acceptability and citizen trust in 
biometrics, noting that such studies would significantly enhance current public 
debates (2005, p.283). 
 
Another notable information systems study comes from Davis and Hufnagel 
(2007), who take a different tack. Their research is on the ways in which the 
automation of expert fingerprint analysis within forensics labs changes the 
nature of work and related organizational dynamics. They explore how new, 
complex systems with sophisticated search and match algorithms (what they 
describe as the “ghost in the machine”) affect analysts’ perceptions of their 
work, the distribution of tasks and roles within labs, and organizational values 
and norms. 
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Finally, while both Clarke (1994a) and Otjacques et al. (2007) discuss 
biometrics in their studies of human identification in information systems and 
EU public organizations’ management and sharing of identity data, 
respectively, neither study focuses on biometrics in a substantial way. 
 
Acceptance and perceptions of biometrics 
Returning to the literature on user acceptance and perceptions, different types 
of study focus on what has been termed the “people” side of biometrics (e.g., 
Chau et al. 2004, p.1). The technology acceptance model (TAM) (Davis 1989) 
and its revisions (TAM2) (Venkatesh & Davis 2000) influences much of this 
literature. A lot of it lacks a theoretical grounding. Virtually all of it is survey-
based and hypothetical in nature. Respondents are typically asked to opine 
about biometrics without context or substantial engagement with the 
technologies in question. 
 
Deane et al. (1995) appear to have conducted the first study of user 
acceptability of biometrics, based on a questionnaire completed by workers 
from the banking sector and university administration. In this initial study, 
biometric systems were perceived as less acceptable than traditional 
password-based security systems. Behavioral biometrics were considered 
less acceptable than physiological ones. 
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Since then there have been a series of these types of study, mostly involving 
surveys of university students, staff, or faculty. Table 2.7 summarizes these 
articles in terms of their theoretical focus (or lack thereof) and methodological 
approach. 
 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Title of article Theory Method 
Deane et al. 
(1995) 
Perceived acceptability of biometric 
security systems 
None Survey with 76 
respondents 
Furnell et al. 
(2000) 
Authentication and supervision: A 
survey of user attitudes 
None Survey with 175 
respondents 
Clarke et al. 
(2002) 
Acceptance of subscriber 
authentication methods for mobile 
telephony devices 
None Survey of 161 
mobile 
subscribers 
Ho et al. (2003) Biometric authentication adoption 
issues 
Technology 
acceptance 
model 
None 
Chau et al. 
(2004) 
Biometrics acceptance – perceptions 
of use of biometrics 
Technology 
acceptance 
model 
None 
Moody (2004) Public perceptions of biometric 
devices – the effect of misinformation 
on acceptance and use 
None Survey with a 
sample of 300 
Weerakkody 
(2006a) 
A comparative analysis of opinions of 
American, Australians, and 
Malaysians on the use of biometric 
devices in workplaces for security 
and monitoring of worker productivity 
“Critical 
theory” 
Survey with 
convenience 
sample of 230 
Australians, 408 
Malaysians, and 
300 Americans 
Weerakkody 
(2006b) 
A comparison of Australian and 
Malaysian views on the use of 
biometric devices in everyday 
situations 
“Critical 
perspective” 
Survey with the 
same sample of 
230 Australians 
and 408 
Malaysians 
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Author(s) 
(Year) 
Title of article Theory Method 
Ng-Kruelle et 
al. (2006) 
Biometrics and e-Identity (e-
Passport) in the European 
Union: End-user perspectives on the 
adoption of a controversial 
innovation 
Organizational 
theory 
(Hofstede)  
Survey of 269 
MBA students 
from the UK, 
Germany, 
Spain, Greece, 
and Denmark 
James et al. 
(2006) 
Determining the intention to use 
biometric devices: an application and 
extension of the technology 
acceptance model 
Technology 
acceptance 
model 
Survey of 
university faculty, 
staff, and 
students 
Perakslis and 
Wolk (2006) 
Social acceptance of RFID as a 
biometric security method 
None Survey of 141 
university 
students 
Heckle et al. 
(2007) 
Perception and acceptance of 
fingerprint biometric technology 
None Experiment 
involving 24 
participants 
Jones et al. 
(2007) 
Towards understanding user 
perceptions of authentication 
technologies 
Technology 
acceptance 
model 
Survey of 115 
university 
students 
Furnell and 
Evangelatos 
(2007) 
Public awareness and perceptions of 
biometrics 
None Survey with 209 
respondents 
Table 2.7: Summary of IS literature on user acceptance and perceptions of biometrics 
 
An example of one of the TAM-inspired studies of biometrics is by Ho et al. 
(2003), who develop a biometrics acceptance model in which the traditional 
TAM concepts of ‘perceived usefulness’ and ‘perceived ease of use’ are 
modified to better fit what they deem to be the particularities of biometric 
systems. Based on a reading of the literature, they identify a number of 
theoretical factors that could potentially contribute to perceptions of 
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accept and use biometrics (Ponemon Institute 2006), others note ongoing 
reluctance and potential resistance (Moody 2004). Some try to confront the 
unclear and contradictory nature of public opinion regarding these issues 
(Moody 2004; Heckle et al. 2007), noting that understanding context and how 
exactly biometrics will be used by organizations is important. However, the 
instrumental view of public acceptance, perceptions, and understanding 
adopted in these studies, which tend to treat context as an abstract variable 
rather than an inextricable part of the technologies and the attendant 
processes and practices, leaves one wanting. These typically one-off studies 
seek to understand views about biometrics at a certain point in time, without 
considering how such views emerge from, and are influenced by, recent 
events, political dynamics, and other contextual factors. Some of these 
studies also acknowledge that many people are simply unaware of the term 
and concept of biometrics, but they do not explore philosophically what this 
lack of awareness means in terms of public acceptance. 
 
Whereas most IS studies of biometrics have failed to engaged with the 
richness of the contexts into which biometrics are being deployed, this study 
will directly and deeply engage the context-based public discourses that led 
up to and accompanied proposals for a national biometric identity program in 
the UK. 
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2.5 A research opportunity 
The review of literature on biometrics has highlighted a number of strengths in 
the academic research, including a considerable appreciation of their potential 
benefits and risks. It is believed that, if designed, implemented, and managed 
properly, biometrics can be used to alleviate many challenging problems 
related to citizen and consumer identity. The threat of identity theft, for 
example, is one such problem area. It is commonly argued that identity-
related fraud could be reduced with the appropriate use of biometrics. But of 
course, this is not guaranteed. Others claim that using more data such as 
biometrics is not the answer and that we are too quick to embrace 
technological solutions when confronted with complex social challenges. 
 
In reviewing the literature on biometrics, I exposed shortcomings that this 
project seeks to address. For example, the vast majority of the technical 
research on biometrics is largely experimental in its design and testing, and 
leaves much to be desired in terms of understanding how biometric systems 
emerge within real-world contexts, the motivations behind their use, how they 
‘come to life’ discursively (or socio-materially (Orlikowski & Scott 2008; 
Orlikowski 2010)), and how they take on particular social meanings (whilst 
resisting others). 
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This is more than a problem of accurately simulating real-world environments 
in trials of biometric systems (which is, no doubt, a daunting task). Rather, the 
experimental nature of these studies precludes the emergence of the full 
range of meanings and discourses that technologies such as biometrics afford 
when launched in different contexts. These are organizational or societal 
contexts where diverse values, politics, and expectations about the future 
affect decisions about what technologies to pursue, for what purposes, and 
involving whom, to name just a few of the many important issues.  
 
A shortcoming of the sociological and ethics literature on biometrics is that, in 
critiquing the technology which is often in a prospective or unsettled form, it 
treats it as a reified, accomplished thing whose outcomes are well-defined and 
predictable. Indeed, it is often based on, as Alterman admits in his ethical 
critique, “the ideal assumption that biometric systems can uniquely identify an 
individual within an arbitrarily large population” (2003, p.144), without 
questioning these enormous assumptions. 
 
This literature rarely sees the technology itself as deserving much attention. It 
largely overlooks the important differences between different types of 
biometric system (fingerprint versus iris versus facial recognition versus DNA, 
etc.) as well as within the same types of system (e.g., still-face recognition 
systems as opposed to recognition-from-video systems; or single fingerprint 
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biometric systems that store only templates verses ten-fingerprint systems 
that record original images). Authors writing in this tradition tend to lump these 
different technologies together under the umbrella of ‘biometrics’ before 
launching into their critique.  
 
Indeed, this tendency to take for granted the information technologies that are 
central to so many modern policy initiatives is not unique to the case of 
biometrics. It is emblematic of many sociological and criminological critiques, 
particularly within the emerging field of surveillance studies. Studies of 
surveillance largely neglect or fail to take account of the important role that 
technological artifacts play in both the experience of surveillance and the 
organizational dynamics of surveillance work. However, this tendency extends 
far beyond surveillance policies and certainly applies to most IT-leveraged 
policy (Whitley & Hosein 2010). 
 
Finally, this sociological literature also tends to neglect the important details of 
the assorted contexts into which biometric technologies can be implemented 
and used. For example, many sociological and ethical critiques do not 
distinguish between the issues that arise around biometric systems mandated 
for use at the workplace and those that accompany biometric schemes that 
form part of standardization initiatives for international travel documents. 
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Schools and nurseries are yet further contexts where these issues and 
debates take on a different character. 
 
We also found that previous research on biometrics originating in the field of 
IS was not without shortcomings either. The field’s historical preoccupation 
with technology acceptance models (TAM) means that, to date, the research 
questions posed by IS researchers interested in studying biometrics have 
been limited in scope, mainly focusing on end-user acceptance. This literature 
aims at better understanding what impedes users from accepting biometrics 
so that these impediments may be overcome and biometric technology more 
widely adopted. 
 
As discussed, there is a potent normativity to these studies, in which adoption 
is viewed as a good thing and resistance something that can be designed out 
or regulated. While certain exceptions to this trend in the literature do exist 
(e.g., Scott et al. 2005; Zviran & Erlich 2006; Davis & Hufnagel 2007), the 
information systems field has largely been fixated on acceptance concepts 
and has underestimated and understudied other social dynamics. 
 
Such restrictions to the research questions posed by information systems 
researchers naturally influence their selection of methodology. To take a 
particularly egregious example, a study of perceptions and user acceptance of 
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fingerprint technology describes its research design and methodology and as 
follows: 
A laptop PC was equipped with a Microsoft Fingerprint Reader (Model 
DG2-00002). The participants were informed that their fingerprint data 
was not being captured, but that they should role-play as if it was. The 
fingerprint reader lit up when it was used. The participants were told that 
this simulated data capture, and they could then press the ‘submit’ button 
on their screen to complete their transaction. (Heckle et al. 2007, p.1, 
emphasis added) 
 
It is the artificial makeup of such studies, where role-play and simulation are 
used as substitutes for a realistic engagement with the technologies, which 
detracts from their academic value. These types of study share some of the 
limitations of the experimental research projects discussed above in that, by 
design, they are removed from real-world contexts of use – and, as I will 
discuss later, it is these contexts that make the difference. 
 
Likewise, most studies of user perceptions of biometrics seek to understand 
attitudes toward the technology without taking into account how such views 
are formed in situ and are influenced by changing applications and shifting 
contexts (cf. Sasse 2007). It is one thing to have a general opinion about 
fingerprinting, considering that most people view it as something that only 
criminals undergo. However, such opinions are likely to change when 
everyone is obliged to forfeit their fingerprints to some authority, perhaps with 
minimal personal benefit in return. 
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These IS studies regularly black-box biometrics, viewing them as a settled 
issue, whose stability and meaning is unproblematic. However, many 
biometric technologies are still in their infancy, especially in terms of large-
scale roll-outs for everyday use, and thus measurements of perceptions or 
attitudes toward biometrics, when devoid of context and an appreciation of the 
ongoing uncertainties around the technologies, suffer real limitations. 
 
Therefore, from an IS perspective we must ask whether the concept of 
‘acceptance’ is sufficiently meaningful or even helpful in the current research 
context. This requires that we first ask who would have been accepting the 
biometrics in this case. This is not so straightforward. Was it the policy-makers 
and politicians responsible for establishing the NIS? The civil servants 
responsible for making it a reality? The government departments and other 
organizations (e.g., banks or employers) that were expected to incorporate the 
identity system into their customer or employee identification and 
authentication processes? The citizens and foreign nationals who were 
expected to enroll in the system and use it? Or some other set of actors? This 
initial consideration of actors suddenly complicates the question of 
acceptance, showing that in practice it is many different actors who could 
potentially accept the technology, in very different ways, and based on varying 
motivations. 
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Additionally, in a context where the collection and use of biometrics was 
legislated as part of a larger national identity system that, at some point, could 
have become mandatory, we must ask whether ‘acceptance’ is an appropriate 
analytical term. The focus on biometric acceptance is somewhat misleading 
and unhelpful in the current case for it is not clear that acceptance was a real 
option for certain actors (such as those non-EEA foreign nationals whose data 
was collected or the airport workers who were ‘encouraged’ by management 
to apply for identity cards). Can we speak frankly of biometric acceptance, 
which assumes a measure of choice both in the enrollment stage and in the 
subsequent use of biometrics, when the uptake by these users was more akin 
to compulsion than adoption? 
 
The cases of US-VISIT and the United Arab Emirates’ iris recognition border-
crossing system (both of which are compulsory for certain nationalities and 
must be used if one wants to enter the United States or the UAE, respectively) 
involve similar issues. Related proposals for national identity systems in 
countries such as India and Mexico, where the respective governments are 
currently pursuing policies for the mandatory collection and use of multiple 
biometrics including iris recognition technology, add to the increasingly 
international character of these debates in which it is common to hear that, by 
and large, the public “accepts” these technologies – whatever that means. 
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There is also the ongoing situation in which the ‘acceptance’ of biometrics is 
facilitated through their inclusion in new electronic passports, resulting from 
policy decisions that are made at a transnational level by policy actors who 
circumvent traditional deliberative channels (Hosein 2004). As before, the 
concept of acceptance does not fit well here. It suffices to say that it is a 
problematic term. 
 
Yet the issue of acceptance is not totally absent. The concept might have 
some meaning and utility in this case insofar as it motivated people’s choices 
about whether to enroll in the Scheme when it was first launched in targeted 
geographical areas, or to the extent to which it helps to explain the ongoing 
resistance to the former proposals. Or, by exploring certain discourses on 
acceptance, among others, we might be able to understand the role that talk 
about the public played in the failed roll-out of the Scheme. 
 
What I am suggesting is that in contexts such as these it may be more 
interesting and more fruitful to study how public discourses on the proposed 
biometric technologies developed over time within a particular socio-political 
reality. In other words, if we shift the analytical focus from the instrumental 
studies of user acceptance to which mainstream IS research has grown 
accustomed, to the discursive unfolding of biometrics in early 21st century 
Britain, then we may better understand how such technological innovations 
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enter the public consciousness and come to life (or fade) before questions 
surrounding acceptance begin to make sense. 
 
This raises a more fundamental question, motivated by the qualitative 
information systems research tradition (cf. Myers 1997) and inspired by 
developments within science and technology studies (e.g., Sismondo 2009), 
of what is being accepted by these actors? In other words, if we place the 
technological artifact front and center and explore what goes into giving it 
meaning and shaping our understandings of it, then we can study the 
technology’s trajectory through the various discourses that shape it and within 
the policy debates that provide its impetus at a particular point in recent 
political history. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical framework 
3.1 Introduction 
Recall that a recurring theme from the literature review was the lack of 
empirical research undertaken in the socio-political contexts in which 
biometrics are being deployed, especially when they are proposed for use on 
a national scale and on a potentially mandatory basis, as was the case in the 
UK. The National Identity Scheme (NIS) thus provided an occasion to study 
biometrics ‘in the wild’. Considering the timing of the study and the ultimate 
demise of the Scheme, this research focuses not on the technologies in use, 
but rather on the discourses that accompanied their planned widespread 
diffusion, before it was terminated following the change of government 
resulting from the UK general election of 2010. This requires theory that helps 
us to understand the role of discourse, and in particular future-oriented 
discourse, about new technology and its relationship with organizations that 
were expected to build and operate the systems, as well as the citizens who 
were expected to use them. The theory adopted must also appreciate the 
significance of changes in these discourses. 
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The goal of this chapter8 is to develop the theoretical framework required for 
such a study, which draws on ideas from the social science literature on 
framing, the qualitative study of information systems (IS) (namely organizing 
visions theory), and science and technology studies (STS) (including the 
sociology of expectations and research on the public understanding of 
science). In the next chapter I spell out the research methods needed for 
collecting and analyzing data in accordance with this framework. 
 
As an entry point into this theoretical discussion, I begin by introducing 
Gregor’s (2006) ideas on the nature of theory in IS research. This theoretical 
reflection lays the groundwork for the choice of concepts that will comprise my 
theoretical framework. 
 
Gregor starts by noting that there are important domain questions regarding 
what phenomena, problems, and topics are considered worthy of study by IS 
researchers (p.611). These debates over the domain’s identity have been 
around for decades. Orlikowski and Iacono (2001) confront these debates by 
calling for increased analytical attention to what they term the ‘IT artifact’ in IS 
research. 
 
                                            
8 Portions of this chapter were previously presented as a conference paper entitled “Adapting 
theory for researching future expectations in information systems innovations: the case of the 
United Kingdom’s national biometric identity scheme” (Martin 2008), at the Society for Social 
Studies of Science (4S) meeting in Rotterdam. 
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What is an IT artifact? There are varying definitions. For Monteiro and 
Hanseth (1996), it is the outcome of discourses that negotiate the 
development, adoption, and use of a new technology.  Lee (2001) sees 
artifacts as emerging when technological systems and social systems interact 
(p.iii). For Orlikowski and Iacono (2001), IT artifacts are “those bundles of 
material and cultural properties packaged in some socially recognizable form 
such as hardware and/or software” (p.121). Benbasat and Zmud (2003) argue 
that it is “the application of IT to enable or support some tasks embedded 
within a structures that itself is embedded within a context” (p.186). Agarwal 
and Lucas (2005) want to expand Benbasat and Zmud’s definition by 
“specify[ing] IT as the integration of the processing logic found in computers 
with the massive stores of databases and the connectivity of communications 
networks. The IT artifact includes IT infrastructure, innovations with 
technology, and especially the Internet” (p.394). 
 
Orlikowski and Iacono admit that such theorizing about IT artifacts might take 
many different forms (2001, p.131). Nonetheless, they offer five premises from 
which they believe theorizing should happen. 
 
• IT artifacts are never natural, neutral, universal, or given; they are 
necessarily contingent. “Because they are designed, constructed, and 
used by people, they are shaped by the interests, values, and 
assumptions of a wide variety of communities” (p.131) 
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• IT artifacts are always embedded in a context (understood as time, 
place, discourse, and community) 
• The artifacts themselves are actually an array of different, 
interconnected components. We often talk about technology as a 
unified and stable thing, such as “the Internet” or in this case study 
“biometrics”, but in reality technologies are never as integrated as our 
language might lead us to believe 
• Rather than being fixed and independent, IT artifacts emerge as a 
result of varying social practices 
• IT artifacts are dynamic; any stability they might display is conditional 
 
These points on theorizing the IT artifact condition my selection of theoretical 
concepts and, following from that, my research approach. 
 
Besides the diverging views on domain identity, Gregor notes three other 
classes of theoretical concerns facing the IS discipline: ontological questions; 
epistemological questions; and socio-political questions. Ontological questions 
interrogate the nature and composition of IS theory and the types of claims 
that can be made by IS scholars. Epistemological questions inquire about 
theory construction and testing, how knowledge is considered scientific, and 
research methodologies. Socio-political questions consider the relationship 
between the knowledge generated by IS research and those who produce and 
use it. 
 
Having acknowledged these general debates, Gregor explains that within the 
field there are multiple perspectives on the role of theory in IS research. Each 
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perspective comes with its own set of assumptions regarding the different 
goals of the research enterprise, including: analysis, explanation, prediction, 
and prescription. She proposes a taxonomy to help to classify different IS 
theories based on how they address these goals (see Table 3.1). 
 
Theory type Distinguishing attributes 
I. Analysis Says what is. The theory does not extend beyond analysis and 
description. No causal relationships among phenomena are specified 
and no predictions are made. 
II. Explanation Says what is, how, why, when, and where. The theory provides 
explanations but does not aim to predict with any precision. There are 
no testable propositions. 
III. Prediction Says what is and what will be. The theory provides predictions and 
has testable propositions but does not have well-developed 
justificatory casual explanations. 
IV. Explanation and 
prediction 
Says what is, how, why, when, where, and what will be. Provides 
predictions and has both testable propositions and causal 
explanations. 
V. Design and action Says how to do something. The theory gives explicit prescriptions 
(e.g., methods, techniques, principles of form and function) for 
constructing an artifact. 
Table 3.1: Gregor’s taxonomy of theory types in IS research 
 
Gregor argues that theory can do different things. There are theories for 
analyzing, describing, understanding, explaining, predicting, and explaining 
and predicting; and for design sciences such as architecture or IS, theories for 
designing and acting. While each theory type has its own distinguishing 
attributes, the different types are interrelated, with some well-established 
bodies of theory including parts from the different types.  
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To suit my purposes, in this chapter I want to focus mainly on theories that fall 
under type I and partly under theory type II. The research project seeks to 
identify, integrate, and strengthen theory to analyze and describe the 
discursive development of biometrics in the current case, with the hope that 
this theory can be applied to similar technologies and research contexts. 
Where explanation does occur, it is not an attempt at causal explanation, but 
rather about constructing “classificatory, compositional, or associative” 
relationships (Gregor 2006, p.623). Furthermore, as this is qualitative 
research, I am not especially interested in devising testable propositions for 
predicting the future outcomes of technology use (type IV); nor is this project 
about prescribing design methods (type V). 
 
Theories for analysis focus on describing and making sense of “what is” rather 
than trying to explain causality or test propositions. Fawcett and Downs call 
these theories “the most basic type of theory” (1986, p.4), which can be used 
to describe or categorize the characteristics of the object of study, including 
phenomena such as new technology. “Descriptive theories are needed when 
nothing or very little is known about the phenomenon in question” (Fawcett & 
Downs 1986, p.4). Such is the state of affairs in this study, with the knowledge 
void that exists around real-world deployments of biometrics.  A contribution to 
theory within this type would attempt to provide a credible description of “what 
is”, perhaps structured analytically by a classificatory schema. 
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While descriptive analysis is a very important component of qualitative IS 
research, there is also a role for theory that explains how and why 
phenomena occur (Gregor 2006, p.624). Gregor notes that this class of theory 
could perhaps more accurately be labeled “theory for understanding”, which 
highlights how these theories can open up new ways of viewing phenomena, 
and de-emphasizes concerns about causal explanation and the formulation of 
testable propositions. In this sense, explanatory theory can be understood as 
a “sensitizing device” (Klein & Myers 1999, p.75).  
 
Theories for analysis or explanation also lend themselves to case study 
research, whereby in-depth explanations can be given about the process by 
which some real-world event happened, as well as the factors that brought 
about such an outcome. Thus, a contribution to knowledge within this type of 
theory should resemble concepts that help to explain how and why something 
happened the way it did in this case, which was previously poorly understood. 
Gregor argues that contributions from case study research must be more than 
simply a story about what happened; for contributions to be considered 
“theoretical” they must offer “conclusions with some generality” (2006, p.625). 
As with contributions to theory type I (analysis and description), contributions 
must be plausible, credible, and consistent. 
 
 104
What academic fields and disciplines can be drawn upon in erecting a 
theoretical framework which allows us to understand more clearly the 
dynamics around discourses on biometrics in the context first identified in the 
introduction and then elaborated in chapter 2? Are there concepts that 
researchers can use to study similar information technology (IT) innovations 
as they emerge in a given socio-political context? If so, what are their 
strengths and weaknesses, and further, what might I be able to contribute 
back in terms of theory? 
 
My objective in the following sections, therefore, is to marry sets of concepts 
from different fields to better understand the discursive development of IT 
innovation. This conceptual marriage lays the groundwork for the in-depth, 
qualitative study of biometrics that follows. Throughout, I place emphasis on 
theory that helps to describe and explain the dynamics of public discourses 
about new technology and the public. 
3.2 Frames and framing processes 
The idea of ‘frames’ has been used extensively in social science research on 
social movements and collective action (Goffman 1974; Benford & Snow 
2000). Members of social groups, including actors such as the politicians and 
civil servants that sponsor and execute new policy initiatives, are viewed as 
signifying agents that actively engage in meaning production and meaning 
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maintenance around social issues (Snow & Benford 1988). They do so partly 
through discursive work. Framing is understood as an active and goal-
oriented process. It is a contentious activity in the sense that it involves 
generating interpretive frames that both differ from existing ones and also 
challenge them. Framing is also a dynamic process that is both enabled and 
constrained by political, cultural, and audience-related factors. These frames 
may become more or less resonant due to political currents, and are 
supported by the “extant stock of meanings, beliefs, ideologies, practices, 
values, myths, narratives, and the like” (Benford & Snow 2000, p.629).   
 
The resulting products of this process are referred to as ‘collective action 
frames’. For Goffman, frames represent “schemata of interpretation” that allow 
us “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” events and organize our 
experiences (1974, p.21). Likewise, collective action frames help us to 
interpret and organize the world out there, but with the objective of mobilizing 
for action. These action frames are more than just cognitive constructs. They 
are also the outcome of meaning negotiations (Gamson 1992, p.111). The 
concept of frames can thus be seen as core to understanding the processes 
of collective social action and organizing IT innovation. 
 
The social science research on the different processes of framing activities is 
particularly relevant to the present study. Understanding the discourses that 
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comprise the case from a process prospective will help us achieve a richer 
longitudinal analysis by highlighting how frames developed over time and 
explaining the significance of the changes they underwent. Research on the 
processes of framing is therefore especially helpful, although as Davidson 
(2006) notes, there is a dearth of IS research on the framing processes 
around new technology. 
 
Snow and Benford review the social science literature to identify several 
processes that constitute the development, generation, and elaboration of 
collective frames: 
 
• Frame articulation – the discursive linking and alignment of otherwise 
separate events in a unified and convincing manner 
• Frame punctuation – highlighting some issues as being more salient or 
relevant than others 
• Frame alignment, which is inclusive of: 
o Frame bridging – linking two or more “ideologically congruent but 
structurally unconnected” frames around an issue or problem 
area (p.624). Bridging can occur both within and across groups 
o Frame amplification – embellishing or clarifying a frame so that it 
resonates with existing cultural values 
o Frame extension – drawing out a frame beyond its primary focus 
to include other issues; however, doing so may destabilize the 
frame 
o Frame transformation (or frame switching) – changing frames or 
generating new ones in light of new evidence 
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• Counter-framing – when another group challenges, undermines or 
neutralizes another group’s interpretive framework, which may 
subsequently lead to re-framing (Benford 1987, p.75). These processes 
are referred to as ‘framing contests’ (Ryan 1991). The media, in 
particular, play an important role in these contests 
 
Beyond frame generation and development, another set of processes 
surrounds the diffusion of frames. How do frames move from one movement 
or context to another? Frames are said to diffuse either through strategic 
frame selection and strategic frame fitting (Benford & Snow 2000, p.628). 
When frames are strategically selected, they are actively borrowed or 
imported from another cultural domain. Strategic fitting involves strategically 
promoting and tailoring a frame from another context. 
 
These different framing activities provide a dynamic and process-oriented 
perspective to apply to the core theoretical concepts in this thesis. It will be 
important to focus on how the frames that underlie discourses at work in the 
government’s vision for biometrics developed and, more importantly, how and 
why they changed during the course of the proposals. 
3.3 Organizing visions in information systems innovations 
The core stream of IS literature that motivates this research project focuses 
on the processes of interpretation, legitimation, and mobilization in IT 
innovation (Swanson & Ramiller 1997; Swanson 2003). In particular, the 
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notion of an ‘organizing vision’ provides a useful concept to help understand 
and explain the discursive emergence and development of an innovation such 
as the UK government’s pursuit of multiple biometrics in a national identity 
scheme. 
 
In their seminal paper, Swanson and Ramiller aim to understand the 
institutional processes that facilitate the adoption and use of new technology 
in organizations. In contrast to the view that the early decision to adopt a 
given innovation is the result of local, rational organizational processes, which 
are subsequently institutionalized with the increased uptake of the technology 
(Tolbert & Zucker 1983), they argue that IS innovation can be better explained 
by viewing the phenomenon as a collective process of creating and 
propagating an organizing vision that co-ordinates decisions and actions 
related to the technology’s materialization and diffusion. The organizing vision 
can, thus, be understood as a sense-making device (Weick 1995). They state 
that, “in so making sense of the innovation, the community in effect also 
defines it and creates it” (Swanson & Ramiller 1997, p.459). I make use of 
such a constructivist conceptualization of innovation in the present study. 
 
Organizations are frequently confronted with novel technologies which they 
perceive as demanding their attention. “New technology often arrives on the 
marketplace in an immature state, puzzling as to its benefits, future prospects, 
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and long-term form” (Swanson & Ramiller 1997, p.459). Defined as “a focal 
community idea for the application of information technology in organizations” 
(1997, p. 460), an organizing vision is therefore intended to reduce, in broad 
strokes, the uncertainty that accompanies these new technologies. The 
organizing vision permits simplified understandings about these novel and, as 
yet unsettled, technologies. 
 
Swanson and Ramiller identify three main functions of an organizing vision: 
• Interpretation: When a new technology arrives on the scene its 
meaning and implications are not well-understood by organizational 
actors. It is in this context that organizing visions are generated to give 
some interpretive coherence to the innovation. They provide a focus for 
the innovation’s interpretation (Swanson & Ramiller 2004, p.556). 
• Legitimation: These visions also give organizations reasons and 
justifications for pursing an innovation. They provide an answer to the 
question, ‘why do it?’. This legitimation process is facilitated through 
the reputations and authority of those promulgating the vision. To adapt 
an example from Swanson and Ramiller’s paper to fit the case at hand, 
this process might be initiated as follows: “Why aren’t we doing 
[biometrics] yet?” the [Home Secretary] might ask his or her [civil 
servant], having just read about it (and all the good things that come to 
leading [countries] doing it) for the first time in Business Week (1997, 
p.461). 
• Mobilization: The organizing vision is a “creative force” that sparks and 
energizes market interest and activity to support the realization of the 
innovation. “Would be adopters look to the market for needed 
resources, including hardware, software, and skills, following clues and 
guidelines embedded in the organizing vision” (Swanson & Ramiller 
1997, p.461). 
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Organizing visions are produced and sustained discursively, by a community 
with a common interest, who may agree or disagree about the content of the 
vision (Swanson & Ramiller 1997, p.462). “An organizing vision is a 
construction in discourse” (Swanson & Ramiller 2004, p.556, emphasis 
added). The potential for disagreement means that there is an ongoing 
contest of interpretation over the meaning of the technology. It may be the 
case that, in some instances, these contests consist of counter-framing 
processes that are motivated by hostility to the vision as a whole rather than 
mere disagreement about its content. 
 
For Swanson and Ramiller, the depiction of the vision as an appropriate 
response to a certain problematic will determine its currency and perceived 
relevance. The vision’s perceived distinctiveness, intelligibility, 
informativeness, plausibility, and practical value will determine how compelling 
it is to other stakeholders and its eventual success (or failure) (Swanson & 
Ramiller 1997, p.469). Importantly, there must be some new or emerging 
technology accompanying the vision that can be exploited by, but which also 
constrains, the vision. Often buzzwords (such as ‘customer relationship 
management’ (Firth 2001) or ‘enterprise resource planning’ (Wang 2009), or 
as in this present case, ‘biometrics’) play an important discursive role in 
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signaling and strengthening the vision. However, there are risks to the 
overuse and overextension of such terms. 
 
The notion of an organizing vision provides us with a main concept to study 
the role of imaginative discourse in information systems innovations. It 
explicitly recognizes that the content of visions may originate in contexts 
outside a single business organization and provides a means to understand 
the influence that other participants and actors (including technology vendors, 
consultants, academics, the trade press, etc.) play in IT innovation processes. 
Second, it provides a conceptual footing for the role of buzzwords and 
marketing hype in perpetuating IT fads. Third, its emphasis on the early 
stages of discursive development, when understandings and outcomes about 
new technology are most uncertain, makes it particularly useful to this case 
study.  
 
Elsewhere, Swanson and Ramiller build on their organizing vision concept to 
explore the differences between ‘mindful’ and ‘mindless’ organizational 
innovation (2004). Mindless innovation is best illustrated by organizations that 
purse new technology because others are doing so – the well-known ‘me too’ 
phenomenon. In contrast, an organization that innovates mindfully does so 
“with reasoning grounded in its own organizational facts and specifics” 
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(Swanson & Ramiller 2004, p.559). Noting that mindfulness is a kind of ideal 
type, the authors identify five attributes of mindful innovation: 
1. Healthy preoccupation with failure – rather than celebrating successes, 
mindful organizations obsess over failure and learn from close calls. 
2. Reluctance to oversimplify interpretations of new technology – 
mindfulness “calls for the organization to eschew stock or formulaic 
interpretations of IT innovations” and “entails a resistance to the 
simplified image of the innovation that is encoded in the organizing 
vision” (Swanson & Ramiller 2004, p.660). 
3. Sensitivity to operations – mindful organizations attend to minor and 
seemingly insignificant details. 
4. Commitment to resilience – mindful organizations are resilient and 
flexible. They improvise rather than over-plan, adapt instead of 
following routine, and aim for effectiveness over efficiency. 
5. Mindful organizations defer to experts over formal authority – such 
expertise is typically heterogeneous and dispersed throughout the 
organization. 
Swanson and Ramiller note that future research in this area should explore 
the larger community terrain over which organizing visions reign (1997, 
p.471). While they do explicitly acknowledge the role that external actors play 
in developing and energizing visions for new technology, their original 
empirical focus was on institutions. There is therefore an opportunity to 
explore innovation processes beyond the boundaries of formal organizations, 
as Wang and others have recently done (Wang & Swanson 2008; Ramiller & 
Wang 2009; Wang 2009; Wang 2010). Wang argues that researchers 
studying IT innovation must peer beyond organizational boundaries to explore 
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the collective discursive environment in which adopters, technology vendors, 
IT consultants, investors, journalists, analysts, academics, and others develop 
ideas about how to develop and use new technology (Wang 2009, p.4). These 
understandings represent what a technology is, why organizations should 
strive to adopt it, and how to go about doing so. Wang focuses on discourse 
arenas such as advertisements, books on new technology, magazine articles, 
conference and exposition speeches, training materials, brochures, interview 
scripts, roundtable discussions, and blogs to analyze the popularity and 
prevalence of ideas about new technology. For example, he and Swanson 
study advertisements for customer relationship management (CRM) systems 
in Business Week to show how ads provided fresh meanings to the 
technology’s organizing vision (Wang & Swanson 2008). 
  
Wang’s approach to studying innovation processes through extra-institutional 
discourses on new technology supplements the organizing vision concept by 
focusing our attention on other arenas where innovation ‘happens’. 
3.4 Technology and expectations 
Closely related to organizing visions theory is a growing body of concepts and 
empirical findings on future expectations in new science and technology 
emerging from the science and technology studies (STS) literature (van Lente 
1993; van Lente & Rip 1998; Borup et al. 2006). This ‘sociology of 
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expectations’ is concerned with the role and significance of prospective, 
speculative, imaginative, and futuristic discourse and imagery in science and 
technology ventures, exploring whether and to what extent these discourses 
mobilize and co-ordinate actors and shape organizational change. 
Expectations are seen as a constitutive or performative force of innovation; 
enabling some scientific and technological possibilities while disabling others. 
As the discourses that comprise the case are rife with expectations about 
what biometrics can achieve, I want to introduce these theoretical ideas on the 
relationship between technology and expectations. These ideas provide new 
insights that will sharpen the analytical lens we apply to the data by expanding 
our understanding of the function and agency of expectation-based 
discourses. 
 
The sociology of expectations seeks to theorize how those with vested 
interests in a scientific or technological endeavor go about giving life to that 
which does not yet exist in material form. Through the careful development 
and management of future expectations, imaginings, and visions for 
technology, actors hope to guide activities, provide structure and legitimacy, 
attract interest and resources, and frame discourses on issues of seeming 
relevance (Borup et al. 2006, pp.285-286). Previous studies have investigated 
the role of expectations in biotechnology (Brown & Michael 2003; Väliverronen 
2004), genetic technology (Horst 2007; Sung & Hopkins 2006), and 
 115
nanotechnology (Lösch 2006), among others. In his analysis of the visionary 
depictions of nanotechnology, for example, Lösch (2006) showed how 
futuristic visual imagery serves as a means of expectation exchange and 
meaning production between the domains of science, economy, and mass 
media. 
 
In their review of work from the sociology of expectations, Borup et al. (2006) 
appraise four major functions of expectations: expectations as a constitutive 
force of change, expectations as temporal variability, expectations as socio-
spatial variability, and expectations as bridging the imagination and 
materiality. I summarize each in turn and explain their applicability to the 
current research. 
 
Expectations as constitutive force 
In this function, expectations are seen as agents that broker relationships 
between different actors and groups involved in a scientific or technological 
pursuit. It is difficult to imagine technological development and innovation 
without a shared, yet flexible set of guiding expectations. This is especially the 
case during the periods of high uncertainty encountered in early moments of 
technological change, in which shared expectations are required to enroll a 
broad range of stakeholders and improve the likelihood of success (Borup et 
al. 2006, p.289). Van Lente and Rip (1998) view expectations as prospective 
social structures, which can be filled in, modified, or reconfigured. Within 
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these dynamics, it is the content of expectations that matters. This content 
pulls actors together and shapes further action. These ideas about the 
potential agency of expectations resonate with Swanson and Ramiller’s points 
on organizing visions, outlined above.9 
 
Expectations as temporal variability 
Most scientific and technological undertakings experience cycles of hype and 
disappointment. This phenomenon of early promise and subsequent 
disappointment reveals how an early surge in hype might be necessary to get 
a hearing (Borup et al. 2006, p.290). In this sense disappointment may be 
viewed as being built into scientific and technological ventures. Early hope is 
almost never proportionate to the eventual results of a project. At the same 
time, past failures are often written off as unusual or atypical (Borup et al. 
2006, p.290). 
 
These are interesting ideas that need to be accounted for in the analysis. In 
particular, the temporal variability of expectations for biometrics will be 
examined. Moreover, the fact that the program was initiated and sponsored by 
the UK government, which is often criticized for its poor track record on 
completing large-scale IT projects (cf. Public Affairs Committee 2011), could 
                                            
9 However, explicit mention of the organizing vision perspective is missing from virtually all 
the work on the sociology of expectations, including the contributions to the 2006 Technology 
Analysis and Strategic Management special issue on expectations. Only recently have 
scholars begun to connect these theoretical dots (see Pollock & Williams 2010). 
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mean that expectations of failure were prominent from the outset, at least 
among certain groups. 
 
Expectations and socio-spatial variability 
Expectations and future uncertainty vary not only over time, but also among 
different groups of actors involved in a project. As a result, people will attach 
different levels of trust to technological expectations. Borup et al. remark: 
“Expectations have the appearance of greater authority for those who see 
themselves as having little influence over the outcome of a promise (publics, 
for example). This easily translates into a normative framing of expectations: 
‘it’s going to happen so you might as well get used to it!’” (2006, p.292). 
 
These points align with arguments by MacKenzie – illustrated by his ‘certainty 
trough’ (see Figure 3.2) –, which depicts the relationship between a group’s 
proximity to a technological development and the degree of uncertainty they 
posses about the technology. It illustrates how those who are removed from 
the relevant decision-making processes tend to exhibit the highest levels of 
uncertainty about new technology. However, it also shows how those who are 
intimately connected with knowledge production are also often less sure about 
their knowledge claims than those with indirect knowledge. 
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Imagination, materiality, and embodiment 
Finally, to what extent are expectations simply discourse or rhetoric? Can we 
begin to understand expectations as being ‘inscribed’ in materiality? If so, then 
what are the ‘routes of transmission’ between imagination, embodiment, and 
materiality? While these questions are interesting, they are less relevant to 
this study, which focuses centrally on discourses rather than the material 
artifact. However, there were important moments in the development of the 
Scheme when expectations were ‘made material’, such as during biometric 
technology pilots and a “biometrics roadshow” across the UK. The discourses 
that emerge around these moments provide channels to analyze the dialectic 
relationship between the conceptual and material. 
 
Finally, a recent critique and elaboration of these ideas in the sociology of 
expectations comes from Pollock and Williams (2010), who take issue with 
many studies of expectations that neglect the what they describe as the 
“business” of technological expectations; that is, the promissory intermediaries 
which produce, commodify, and sell future-oriented knowledge to 
organizations interested in adopting new technology. They argue that, by 
ignoring these middlemen and the attendant dynamics of knowledge 
production, scholars risk misunderstanding the effects of expectations – how 
expectations influence innovation in different ways. In particular, they take 
issue with the notion of expectation as ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’, which they 
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claim oversimplifies the performativity of future-oriented discourse. These 
intermediaries where present in the case of the NIS. They will need to be 
accounted for in the analysis, along with the influence of their discourses. 
3.5 The publics of technological innovation 
Public understanding of science and technology 
I now move to review final set of ideas in order to draw out a concept to 
explain the ‘publics’ of innovation. Research on the public understanding of 
science and technology (abbreviated as PUS) has traditionally focused on the 
public’s perception, opinion, and acceptance of scientific innovations such as 
nuclear power (Gamson & Modigliani 1989), biotechnology (Gaskell & Bauer 
2001), and nanotechnology (Gaskell et al. 2005), to name a few popular 
examples. Studies on the public’s perceptions and understandings of 
surveillance and security technologies are just now beginning to emerge (see, 
for example, Pavone & Degli Esposti 2010). 
 
Bauer et al. (2007) identify and trace three main PUS research paradigms: 1) 
science literacy, 2) public understanding of science, and 3) the science and 
society critique. They argue that each paradigm approaches the problem of 
public understanding in a different way and poses distinguishing questions 
and solutions to the ‘problems’ of PUS (2007, p.79). 
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Originally, PUS research was mostly concerned with identifying and correcting 
knowledge and attitudinal deficits. This approach was castigated as being a 
patronizing ‘deficit model’ and has since been displaced by so-called critical 
approaches. In the next sections, I briefly outline each paradigm, noting their 
respective strengths and weaknesses. The output of this review is a concept 
to apply to discourses about publics and their understandings of new 
technology. 
 
Science and technology literacy 
Historically, the science literacy paradigm has sought to measure textbook 
knowledge of scientific facts, the scientific method, and the history of scientific 
and technological ‘progress’. It has also aimed at helping the public reject 
unscientific superstitions such as astrology and numerology (Bauer 2009). 
The literacy paradigm often attributes a knowledge deficit to the public so that 
it may be corrected. By demonstrating that the public is ignorant about a 
certain scientific or technological issue, a case can be made for increased 
education. Calling the public ignorant in matters of science and technology 
also permits the rise of an expert class for scientific and technical decision-
making. As Bauer et al. remark, the deficit model “plays into the hands of 
technocratic attitudes among decision-makers: a de facto ignorant public is 
disqualified from participating in science policy decisions” (2007, p.80). 
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This paradigm has been critiqued extensively over the years due to its 
inherently negative attitudes towards the public (Wynne 1995). Critics further 
argue that researchers in this domain rarely critically reflect on what is exactly 
meant by ‘science’, ‘understanding’, ‘technology’ or the ‘public’ (Wynne 1995, 
p.362; Jasanoff 2000, p.41). Horst notes that the idea of the ‘public’ as “a 
national unity of laypeople characterized by greater or lesser degrees of 
scientific literacy” is especially conceptually problematic (2007, p.152). 
 
Critics have also taken issue with the literacy paradigm’s over-reliance on 
survey methods, as well as the tendency for governments, businesses, and 
scientific institutions to sponsor such survey research (Bauer et al. 2007, 
p.79). This tendency has been interpreted and criticized as pursuing agenda-
based research, with the claim being that surveys can always be designed to 
discover some sort of knowledge deficit in respondents. However, Bauer et al. 
are careful to point out that the automatic equation of a particular political 
agenda with a particular research method is a fallacy (2007, pp.79-80). While 
it might be the case that past research into scientific and technology literacy 
has relied heavily on survey methods, it does not necessarily follow that public 
surveying is simply about identifying and correcting supposed public deficits. 
Nor does it mean that agenda-based research cannot adopt other research 
methods (e.g., focus groups). 
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As the first major research paradigm within PUS, the science literacy 
approach is historically important. Indeed, many policy discourses still reflect 
its biases. However, this paradigm does not provide any analytical tools for 
the present research study. Its focus on testing textbook knowledge of science 
and technology is incongruent with the stated aims of my research as it fails to 
appreciate the ongoing uncertainties and contingencies around biometrics. 
 
Public understanding of science: attitudinal deficits 
In the late 1980s concerns about knowledge deficits among the public made 
way for alarm in scientific and policy-making communities about increasingly 
“poor” attitudes towards science and technology (Bauer et al. 2007, p.82). A 
public unsupportive of science was deemed bad for society. During this 
period, research shifted away from measuring literacy and towards assessing 
knowledge and attitudes. The correlation between knowledge and public 
attitudes therefore became the focal point of PUS research (Bauer 2009, 
p.224). 
 
Within this research paradigm it is possible to locate two agendas: ‘normative-
rationality’ and ‘realist-empiricism’ (Bauer et al. 2007, p.83). For the former, 
increased knowledge of science and technology is said to result in improved 
attitudes – ‘the more you know about science and technology, the more you 
love it’. A lack of knowledge is associated with biased risk perception. It is 
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argued that an informed public is also more inclined to agree with experts, 
who know best. 
 
For the ‘realist-empiricist agenda’, attitudes are said to be loaded with values, 
with important relations with the social world. These “values and emotions are 
a fact of life and the battle is a battle for hearts of a lifestyle public” (Bauer et 
al. 2007, p.83). Within this agenda, the public are seen as consumers of 
science and technology, and accordingly fall into different market segments: 
confident believers, technophiles, supporters, concerned, the ‘undecided’, and 
the ‘not for me’ (Office of Science and Technology 2000). It is said that 
scientific evidence and technical know-how need to be made ‘sexy’ so that 
consumers are seduced (Bauer 2009, p.225). 
 
Science and society 
In the context of this second debate, the science and society paradigm seeks 
to move beyond the traditional deficit model by reversing it and attributing a 
deficit to scientific institutions and technical experts. Its critique of earlier 
paradigms centers on a perceived crisis of trust among the public with respect 
to science and technology and the expertise employed to communicate issues 
deemed relevant to public attention (Bauer et al. 2007, p.85). 
 
It is believed that once public trust in science and technology is lost it is 
virtually impossible to regain, and therefore there is a perceived need for 
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increased public deliberation and participation in scientific matters. 
Proponents argue that efforts of public engagement should occur ‘upstream’, 
meaning in the early stages of new scientific and technological developments, 
“to enable front-end input and not only post-hoc reactions to already 
established facts” (Bauer et al. 2007, p.85). 
 
One stream of research within the science and society critique to public 
understanding considers the extent to which members of the public are 
consulted and involved in decision-making processes, particularly during the 
early phases of planning, designing, and developing science and technology 
projects. Michael describes this model as a movement aiming to capture and 
circulate “the voice of publics” vis-à-vis scientific and technological 
controversies (2009, p.621).  
 
Such deliberative models rely on citizen juries, public hearings, consensus 
conferencing, scoping exercises, science festivals, and so forth (Einsiedel 
2001; Bauer 2009). These different engagement formats share the same 
basic elements: the participation of the lay citizenry in considering some 
scientific and technological problem; an extensive learning process and 
exploration of what is known amongst the public about a given issue; 
considering the different values underlying these viewpoints; examining what 
is known, unknown, or unsure on the evidence base; facilitating deliberation 
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between citizens and representatives of various technical perspectives; and 
developing policies based on these deliberations (Einsiedel 2001, p.95). 
These formats for assessing public understanding were prevalent in the case 
of the National Identity Scheme and offer a special set of discourses about the 
public on which to draw. 
 
Despite its promise, there are several problems with this approach. Bauer 
(2009) argues that engagement research runs the risk of becoming advocacy, 
for, in many ways, it is action research in which analysis is not always 
separated from intervention. Worse, academics can end up as political 
consultants who are tasked with rebuilding public trust. And as public 
engagement requires ‘event making’ where engagement and deliberation can 
‘happen’, resources and know-how (i.e., expertise) are required to run the 
show. Furthermore, policy-makers feel the need to evaluate these public 
deliberations (i.e., were they effective and good value for money?) and thus 
the ethos of traditional PUS research ironically creeps back in. 
 
Theorizing publics 
Instead of assessing or correcting presumed knowledge or attitude deficits in 
the public, critical approaches to PUS research explore the range and 
diversity of local or contextualized understandings with respect to new science 
and technology. In doing so researchers try to explain what these 
understandings represent in terms of science-society or technology-society 
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relationships. In particular, some scholars try to discern the different ‘publics-
in-particular’ (Michael 2009) or ‘ethno-epistemic assemblages’ in respect of a 
given innovation. These publics are described as coalitions or hybrid groups 
characterized by heterogeneity and fluidity in their understandings of and 
dispositions toward new science and technology (Irwin & Michael 2003; Horst 
2007). They are manifestations that are always being constructed, 
deconstructed, negotiated, and reconfigured as part of the meaning 
production taking place during a technology’s development. 
 
This conceptual reformulation is in opposition to previous notions of the 
‘public-in-general’, which are perhaps most evident in the national surveys of 
PUS informed by traditional deficit models. Critics charge that these 
instruments actually construct the public (or publics) whose knowledge they 
aim to measure. When these publics appear in policy discourses on science 
and technology they may have further normative and performative effects. 
 
 
The concept of an ‘ethno-epistemic assemblage’ on the other hand provides a 
alternative by highlighting how any discussion of the public, be it in a research 
instrument, a political speech, or media report, simultaneously functions to 
‘make’ and perform publics. It allows us to theorize the publics of biometrics in 
an innovative way – as constructions that emerge through the research 
instruments used to measure their acceptance, opinions, and knowledge, the 
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policy discourses that depict them and their relationship with the government’s 
proposals, and the media coverage that captures these events. 
3.6 Integrating the framework  
Having reviewed the theoretical literature that informs this study, in this 
section I present a summary of the conceptual framework for the study of 
discourses about biometrics in the case of the NIS (see Table 3.3). 
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Concept Empirical application Comments Key questions 
Organizing vision Government 
discourses on 
biometrics 
This serves as 
the core concept 
in this study. It 
will be applied to 
the 
government’s 
discourses to 
explore how 
officials made 
sense of 
biometrics and 
the extent to 
which their 
discourses were 
able to mobilize 
efforts 
What was the 
government’s vision for 
biometrics? Was it 
distinctive? Intelligible? 
Informative? Plausible? 
Of practical value? 
How did it change over 
time? What difficulties 
did the vision 
encounter and how 
were they resolved? 
Technological 
expectations 
Public discourses on 
biometrics (including 
policy and media 
discourses) 
Enriches our 
understandings 
of the agency 
and function of 
future-oriented 
discourses 
What types of 
technological 
expectations were 
active in public 
discourses on 
biometrics? What 
function did these 
expectations play? 
Technological publics 
(ethno-epistemic 
assemblages) 
Discourses about the 
public with respect to 
biometrics 
Provides a 
radical view of 
the publics of 
new technology 
How did the publics of 
biometrics emerge in 
government 
discourses? What 
problematic publics 
emerged? 
Table 3.3: Concepts for analyzing discourses about biometrics and their publics 
 
How do these concepts interconnect? First, the organizing vision concept 
serves as the core theoretical construct in this study. The objective in using 
the concept is to understand how a vision for biometrics emerged in the case 
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and the extent to which it was sustained. Whether or not a vision organizes is 
a separate issue. This is an open question that must be empirically 
determined. Answering this question involves exploring the vision’s capacity to 
interpret, legitimize, and mobilize actors to innovate (i.e., to satisfy the three 
functions of an organizing vision). 
 
Studying visions in this manner means studying discourses. I understand a 
vision for new technology to emerge through discourse. It is an outcome of a 
discursive process involving proponents and challengers. These discourses 
also function to sustain the vision if and when it emerges. A significant subset 
of these discourses can be characterized as expectations insofar as they 
attempt to describe or predict a future state of affairs. Technological 
expectations may perform different functions, including being a constitutive 
force of change, providing temporal and socio-spatial variation, and bridging 
the gap between imagination and materiality. Another subset of these 
discourses will pertain to the publics of new technology. I conceptualize these 
discourses in terms of the ethno-epistemic assemblage. That is, I will allow 
the publics of biometrics to emerge through the discourses that describe and 
try to resolve them. 
  
All of the discourses that comprise the vision for new technology provide a 
medium for the framing processes that underlie the production and 
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maintenance of meaning. Of particular interest are the changes that frames 
undergo over the course of the case study. Figure 3.4 visually depicts how 
these concepts fit into a high-level framework. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Working theoretical framework 
3.7 Research questions 
Finally, the preceding theoretical discussion gives rise to a set of core 
research questions: 
1. How did government spokespeople portray a vision for biometrics in 
the National Identity Scheme, and to what extent did this vision 
organize efforts and mobilize actors to innovate? 
Discourses on 
biometrics 
‐ Technological expecta ons 
‐ Discourses about the public 
 
 
Organizing 
vision 
 
Framing processes 
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2. How did policy debates and attendant media reportage discursively 
capture biometrics, and what were the limitations of these discourses in 
revealing the complexities and perplexities of the technologies? 
3. How were the ‘publics’ of biometrics portrayed in these discourses? 
 
I now move to devise my research methods for answering these questions. 
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Chapter 4: Research methods 
4.1 Case study research 
I elected to adopt a case study research strategy to investigate the discursive 
trajectory of biometrics within the National Identity Scheme (NIS) in the UK 
because, as Yin (2003) points out, case studies permit the investigation of 
phenomena in their ‘natural’ environments (that is, in real-life contexts rather 
than as part of artificial experiments). 
 
But what is a case? It is a question for which conclusive answers are hard to 
come by. Indeed, there are entire volumes dedicated to pondering this 
question (e.g., Ragin & Becker 1992). It is an issue that has forever plagued 
social science. Ragin argues that there are four possible ways to answer the 
question: 
• Cases are found – implies that cases are “empirically real and 
bounded, but specific”. Researchers identify and establish cases during 
the process of doing research (Ragin 1992, p.9). 
• Cases are objects – also treats cases as having an empirical reality 
and being bounded, but these can be unspecific. That is, researchers 
feel no need to designate boundaries around the case. 
• Cases are made – cases are “specific theoretical constructs which 
coalesce in the course of research” (Ragin 1992, p.10, emphasis 
added). 
• Cases are conventions – cases are general theoretical constructs 
which are the product of the collective work of scholars. 
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Importantly, these distinctions are not absolute and overlap is to be expected. 
Myers (2008) reiterates these points when he notes that, “In case study 
research, it is in fact very difficult to separate the phenomenon of interest from 
the context, because the context itself is part and parcel of the story” (p.75). 
As discussed earlier, the context in which the NIS proposals took place was 
tightly interwoven with the discourses themselves, as well as other, related 
government programs and technological discourses. During the research my 
venture to ‘find’ the specific case ran into various stumbling blocks, which 
were partly the result of a lack of specificity around the object of study. As a 
result, I treated the case as a real but relatively unspecific object, existing 
through the various and occasionally contradictory discourses under analysis. 
And by studying this case, I undoubtedly simultaneously constructed it. 
 
Ragin and Becker call for researchers to ask themselves “what is this a case 
of?” throughout the course of their research project. Heeding this call, mine is 
a study of the case of biometrics in the UK government’s proposals for a 
national identity program. The case study strategy to social research involves 
an extended, longitudinal examination of the phenomenon. Mine is idiographic 
in nature as it tries to understand the discursive dynamics around a 
(supposedly) single phenomenon (namely biometrics) within a particular time 
and place (early 21st century Britain) (Benbasat et al. 1987, p.369). Such a 
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strategy is also particularly useful when the data sources are multiple (Yin 
2003, pp.13-14), as, indeed, was the case in this research project. 
 
This research project covers the time period spanning from July 2002, when 
the original Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud consultation document was 
launched, until December 2008, when the Home Office began issuing identity 
cards for foreign nationals and the Identity and Passport Service (IPS) moved 
to create a market for biometric enrollment through its release of a Front 
Office Services Prospectus. This provides roughly 6 years of data from which 
to tell a tentative and incomplete story of biometrics. 
 
There were two major empirical research phases in this project: a data 
collection phase and an extended analysis phase. The data collection phase 
included exploratory focus group interviews as well as the systematic 
gathering of government communications about biometrics and relevant 
media coverage. The decision to collect data from these spheres was 
motivated by Bauer’s (2002) triangular model of the public sphere of science 
and technology, which encourages the analysis of data from the arenas of 
policy, media, and public opinion. The data analysis proceeded from this first 
phase, and was based on techniques of critical discourse analysis. 
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4.2 Methods for data collection and analysis 
Data collection 
From the beginning of the research project (Autumn 2006) I reviewed the wide 
array of documents relating to the NIS that were regularly issued by the 
sponsor actors in the case (namely, certain members of the Labour Party, the 
Home Office, and its newly created sub-department: the IPS), the transcripts 
of interviews that the leaders of these organizations as well as political figures 
such as the Prime Minister occasionally gave, and the records of 
parliamentary statements (found in Hansard) regarding the Scheme and the 
role of biometrics. These sponsor actors were an amalgamation of those 
individuals and organizations who had privileged access to information about 
the Scheme and who made policy decisions about its introduction and 
ongoing implementation. 
 
During this time I also reviewed the historical documentation that had been 
issued since 2002 (prior to the commencement of my PhD research), which 
had been archived by the LSE Identity Project (with whom I was fortunate to 
work closely). The LSE Identity Project team has amassed what is probably 
the most comprehensive archive of documentation related to proposals for 
identity cards in the UK (Whitley & Hosein 2010, p.xviii). Alongside these 
documents, I also monitored the mainstream press coverage of the NIS, 
familiarizing myself with how issues were framed and their lifecycles. This 
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early reading of documents and the monitoring of media coverage were 
intended to inform me of the major currents and themes of interest and was 
not initially systematic. The systematic documentary data collection and 
analysis would take place later. These early efforts, combined with the 
subsequent systematic analysis, contributed to an important hermeneutical 
component to my study (Myers 2008, chap.14). 
 
Exploratory focus group interviews 
Following my PhD upgrade I undertook a series of focus group interviews with 
certain members of the public. These interviews were intended as an 
opportunity for “relevant social groups” (Pinch & Bijker 1984) to voice their 
understandings of and concerns about the topic of biometrics, and for me to 
begin exploring the meanings that these technologies elicit when people are 
given an opportunity to reflect on them. The focus group interview format was 
chosen because it is a staple of public understanding of science and 
technology research (the more qualitative version of the research approach 
lends itself quite well to focus group methods), but also because I was 
interested in ascertaining collective views on the topic of biometrics and group 
interviews are conducive to generating these shared meanings. 
 
In the first instance I drafted an interview guide, which was tested in a pilot 
session and reworked for subsequent interviews. One of my first findings in 
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the initial pilot interview was that I assumed that the interviewees would know 
what the term “biometrics” meant. A surprising number of them did not 
recognize the term, but were familiar with the different types of biometrics 
once they were put forward. By naming examples of types of biometrics 
(fingerprints, iris scanning, and facial recognition) in the opening questions, I 
was able to facilitate a better discussion. 
 
The finalized interview guide is available in Appendix 1. The questions 
included in the guide were theoretically-informed, generated from a detailed 
reading of the academic literature on biometrics, and modeled after focus 
group guides from previous research on biotechnology (Gaskell & Bauer 
2001) and information and communication technologies and trust (Lachoee et 
al. 2006). The interviews were scheduled to run for a full hour, but 
occasionally ran over. 
 
I used video stimuli in the focus group interviews. Two video clips were 
originally appropriated for the pilot. The first video was produced by the IPS 
and served as a general introduction to the Scheme and how it was 
envisioned to work. It also introduced the concept of biometrics to viewers. In 
order to balance the perspective put forth by this government-sponsored 
video, I contacted Mr. Phil Booth, the national coordinator of the anti-ID card 
civil society group No2ID, to have him record a video response in which he 
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provided another set of opinions and perspectives on the biometric 
technologies in the Scheme. In the end I chose to replace the No2ID video 
with two shorter clips originating from Germany, which highlighted the 
perceived risks with their new biometric passports (i.e., that the fingerprint 
technology might not be totally secure and is spoofable). Combined, the IPS 
video and the two videos on the German biometric passport ran for 10 
minutes. Screen shots from each of the videos (including the replaced No2ID 
clip) are presented below. 
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Social group Reason for inclusion 
Airport workers Targeted by government in its Delivery Plan 
(IPS 2008c) 
Foreign nationals – particularly non-EEA 
students; those on discretionary leave; those 
in marriages or civil and common law 
partnerships; children of parents already 
settled in the UK; and those with work 
permits 
Targeted by the Home Office and Border and 
Immigration Agency (BIA 2008) 
Young people (i.e., students) Targeted by government in its Delivery Plan 
(IPS 2008c) 
People renewing the passports Eventually, those renewing their passports 
were to be automatically enrolled on the NIR 
Those in positions of trust who require a 
criminal background (Criminal Records 
Bureau (CRB)) check, including certain public 
sector workers, and possibly those working 
with vulnerable children 
Mentioned in a leaked government 
document, entitled National Identity Scheme 
Options Analysis – Outcome (IPS 2007a) 
Table 4.2: Original social groups deemed of interest to the research project 
 
However, as I began approaching representatives from these groups, 
particularly airport workers, I encountered some recruitment challenges. 
Initially, the union representatives for the airport workers (affiliated with the 
Unite union) showed interest in participating in group interviews, and even 
offered for me to come to Heathrow airport and use their facilities, but their 
interest waned shortly thereafter.10 
 
I also sought to interview refugees in Belfast because of their unique status in 
the country and because asylum seekers are already required to hold a 
                                            
10 Coincidentally, this was around the time that Terminal 5 opened at Heathrow and the 
resulting chaos around lost baggage and cancelled flights (BBC News 2008) spoiled my 
chances of meeting with the airport workers there. 
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biometric identity document (known as the Application Registration Card 
(ARC)). Having arranged an interview in Belfast through the Northern Ireland 
Community for Refugees and Asylum Seekers (NICRAS) in March 2008, no 
one showed up at the meeting. Likewise, I faced problems identifying people 
in the process of renewing their passports and so they were also dropped 
from my interview schedule, as were those in the process of undergoing CRB 
checks, as it was revealed that the proposed policy requiring them to be one 
of the first groups to enroll in the Scheme was not certain. Other planned 
interviews (with students in the Sheffield area, for example) also failed to 
materialize.11  
 
In the end I was able to complete 10 focus group interviews (including the 
initial pilot). Table 4.3 lists the pertinent information about these interviews. 
 
                                            
11 One of the lessons learned from the process of trying to arrange focus group meetings is 
that doing so without adequate financial resources and incentives for potential attendees can 
be a frustrating and unfruitful process. 
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ID Group type Number of 
participants 
Date Venue 
Pilot1 Foreign national 
students at the 
LSE 
9 6 February 2008 LSE 
ForNat2 Foreign national 
students at the 
LSE 
5 22 April 2008 LSE 
ForNat3 Foreign 
nationals (IT 
professionals) 
7 28 April 2008 LSE 
ForNat4 Summer school 
students on e-
business course 
(foreign 
nationals) 
5 12 August 2008 LSE 
Stud5 IS14312 
students 
12 12 December 
2008 
LSE 
Stud6 IS143 students 13 12 December 
2008 
LSE 
Stud7 IS143 students 12 12 December 
2008 
LSE 
Stud8 IS143 students 12 12 December 
2008 
LSE 
Stud9 IS143 students 13 14 December 
2008 
LSE 
Stud10 IS143 students 13 14 December 
2008 
LSE 
Table 4.3: Focus group interviews 
 
Many of the students were recruited from classes in which I was a teacher. 
Others (such as those in ForNat3) were recruited through personal channels 
                                            
12 IS143 is a first-year undergraduate course at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science. The course, named ‘Information Technology and Society’, explores social and 
political aspects of information and communication technology. 
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at the university. Thus, these were very much convenience (non-probability) 
sampling methods. 
 
Each of these interviews was audio recorded and later analyzed by the 
author. Notes were taken throughout the discussions and entered into a 
journal. I also adapted a technique known as ‘interviewing the moderator’, 
which is an ancillary method to focus group interviewing (Traulsen et al. 
2004). Immediately following each focus group I would interview the 
moderator (that is, myself13), asking a number of prepared questions about 
the group dynamic during the interview, the composition of the group, how 
they reacted to the questions, issues relating to surveillance, privacy, or the 
government (as the sponsor actor), and anything that might have been said 
off the record (that is, after the recorder had been switched off). This 
technique provided me with immediate feedback on the data and furnished 
additional data for later consideration. It also introduced an important degree 
of reflexivity in the interviewing process. (See Appendix 2 for the ‘interviewing 
the moderating’ guide used.) 
 
As part of that reflexive process, I came to realize that these conversations 
were lacking a certain level of depth. It is not that they were not interesting or 
insightful. Rather, the interviewees often seemed reluctant to engage the topic 
                                            
13 Typically, team members on the research project conduct these interviews, but as this is a 
PhD project, these interviews were, in practice, me completing a pre-written questionnaire. 
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and at times were concerned about providing the ‘right’ answer to my open-
ended questions. Part of this, I believe, is related to the fact that many of 
these conversations were with students who viewed me as an instructor (in 
many cases I was their class teacher) and not an equal peer in the discussion, 
despite my initial pleas that I was not there to teach them. I expected this sort 
of dynamic to emerge and had even thought through how to manage it, but 
sometimes this did not always work as planned, plausibly partly due to my 
inexperience. 
 
An arguably more important methodological insight from these interviews was 
that many people were simply unsure about the topic. Biometrics are, still, a 
very new thing and to expect people to ‘get their heads’ around the main ideas 
and ‘generate data’ in an hour long group interview might have been simply 
too much to ask. It was upon this reflection that I decided that I needed to 
begin focusing more closely on public discourses around biometrics. That is 
not to say that the focus groups were all for naught – quite the opposite. 
These discussions provided me with a renewed perspective on the issues, 
coming from the very people who soon were supposed to be using these 
technologies, with which to return to the stock of public knowledge found in 
policy documents and begin a process of systematic analysis. 
 
 146
Data collection methods for government communications on 
biometrics 
Following the exploratory phase of my project, I began an exhaustive 
collection of relevant government communications around the Scheme. The 
already sizeable archive obtained from the LSE Identity Project was 
supplemented with various other texts that I had collected since starting my 
research project. These were documents published through the IPS’s web 
site, along with other communications about the Scheme. The final corpus 
included every known public government document relating to the NIS, 
published within the specified research time frame (July 2002-December 
2008). In total, there were 129 documents in this corpus, including: 
 
• Legislative or parliamentary publications (such as the Identity Cards Bill 
or parliamentary committee reports) 
• Research publications (including feasibility studies and tracking 
research) 
• Corporate publications (such as business plans, delivery plans, and 
contracts) 
• Speeches (with written transcripts) 
• PowerPoint presentations by civil servants and ministers 
• Interviews and interactive web chats 
• Monthly newsletters (published by the IPS) 
• Leaked government documents (which were made available to No2ID 
and subsequently published on-line) 
• Publicly-available responses to Freedom of Information requests 
 
These documents are listed in Appendix 3. 
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The use of such documents is well-established in social research (Prior 2003). 
To cope with the “attractive nuisance” of qualitative data (Miles 1979), this 
corpus was then indexed in its entirety in the ATLAS.ti software for analysis 
(version 6, with native PDF support). (Below I explain my coding techniques, 
rationale, and analysis methods.) 
 
My familiarity with the historical development of the case and the larger 
political context in which the NIS took place, along with the formal coding of 
government documents, then allowed me to identify a number of “critical 
incidents” (Miles & Huberman 1994),“moments of interest” (Hosein 2002), or 
“watershed events” (Bauer 2002, p.146) within and around the Scheme’s 
development. These were moments when there was increased activity around 
or public interest in the Scheme, which spurred public discourse and 
deliberation about the program and, in particular, the role of biometrics. These 
included: 
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Critical event Date Period for which data is 
collected 
The re-introduction of the 
Identity Cards Bill to 
Parliament following the 
general election of 2005, 
which coincided with the 
publication of a report by the 
consultancy, Atos Origin, with 
the findings from a trial of 
biometrics 
25 May 2005 25 May 2005 – 25 June 2005 
The day the Identity Cards 
Bill received Royal Assent, 
thus becoming the Identity 
Cards Act 2006 
30 March 2006 30 March 2006 – 6 April 2006 
The period in which iris 
biometrics began to be 
downplayed in policy 
communications 
December 2006 - January 
2007 
December 2006 - January 
2007 
The publication of the 
National Identity Scheme 
Strategic Supplier 
Framework 
9 August 2007 9-17 August 2007 
The period following the 
HMRC data breach 
20 November 2007 20-28 November 2007 
The launch of the foreign 
national ID card, which 
coincided with the move to 
the market for biometric 
enrollment through the 
publication of the Front Office 
Services Prospectus 
document by the IPS 
November 2008 – December 
2008 
November 2008 – December 
2008 
Table 4.4: Critical moments for biometrics in the NIS 
 
In chapter 5 I explain in-depth the rationale behind selecting each of these 
critical moments and why they are important to the case study. In this section, 
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I describe the data that were collected around these moments. These data 
included both parliamentary debates about biometrics, captured in Hansard, 
and mainstream media (i.e., newspaper) coverage about the Scheme. 
Whereas the first corpus of government publications included all the available 
data published about the identity cards program, these two data sets were 
much more selective and focused around the six events listed above. 
 
Hansard 
One of the interesting methodological aspects of studying a high-profile, 
national e-government system such as the NIS in the UK is the existence of 
Hansard and the historical record it provides to researchers. Hansard is the 
official transcript of parliamentary debates in the Westminster system of 
government and is a rich source of political discourse. As Bayley notes, 
“parliaments are institutions dedicated to talk; members of parliament debate 
legislative proposals and scrutinize the work of governments through 
questioning” (2004, p.1). These debates can be lively affairs and they offer an 
opportunity for parliamentarians to engage in relatively spontaneous 
discussion about issues. While much of the agenda is prepared in advance, 
when compared to the official published reports on the same matters, which 
are reviewed many times over and carefully edited before their release, 
parliamentary debate is somewhat freer and more dialogic. 
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I chose to include these parliamentary discourses about biometrics in the NIS 
as a second dataset. To do so, I searched the archives for the Commons 
Hansard Debates, Commons Written Answers, Lords Hansard Debates, and 
Lords Written Answers around the six periods listed above. Along with the 
transcripts of parliamentary debates, Hansard also publishes written answers 
given by ministers in response to questions formally posed by members. 
These data were usually collected the week following the event, but 
occasionally longer if the event itself was an extended affair (such as when 
officials first started downplaying iris biometrics in their official 
communications). My search terms in the Hansard archives were: 
 
• biometric* 
• finger* 
• iris 
• retina 
• facial 
• face 
• DNA 
 
The search results were filtered for relevance (to ensure they were about the 
NIS, which defined the case), indexed as a separate hermeneutical unit in 
ATLAS.ti, and then coded and analyzed. Appendix 4 lists information on the 
Hansard debates analyzed in this thesis. 
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Data collection methods for media coverage on biometrics 
Writing about public political discourse, Bayley argues that “the arena for 
political debate has shifted in the last fifty years from Parliament to the mass 
media, which have arguably become the principal organ for the 
communication of political ideas” (2004, p.11). Therefore, in addition to 
capturing the parliamentary discourses on biometrics around the moments of 
special interest, I also explored mainstream newspaper reports about 
biometrics within the NIS. Research within the public understanding of science 
has championed the analysis of press coverage in studying how new science 
and technology enter public discourse (Gregory & Miller 2000; Bauer 2000), 
as has recent IS research on IT innovation (e.g., Wang 2009). There is even 
some emerging surveillance studies and privacy research that focuses on 
media representations (Hoofnagle 2009; Finn & McCahill 2010). 
 
To gather the media stories I logged onto the Nexis on-line archive service 
and performed an initial search of major UK newspapers, including the 
following broadsheets and tabloids: 
1. The Guardian 
2. The Independent 
3. The Daily Telegraph 
4. Daily Mail  
5. The Mail on Sunday 
6. The Times 
7. The Mirror 
8. The Sunday Mirror 
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9. The Sun 
10. News of the World 
11. The Express 
12. The Observer 
13. The Sunday Times 
14. Independent on Sunday 
15. Sunday Telegraph 
16. The Sunday Express 
 
As the Financial Times is not indexed by Nexis, I paid for a subscription in 
order to access its archive and download the relevant articles.14 
17. Financial Times 
 
I downloaded all the articles published in these outlets from 25 May 2005 until 
the end of December 2008 that included any of the following terms: 
• “ID card” 
• “identity card” 
• “national identity scheme” 
• “national identity register” 
 
These articles were then indexed in ATLAS.ti and filtered for relevance. For 
example, any report including the term “identity card” which was not about the 
UK’s identity card program was ignored. In total, there were 354 newspaper 
reports within the final sample. These reports were subsequently coded and 
analyzed, with an emphasis on discourses about and portrayals of biometrics. 
In the same fashion as the Hansard data, I targeted the data analysis around 
                                            
14 My aim in including such a wide variety of newspapers in my search was to capture the 
widest possible range of media discourses about the NIS and biometrics. These selections 
span the UK political spectrum and include both left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers, as 
well as those of the tabloid and business variety. 
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the six moments of interest to see whether and how these events were 
represented in the media. Figure 4.5 represents the frequency of UK media 
reports with references to identity cards or the National Identity Scheme, 
spanning 25 May 2005 to the end of 2008, and inclusive of all 17 newspapers 
listed above. The red areas depict the periods for which I conducted the 
extensive critical discourse analysis, focusing on discourses on biometrics 
present in the newspaper coverage.
  
 
T
p
able 4.5: Frequen
eriods for which I
cy of UK newspa
 performed the cr
per coverage on 
itical discourse an
the topics of iden
alysis on the top
tity cards and the
ic of biometrics)
 National Identity Scheme (the areas shaded in red 
15
 
represent the 
4
 155
 
As with my multiple and hermeneutical readings of the policy communications, 
my iterative and redundant readings of the media reports on biometrics over 
time granted my analysis an inestimable hermeneutical component. It 
provided me with a much broader understanding of the various happenings 
throughout the case and how they interrelated. It also helped to ensure that 
my research was rigorous by forcing repetitive readings of events from 
multiple perspectives. 
 
Data analysis 
The distinction between data collection and data analysis is especially 
problematic for qualitative research. During the collection phase, researchers 
almost always informally ‘analyze’ as they order and categorize their data. 
Such is the nature of qualitative data that these decisions made in the early 
stages of data collection have analytical effects. For example, deciding to 
focus on certain ‘critical’ moments as a means to make the data more 
manageable and revealing can be considered a type of analysis. The point 
being, interpretation of data begins well before any formal analysis 
commences. 
 
Yet, a formal and systemic analysis is critical to any serious research project. 
In this section I explain and justify my analytical approach and choice of 
analytical technique: critical discourse analysis. 
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4.3 Critical discourse analysis 
Once each of the datasets was loaded into ATLAS.ti, I coded them according 
to principles and techniques from critical discourse analysis, starting with the 
main corpus of government publications on the NIS, then moving on to the 
media reportage and finally the data originating from Hansard. 
 
According to Fairclough (2010), critical discourse analysis consists of three 
main properties. First, it is a relational form of research. This means that its 
focus is not entirely on entities or people, but rather social relations, which can 
be complex and layered (p.3). Discourse is relational in both an internal sense 
(i.e., discourse is a complex network of communicative relations between 
people and texts), as well as in an external sense (i.e., discourse is also often 
about objects in the world, which are interconnected via social activity). 
Fairclough is keen to stress that discourse is not some simple, discrete thing 
that can be defined independently. It is arrived at by analyzing social relations. 
And by studying discourse we better understand meaning and the processes 
of meaning-making. 
 
Second, discourse is said to be dialectical in that these relations are between 
things which are different from one another yet not totally discrete. 
Fairclough’s favorite illustration of this dialectical nature of discourse is the 
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relationship between power and discourse. Power is, in part, discursive 
(insofar as power depends on discourse to sustain legitimacy), but power is 
not totally discursive (as it can also rely on physical force or resort to 
violence). Power is partly discursive and discourse is partly power – they ‘flow 
into’ one other, as he puts it. “The complex realities of power relations are 
‘condensed’ and simplified in discourse” (Fairclough 2010, p.4). 
 
Third, when we study discourse, we are not studying it in and of itself. Instead, 
we are studying the dialectal relations between discourse and other 
phenomena. Critical discourse analysis is therefore transdisciplinary, for 
analyzing discourse and the relations it renders involves cutting across 
disciplines such as linguistics, politics, sociology, information systems, etc. 
(Fairclough 2010, p.4).  
 
Fairclough describes his approach to studying discourse as a form of critical 
realism, which acknowledges that there is a real world which exists 
irrespective of our knowledge and understanding of it. Within this worldview 
he believes there is a social world, which is separate from the natural world, 
and depends on human activity for its existence. The social world is a 
construct made possible through discourse. 
 
Parker (1992) identifies twenty steps to analyzing discourse critically. 
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1) Discourse is realized in texts, which are the primary objects of study. 
2) The connotations in these texts must be explored through methods of free 
association. Johnstone (2002, p.8) builds on this point by suggesting that “the 
basic questions a discourse analyst must ask are: Why is this text the way it 
is? Why is it not another way? Why these particular words in this particular 
order?” 
3) As discourse is about objects, the analyst must ask what objects are being 
referred to and describe them in detail. 
4) This involves talking about the text “as if it were an object”. 
5) Discourse contains subjects, so analysts should specify what types of 
person or thing about spoken about. 
6) The analyst must also speculate about what these subjects are capable of 
saying in the discourse. 
7) As a system of meaning, a discourse maps a picture of the world. 
8) It is incumbent upon the analyst to understand how texts use discourse to 
deal with meanings that run counter to their own; i.e., counter-discourses. 
9) Discourse refers to other discourses, so contrasting these discourses is a 
valuable means of understanding. 
10) Identify where discourses overlap and talk about similar objects in 
different ways. 
11) Explore how discourses address different audiences. 
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12) Reflect on how those speakers label their own talk. 
13) As discourses are historically located, examine how and where they 
emerge. 
14) Describe how they change. 
15) As discourses support institutions, the analyst must discover which 
institutions benefit from a given discourse. 
16) And those institutions that suffer from discourses. 
17) Identify which persons benefit from a discourse. 
18) Who would promote such discourses and who would rather avoid them? 
19) Demonstrate the extent to which a discourse connects with other, 
oppressive discourses. 
20) Show how discourse allows dominant groups to subjugate less powerful 
groups. 
 
Reflecting on these steps, a critical discourse analysis naturally involves the 
study of texts and therefore requires some form of linguistic analysis. In 
particular, the micro-analysis of texts is a form of coding which is designed to 
break open textual data so that the analyst considers all the possible 
meanings of a term or phrase (Corbin & Strauss 2008, p.59). Micro-analysis 
focuses on the minute details of language use – “it is like using a high-
powered microscope to examine each piece of data close up” (Corbin & 
Strauss 2008, p.59). Micro-analysis involves meticulously coding around a 
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concept. Importantly, any micro-analysis of a text must also link to a social 
analysis of the practices, organizations, and institutions which produced the 
text (Fairclough 2010, p.7). I employed such a micro-analysis technique in my 
coding. (See Appendix 5 for a screen shot of what this micro-analysis 
technique looked like in practice.) 
 
Elsewhere, Fairclough (1995) explores the analysis of media discourse and 
what is special about these texts. His aim is to show how a critical analysis of 
media language can be recognized as an important element within research 
on contemporary processes of social and cultural change. He describes the 
‘conversationalization’ of the public language of science and technology (p.9). 
Conversational language is realized through the use of linguistic features such 
as colloquial vocabulary and idioms. Conversationalization helps to 
democratize science and technology, making it more accessible by raising the 
status of the language and experience of ordinary life by recasting science in 
lay terms and rejecting the perceived elitism of science (pp.13-14). 
 
One objection to discourse analysis of media texts comes from scholars of 
media receptions, who disagree with the analytical focus on meaning and 
ideological effects, without taking into account how texts are actually received 
by audiences. They argue that texts do not have unitary meanings and can be 
interpreted in various ways by different audiences and individual audience 
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members. This is a fair point, but while interpretations may vary, any reading 
of a text is a product of an interface between the properties of the text and the 
interpretative resources and practices which the interpreter brings to bear 
upon the text (Fairclough 1995, p.16). The range of potential interpretations is 
always constrained by and delimited according to the nature of the text in 
question. Textual analysis remains a central element of media analysis, 
though it should be complemented by analysis of text reception, where 
possible, as well as by analyses of the production of media texts. 
 
Texts can also be seen as a set of options: selections among available forms 
of language, in which one word was chosen rather than another, or where one 
grammatical structure was used instead of another. These formal choices 
constitute choices of meaning. Such a view of texts encourages the analyst to 
be sensitive to absences from a text – to explore the choices which were not 
made but which might have been made. That is to ask, how else might this 
phrase or utterance have been put? (Fairclough 1995, p.18). 
 
What is critical about critical discourse analysis? Fairclough argues that it 
requires a degree of normativity in the analysis, focusing on social, 
organizational, and institutional wrongs and how the researcher can right 
them. This implies that the analysis is rooted in a set of values – views about 
what constitutes ‘the good’ – with which to evaluate a state of affairs. While 
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these values are always specific to a particular society and culture, 
Fairclough’s main argument is that the researcher is in a special position to 
understand what exists, how it could be otherwise, and how things should be 
based on some coherent set of norms and values (Fairclough 2010, p.7). 
 
4.4 Coding discourses about new technology 
To guide and structure the critical discourse analysis, I opted to code the data 
on government discourses around the seven high-level dimensions related to 
new IT offered by Orlikowski and Gash (1992). These dimensions are as 
follows:  
 
Dimension Definition Components 
1. Philosophy 
towards 
technology 
Beliefs and assumptions about technology 
and information technology in general, as 
held by self and perceptions of 
organizations’ philosophy 
Personal philosophy 
Organizational philosophy 
2. Issues around 
initiation 
Knowledge and experiences of the initiation 
stage of a specific technology, including 
background, participants, feasibility 
assessments, and perceptions of the 
technology’s objectives, utility, and 
importance 
Rationale/history 
Costs/benefits 
Decision process 
Managerial support 
3. Issues around 
implementation 
Knowledge and experience of the 
implementation process of a specific 
technology, including background, 
participants, stages, design issues, support 
from users, managers, technologists, and 
others 
Involvement 
Barriers/facilitators 
Cost/scope/time frame 
Training 
Managerial support 
4. Issues around Knowledge and experiences of the use of a Customization 
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Dimension Definition Components 
use specific technology, including frequency 
and discretion of use, level of 
customization, satisfaction, technical 
support, maintenance requirements, and 
expectations and experiences about the 
technology’s criticality, ease of use, 
usefulness, quality, reliability, integrity, and 
availability 
Maintenance 
Technology attributes 
5. Criteria of 
success 
Beliefs about how the success of a specific 
technology is being or should be assessed, 
and which particular criteria and measures 
are or should be used. Assessment of how 
a specific technology is meeting these 
criteria 
Criteria 
Measures 
Experiences 
6. Impact Expectations or experiences about the 
impact of a specific technology on the 
strategy, structure, culture, and way of 
doing business, as well as how a specific 
technology should or has/will change jobs, 
tasks, autonomy, control mechanisms, 
skills/knowledge, responsibility, social 
relations, status, workload and stress 
Organization-wide effects 
Task-level effects 
Individual effects 
7. Relations with 
other players in 
the computing 
social world 
Expectations and experiences about the 
frequency and extent of interaction with 
other  players about IT, the nature of the 
interaction including the role played in this 
relationship, and perceptions of attitude 
towards and understanding of technology 
Managers (senior, middle) 
Technologists 
Users 
Third parties 
Table 4.6: Dimensions, definitions, and components of technological change (Orlikowski & 
Gash 1992) 
 
These dimensions span general philosophical orientations toward technology; 
personal perceptions about how technology is to be initiated, implemented, 
and used within an organization; perspectives on how to measure and 
determine success; expectations of the technology’s impact on the 
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organization; and how the technology implicates others in the organization 
(and beyond). 
 
Orlikowski and Gash’s objective is to track the shifts in the technological 
frames of managers, technologists, and users over time to understand better 
technology-motivated organizational change. By comparing frames across 
groups longitudinally, they believe the researcher can better understand the 
sources of conflict that arise from the introduction of new technology, the 
barriers to change, and both the intended and unintended outcomes (1992, 
p.9). 
 
These dimensions provide the overall structure for the presentation of the first 
part of the analysis (in chapter 6). 
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Chapter 5: Introducing the case study 
 
5.1 Identifying the actors 
 
Due to the intended scope of the proposals, the case of the National Identity 
Scheme (NIS) involved many different actors.15 Therefore, before beginning 
the in-depth analysis of biometrics within these proposals, the immediate aim 
is to identify the main players and their interrelationships. This will help to 
situate and clarify the analysis of the contest of discourses about biometrics. 
These various actors spoke for biometrics in varying capacities and through 
assorted media (including policy documents, conference presentations, 
newspaper interviews, and on-line forums) over the course of the Scheme’s 
existence.  
 
In particular, when I speak of ‘officials’ or ‘the government’ throughout the 
analysis, I am using these terms as a form of short-hand to capture those 
politicians and decision-makers within certain governmental agencies, who 
were responsible for, or provided policy assistance to, the NIS under the 
Labour government. These actors ranged widely and changed frequently as 
                                            
15 These actors are an elaboration of the resistance framework first presented in a published 
paper: “Understanding resistance to digital surveillance: Towards a multi-disciplinary, multi-
actor framework” by Martin et al. (2009). 
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political careers ended and new blood was nominated, or through internal 
promotions and career changes in the civil service. Thus, the first major actor 
in this study (‘the government’) is actually a multitude of related, but distinct 
actors, including different government departments (and the civil servants 
therein) and various Labour party politicians. 
 
• Government departments and their sub-departments 
o Home Office 
 Identity and Passport Service (IPS) (formerly known as 
the Passport Service and before that the Passport 
Agency) 
 Occasionally, the Borders Agency 
o Cabinet Office 
 Office of Government Commerce 
 
• Labour politicians 
o Prime Ministers (Tony Blair and Gordon Brown) 
o Home Secretaries (David Blunkett, Charles Clarke, John Reid, 
Jacqui Smith) 
o Junior Ministers (Andy Burnham, Joan Ryan, Liam Byrne, Meg 
Hillier) 
 
It is these official voices that are present in the vast majority of the policy 
communications analyzed in the first part of the analysis. Where possible and 
relevant, I assign specific individual-level attribution to quotations originating 
from these actors, although occasionally authorship is difficult to discern (as in 
reports from the Home Office). 
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There are also the branches of Parliament that played an important role in the 
Scheme’s development though their oversight of the proposals and 
publication of regular reports related to the government’s plans for identity 
cards. These include: 
 
• Branches of Parliament 
o Home Affairs Select Committee (House of Commons) 
o Select Committee on the Constitution (House of Lords) 
o Joint Committee on Human Rights (including members of both 
Houses) 
 
The Parliamentary record of the extended debates on the identity cards 
program, captured by Hansard, also gives voice to those members of the 
Labour party who did not support their leaders’ proposals, as well as members 
of opposition parties such as the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. 
These actors had the capacity to speak for themselves in Parliament, and also 
in other settings such as at party conferences and at public events. 
 
At times, local governmental bodies proved an interesting point of resistance 
to the Scheme, with certain councils such as those in Sheffield and Liverpool 
City vowing not to co-operate with the IPS during the roll-out of identity cards 
(Council of the City of Sheffield 2009; Anonymous 2009). 
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Other actors, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and 
the EU are spoken for in the debates in relation to specifications and 
requirements for travel documents, for example. 
 
• Other Parliamentary actors 
o Members of the Labour party who disagreed with the proposals 
o Opposition parties (Conservatives, Liberal Democrats) who 
disagreed with the proposals 
o Members of the Conservative and Liberal Democrats who were 
in favor of the proposals 
• Local government organizations (such as councils) 
• External actors (ICAO, the United States, the EU) 
 
There are non-governmental actors as well, which are equally important to the 
story of biometrics, originating in civil society, the scientific community, and 
academia. Sometimes they are spoken for; other times they speak for 
themselves. These actors emerge in different ways, depending on the 
occasion and the medium. For example, in some policy-related 
communications such as the consultation documents, the views of the police, 
unions, activists, experts, and academics emerge. On other occasions, these 
actors manifest themselves in parliamentary debates, when for example 
parliamentarians pose questions to ministers about an expert report on 
biometrics or the view of activists regarding the efficacy of biometrics in 
preventing identity fraud. 
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• Civil society groups (including No2ID and Privacy International, among 
others) 
• Experts (Biometrics Expert Groups, Biometrics Assurance Group, 
Independent Scheme Assurance Panel) 
• Academics (such as the LSE Identity Project and the Foundation for 
Information Policy Research) 
 
Certain of the commercial documents published by the IPS gave rise to 
commercial actors and other potential business partners, including those that 
eventually bid for contracts, those that did not, and those that withdrew from 
the commercial process. Some of these actors re-emerge in the media reports 
about the Scheme, especially in the more business-oriented Financial Times. 
 
• Commercial actors and potential business partners (e.g., Accenture, 
BAE Systems, CSC, EDS, Fujitsu, IBM, Steria, Thales, the Post Office, 
etc.) 
 
The media played a special role in reporting developments around the NIS – 
arguably one of the most highly publicized e-government programs in recent 
history in the UK – by framing the issues and regularly refreshing the 
meanings and significance of the proposals for identity cards. Social science 
research has established that the media play an important role in the general 
social psychology and the formation of public opinion about social issues 
(e.g., Gamson & Modigliani 1989). Indeed, studies of the public’s 
understanding of scientific and technological controversies take this media 
content and treat it as a cultural indicator of public perception (Bauer 2000). 
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• Media (newspapers and on-line media (such as blogs and the 
specialist information technology magazines)) 
 
And, of course, the ‘public’ make regular appearances in these debates, 
represented by those who participated in various ‘customer experience’ 
studies, the survey respondents whose opinions are analyzed in various 
government-commissioned reports, and the participants on the mylifemyid 
web site (an on-line space created by the Home Office where young people 
were asked to share their opinions about the government’s plans), among 
many other outlets. The public is also frequently spoken for by politicians who 
reiterate how strongly the public supported the government’s proposals, for 
example; or by activists who present counterarguments about how the public 
actually detested plans for identity cards. Indeed, the public is continually 
constructed in these discourses by those seeking to enroll them in their 
rhetoric, either positively or negatively, about the NIS. This discursive 
construction of ‘publics’ and their relationship with the identity cards program 
and biometrics will be discussed further in the analysis and discussion 
chapters. 
 
Naturally, there are countless other actors that I have not listed here. The 
point is not to enumerate each and every actor in the relatively short history of 
the NIS, but rather to highlight the main players in this case study, and 
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particularly those relevant to an exploration of public discourses about 
biometrics. 
 
5.2 A brief history of biometrics in the National Identity 
Scheme 
The history of biometrics in the NIS is, in a way, rather ambiguous and 
irregular. Recall that biometrics were only one small part of a much larger set 
of plans for a national identity program in the UK, which was to include other 
technologies such as ‘smart’ cards and new databases for storing citizen’s 
identity-related information. Non-technological components included new legal 
powers for enrolling people into the program and data-sharing mechanisms, 
and even a new government sub-department (i.e., the IPS) to house and 
administer the program.16 There was thus a lot more to the Scheme than just 
the introduction of biometrics. 
 
In many of the documents that I analyzed, biometrics received very little 
attention, and if they were mentioned at all it was in passing. More often than 
not the focus was on outlining why identity cards were necessary or on cost-
related matters, which became an issue of top priority following the publication 
of the LSE Identity Project’s report on the Scheme, which questioned the 
government’s costing of the program (among other issues). In those 
                                            
16 For an extensive history of the National Identity Scheme, see Whitley & Hosein (2010, 
chap.3-4) 
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documents in which biometrics were not the focus, there was very little 
substance on which to build an analysis. However, in other documents the 
topic of biometrics was treated much more considerably and extensively. It is 
from these documents that we can ascertain the history of proposals for 
biometrics within the government’s plans for identity cards. A review of this 
history will allow us to identify the most important moments relating to, or 
implicating biometrics, and from there we can proceed to the main discourse 
analysis. 
 
First and foremost, the government’s plans for biometrics as part of the 
Scheme were never fully explicit or certain. For example, when entitlement 
cards were first proposed by the Labour government in 2002 in a consultation 
paper, the use of biometrics was considered simply an “option” within a much 
larger proposal for an entitlement cards scheme. The inclusion of biometrics 
was said to be ultimately dependent on the feasibility, cost-effectiveness, and, 
importantly, public acceptance of the Home Office’s proposals. 
Another option which the Government would like to explore is the 
recording of biometric information as part of a card scheme. This would 
take the form of recording a fingerprint scan or the image of a person's 
iris (the coloured ring around the eye) as well as a digital photograph 
which is already taken for passports and driving licences. There would 
be strict controls on how this information was used. If it proved feasible 
and cost-effective, recording this information would greatly reduce the 
ability of fraudsters to create multiple false identities and provide a 
powerful way for people to prevent their own identities from being stolen. 
However it is also important that the introduction of this technology 
should be acceptable to the general public and the Government would 
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like to use this consultation exercise to seek people's views. This means 
whether it would be acceptable in principle for this information to be 
recorded and also whether it would be acceptable in practice as people 
would need to go somewhere where the appropriate recording 
equipment was installed when they applied for a card. (Home Office 
2002, p.2, emphasis added) 
 
Eventually this “option” for biometrics became a requirement, enshrined in the 
Identity Cards Act 2006, although the specifics around biometrics in the 
Scheme would remain fuzzy throughout the life of the proposals. For example, 
the decision about which biometrics the government would use to identify 
citizens was never firm. It was deliberately technology-neutral. While facial 
photographs were always considered the most viable and practicable option, 
they were not always spoken about as “biometric” and instead were 
sometimes treated differently. (I explore this categorical tension in-depth in the 
next chapter). 
 
Fingerprints, the most publicly recognizable biometric, were also subject to 
uncertainty in the government’s plans. For example, the original thinking was 
to collect only four fingerprints from citizens. 
Modern fingerprinting systems no longer require fingers to be inked and 
then rolled onto paper. Electronic scanners are now used but these still 
require well trained staff to ensure that fingerprints are properly scanned. 
The Government envisages a much simpler scanning system than that 
used by the police or the Immigration Service, which would probably 
involve just the scanning of four fingers. (Home Office 2002, p.105, 
emphasis added) 
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However, the number of fingerprints to be scanned soon increased to ten – a 
policy decision that seemed as certain as any in the NIS until a leaked 
government document, made public by the activist group No2ID (2007b), 
revealed that the apparently settled policy for everyone to enroll ten 
fingerprints was not necessarily set in stone. In a bullet point in the “Options 
Analysis” document, unnamed decision-makers conceded that the “nature of 
the group(s) selected drives the requirement for the [biometrics] infrastructure 
(especially face vs. fingerprints)” (IPS 2007a, p.2). No2ID interpreted this 
disclosure as an “indication that dropping fingerprints is being considered for 
some groups. This blows apart the government's whole case for the ID 
scheme, which rests on ‘biometrically securing’ personal information and 
preventing multiple/fraudulent applications through biometric cross-checking” 
(No2ID's annotations in IPS 2007a, p.2). 
 
Iris biometrics, on the other hand, were regularly described as a future option 
and were never a guarantee in the NIS. This was despite many bold claims 
made by government officials about what the program was supposed to 
achieve – claims which many experts agreed were impossible without 
incorporating robust and scalable technology such as iris biometrics from the 
outset. For example, claims about effective one-to-many biometric searches 
using fingerprint records in a fully populated NIS were deemed far-fetched by 
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experts, who argued that only iris biometrics were capable of performing on 
this scale. 
 
In 2004, the (then) UK Passport Service commissioned Atos Origin, a 
consultancy, to conduct a biometrics enrollment trial to “help inform the 
Government’s plans to introduce biometrics to support improved identity 
authentication and help prevent identity fraud” (Atos Origin 2005, p.3). The 
trial included more than 10,000 participants from across the UK, who had their 
face, fingerprint, and iris biometrics recorded and subsequently verified. The 
trial was not a success in terms of demonstrating technological reliability, with 
many of the biometrics performing quite poorly (e.g., 39% of 750 disabled 
participants were unable to enroll their iris biometrics). These results led critics 
to question the reliability of biometrics and their proposed use in a national 
identity system. However, the final report on the trial stressed that its objective 
was not to test biometric technology, but rather to “test the processes and 
record customer experience and attitude” (Atos Origin 2005, p.3). That is, to 
test the system’s user friendliness, but not the technology’s reliability. For 
some, this distinction was disingenuous and simply a way to cover up bad 
results (see, for example, Moss 2009). 
 
Then in 2005, the UK Passport Service held a “biometrics roadshow” at 
different locations across the country, where the public was invited to try out 
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biometrics in order to raise awareness about the technology. Members of the 
public were able to have their irises and fingerprints recorded. At the time, 
then-Home Office minister Andy Burnham said: “This roadshow is very much 
a hands-on experience and people will be able to see for themselves how 
biometrics work and what advantages they can bring in safeguarding our 
identities” (Burnham, as quoted in McCue 2005). 
 
The role of expertise and expert oversight is another notable, if not curious, 
theme in the history of biometrics in the Scheme. In 2004, the Home Affairs 
Committee recommended that the government’s Chief Scientific Officer 
oversee the development of biometrics in the Scheme (p.59), but this 
apparently never happened. Instead, a Biometrics Assurance Group was 
eventually formed, which comprised of experts in biometrics who were 
expected to review the biometric components of the Scheme. This group 
released two reports, in 2007 and 2008, but was disbanded thereafter for 
reasons that remain unclear.  It is also uncertain what influence their policy 
guidance and recommendations had on the plans for biometrics in the 
Scheme. 
 
Another major biometrics-related policy change was the decision for the Home 
Office not to enroll biometrics in-house, but rather to look to the market for 
ways of outsourcing this function. This decision, publicized in 2008, was an 
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apparent attempt to reduce the cost to the Home Office of recording people’s 
biometrics, with the idea being that people would pay out-of-pocket to enroll 
their own biometrics at a high street location such as the Post Office or 
pharmacy. While this move to the market never reached fruition (as the 
Scheme was scrapped before the contracting processes were complete), the 
desire to offload this aspect of the Scheme onto third parties represents an 
important event in the history of the NIS. 
 
5.3 Critical moments for biometrics 
As already noted, the second half of the analysis is focused around six 
different events related to biometrics that occurred as part of, or alongside, 
developments in the NIS. These are presented again in summary form in 
Table 5.1, with an explanation for their inclusion following. 
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Critical event Date Period for which data is 
collected 
The re-introduction of the 
Identity Cards Bill to 
Parliament following the 
general election of 2005, 
which coincided with the 
publication of a report by the 
consultancy, Atos Origin, with 
the findings from a trial of 
biometrics 
25 May 2005 25 May 2005 – 25 June 2005 
The day the Identity Cards 
Bill received Royal Assent, 
thus becoming the Identity 
Cards Act 2006 
30 March 2006 30 March 2006 – 6 April 2006 
The period in which iris 
biometrics began to be 
downplayed in policy 
communications 
December 2006 - January 
2007 
December 2006 - January 
2007 
The publication of the 
National Identity Scheme 
Strategic Supplier 
Framework 
9 August 2007 9-17 August 2007 
The period following the 
HMRC data breach 
20 November 2007 20-28 November 2007 
The launch of the foreign 
national ID card, which 
coincided with the move to 
the market for biometric 
enrollment through the 
publication of the Front Office 
Services Prospectus 
document by the IPS 
November 2008 – December 
2008 
November 2008 – December 
2008 
Table 5.1: Critical moments for biometrics in the NIS 
 
1. The Identity Cards Bill: The re-introduction of the Identity Cards Bill to 
Parliament after the general election of 2005 clearly marks an important 
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moment in the history of the Scheme. It followed nearly three years of 
consultations, impact assessments, and debates about the merits and 
drawbacks of a national identity card, as well as an unsuccessful attempt at 
passing the legislation during the previous Parliament. It also re-energized 
both Members of Parliament and activists, who further scrutinized the 
government’s plans, including its proposals for biometrics. This event initiated 
a series of new battles within Parliament about certain controversial aspects 
of the proposed Scheme, a tug-of-war between the House of Commons and 
House of Lords regarding the bill’s appropriateness, and a vocal public debate 
that played out in the popular press. 
 
Coincidentally, the very same day as the re-introduction of the Bill, the 
government released research findings from the Atos Origin trial of biometrics 
enrollment. Certain of the findings from the trial also made their way into 
critical news reporting on the Scheme. 
 
2. The Bill becomes an Act: This event signifies a political victory for the 
Labour government: the legislation of the Scheme, which was one of the 
party’s election manifesto commitments. It follows almost a year of vitriolic 
political debate, including numerous amendments to the Bill’s original text. 
 
 180
3. Iris biometrics become even less certain: Whereas hitherto iris biometrics 
were almost always listed as an option in the NIS, sometime in late 2006 they 
started disappearing or being downplayed in government discourses on the 
Scheme. This marks an important moment in the Scheme’s history because it 
is widely accepted in the scientific and technological community that relying 
on fingerprints alone to ‘uniquely identify’ everyone in a national population of 
around 60 million people (the current size of the UK’s population) is highly 
problematic. Yet, this unannounced policy shift did not noticeably affect the 
government’s ambitions for biometrics in the Scheme. 
 
To demonstrate this gradual policy shift: Iris biometrics were explicitly 
mentioned in the Identity Cards Act 2006 (“biometric information is data about 
[an individual’s] external characteristics, including, in particular, the features of 
an iris or of any other part of the eye”). The December 2006 Strategic Action 
Plan downplayed the role of irises, noting that “When you enrol into the 
Scheme, your fingerprint biometrics (all 10 fingerprints) will be recorded and 
stored in the National Identity Register…The introduction of iris biometrics 
also remains an option” (2006, p.16). Then the Delivery Plan, published in 
2008, made no mention of iris technologies. 
 
4. Strategic Supplier Framework: The publication of this document marked the 
beginning of the Home Office’s procurement for the Scheme. It was intended 
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for commercial parties interested in bidding for work to help the government 
deliver its system. The document acknowledges that the government did not 
have the expertise, skills, and capacity to deliver the Scheme on its own. The 
government thus hoped for these bidders to become “long-term partners” of 
the IPS. 
 
At the time, the document also represented the official current thinking of the 
IPS on the design of the Scheme, which went through various iterations 
during its existence. 
 
5. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs breaches data security and the 
public’s trust: While this event was not directly related to the NIS, it had major 
consequences on official discourses about the government’s ability to secure 
citizens’ personal data and the role of biometrics in data security. A series of 
parliamentary debates and frenetic media reportage followed (then) 
Chancellor Alistair Darling’s announcement to Parliament that HRMC had lost 
two compact discs with the records of 25 million people. Among other things, 
these debates and media reports focused on whether the inclusion of 
biometrics would have prevented or lessened the impact of the breach. 
Certain statements in Parliament by members of the government regarding 
the capacity of biometrics to prevent lost data such as those in the HMRC 
dataset from being misused led a group of experts to openly criticize these 
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assertions as “a fairy tale view” of what biometrics are about (Anderson et al. 
2007). This was an unusual and unexpected moment in which numerous 
parliamentarians opined openly and at length about biometrics. 
 
6. Launch of the foreign national ‘identity card’ and a move to the market for 
biometric enrollment services: In November 2008 the Home Office began 
issuing the first biometric immigration documents to foreign nationals, 
regularly referring to them as ‘identity cards’. While technically not identity 
cards in the sense that they did not fall under the legal remit of Identity Cards 
Act 2006, they were publicized as such by government officials keen to show 
that the Scheme was on track and, indeed, a ‘reality’. As with the soon-to-be-
issued UK national identity cards, these documents involved the collection of 
fingerprint biometrics and digital facial photographs from enrollees. 
 
On the same day, the Home Office issued a prospectus in which it reached 
out to the market for help in providing a “biometric enrollment service”, with 
the idea being that companies would compete to collect citizens’ biometrics 
for the government in exchange for a fee. In selling this idea to potential 
service providers, the government also noted that further benefits to 
companies would include a new revenue stream, increased footfall, access to 
new customer segments, an association with a respected and trusted brand, 
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and goodwill generated by providing a valuable public service (IPS 2008f, 
p.5). 
 
These events represent important moments for biometrics (and the 
organizations involved in trying to innovate them as part of the NIS). We will 
return to them again in chapter 7, where we analyze media reportage and 
parliamentary debates concerning the Scheme. In the next chapter, we focus 
on the government’s policy discourses regarding biometrics. 
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Chapter 6: Analysis (I) 
The security and reliability of biometrics are at the heart of the 
Government’s case for their proposals [for a national ID card program]. 
We note that no comparable system of this size has been introduced 
anywhere in the world. The system proposed would therefore be 
breaking new ground. - House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 
(2004, p.4, emphasis added) 
 
You're walking into Tesco for a tin of baked beans: “Hang on, I only want 
baked beans. What do you want my iris for?” - Focus group interviewee 
(cited from Cragg Ross Dawson 2004b, p.18) 
 
As for the biometric technology, we have invaluable experience in 
managing biometric systems to draw on which will reduce our delivery 
risk.  People who suggest that this is novel, untried technology seem to 
forget that there are many operational successful biometric systems 
within government ­ for example, we have over 6 million sets of 
fingerprints on police systems and hundreds of thousands of fingerprints 
taken for immigration purposes. - Joan Ryan, former Parliamentary 
Under Secretary of State for nationality, citizenship, and immigration at 
the Home Office (2006, p.3, emphasis added) 
 
Biometric technologies will gather momentum over the coming years and 
we can expect improvements in technology and a deeper understanding 
of the management and operation of biometric systems. - Independent 
Scheme Assurance Panel (2008, p.15) 
 
In fact, I don't actually think most of the general public think that the use 
of biometrics is in itself wrong, either for private transactions or for 
passports or whatever. – Former Prime Minister Gordon Brown (as cited 
in Watt 2008) 
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6.1 Introduction 
This chapter opens with five quotations concerning the potential future use of 
biometrics in the National Identity Scheme (NIS). Each quotation depicts and 
frames the issues of biometrics in a different way. 
 
In the first quotation, we are told by the Home Affairs Committee that the 
government’s proposals for biometrics were groundbreaking – an innovation 
even – with questions about the security and reliability of biometrics at their 
core. The second quotation is from a member of the public, who was asked 
his opinion of the government’s proposals. (He uses humor to emphasize 
valid concerns regarding the principle and proportionality of biometric checks.) 
Third is a short quotation from the Independent Scheme Assurance Panel, an 
independent advisory group tasked with overseeing the Scheme’s 
development, which reflects a technologically deterministic view of biometrics. 
The fourth quotation re-frames the debate by stressing the government’s 
important experience in operating and managing large-scale biometric 
systems – experience which would serve them well in the future, we are told. 
Last is a quotation from former Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who 
discursively frames a public that is willing to accept biometrics into their lives. 
 
Each of these quotations speaks to important themes and issues around 
biometrics that will be explored in this chapter. Rarely does society face a 
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proposal of such magnitude, complexity, and divisiveness – one which 
engenders such a wide range of reactions to and interpretations of a new 
technology. The UK’s proposals for biometrics provide us with an opportunity 
to explore the diverse and shifting discourses that surrounded the attempted 
diffusion of a politically charged and controversial technological innovation. 
 
As previously explained, the first part of the critical discourse analysis (this 
chapter) is structured around Orlikowski and Gash’s (1992) seven dimensions 
of new technology (to reiterate, these are: philosophy towards technology, 
issues around initiation, issues around implementation, issues around use, 
criteria of success, impact, and relations with other players in the social 
computing world). The second part of the analysis (in the next chapter) is 
presented around the six moments of interest in the Scheme’s history and 
analyzes the Hansard debates and media coverage around these moments. 
 
To provide a flavor of the type of analysis I undertake in this chapter and the 
next, recall the following extended quotation, which first appeared in the 
previous chapter, regarding the “option” of using biometrics within the Scheme 
(which at the time was still being referred to by government as an entitlement 
card scheme). 
Another option which the Government would like to explore is the 
recording of biometric information as part of a card scheme. This would 
take the form of recording a fingerprint scan or the image of a person's 
iris (the coloured ring around the eye) as well as a digital photograph 
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which is already taken for passports and driving licences. There would 
be strict controls on how this information was used. If it proved feasible 
and cost-effective, recording this information would greatly reduce the 
ability of fraudsters to create multiple false identities and provide a 
powerful way for people to prevent their own identities from being stolen. 
However it is also important that the introduction of this technology 
should be acceptable to the general public and the Government would 
like to use this consultation exercise to seek people's views. This means 
whether it would be acceptable in principle for this information to be 
recorded and also whether it would be acceptable in practice as people 
would need to go somewhere where the appropriate recording 
equipment was installed when they applied for a card. (Home Office 
2002, p.2, emphasis added) 
 
From the perspective of a critical discourse analysis, there is a lot to unpack in 
this passage from the government’s initial proposal for biometrics. For one, 
note how biometrics are understood as “information” and how examples of 
biometrics are provided to elucidate the concept, along with short descriptions 
of each method. We are reminded that digital photographs are already a 
reality in other identity documents. The passage also speaks of “recording” 
and “scanning” biometrics – two very specific, technical processes. Certain 
problem frames immediately emerge in this passage as well, including how 
biometrics could help to prevent the use of fraudulent identities as well as 
secure our own identities from external threats. These are rhetorical trends 
that persisted over time as the government communicated its plans for the 
Scheme. 
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Second, note how the public is already brought into the fold, with the 
government promising public consultation and an assessment of public 
acceptance. In particular, the Home Office is keen to acknowledge the 
practical matter of requiring everyone to travel to some location to enroll their 
biometrics. This point draws on a frame of convenience. 
 
In this first instance of proposing biometrics, the Home Office (under then-
Home Secretary David Blunkett) was already expressing an interest in 
recording multiple biometrics (in this passage, a digital photograph, 
fingerprints, and irises). These three types of biometrics feature extensively 
throughout government discourses, although as discussed earlier, doubts 
around the use of irises (as well as fingerprints) did arise, bringing important 
rhetorical and practical consequences. For now it suffices to appreciate the 
immensity and complexity of such an undertaking such – one which aims to 
build a national identity system from scratch and collect multiple biometrics 
from an entire national population and certain foreign visitors. 
 
For some, this early proposal for a national entitlement scheme (soon 
thereafter rebranded as a “National Identity Scheme”, and then again a 
“National Identity Service”) might be unproblematic. The extract appears to be 
a basic introduction to biometrics and some of the surrounding problems, such 
as identity fraud. However, from a critical discourse analysis perspective, one 
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can make a number of important observations and insights. First, biometrics 
are described as “information”, which perhaps appears a natural way to 
describe them. 
 
But another description of biometrics from the very same 2002 consultation 
document on entitlement cards states that they are: 
Things which you ‘are’ i.e. your biometric identity. These are attributes 
which are unique to an individual and include fingerprints, iris patterns 
(the coloured part of the eye around the pupil), and DNA profile. Physical 
appearance can also be regarded as a form of biometric identity 
provided the method of checking it (e.g. computer analysis of physical 
features) is sophisticated enough to allow for changes e.g. growing a 
beard, ageing or minor cosmetic surgery. (Home Office 2002, p.100, 
emphasis added) 
 
Here biometrics are described as “attributes” rather than “information”. The 
authors at the Home Office list both fingerprints and iris patterns as examples 
of biometrics, along with DNA profiling. Considering the very different set of 
ethical, technical, and operational aspects that DNA engenders, it is a curious 
biometric to include as an example in a document on entitlement cards. But 
this is not the only occasion on which it is mentioned. 
 
This second passage also states that physical appearance could be 
considered “a form of biometric identity”, assuming it satisfies certain technical 
requirements. This question of when a bodily feature is actually ‘biometric’ 
persists throughout the documents and discussions on the NIS, serving a key 
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rhetorical function. We will return to this theme, for it is an important one in the 
case. Finally, here we also see another prominent theme emerge – that 
biometrics are ‘unique’ to an individual. This supposed advantage of 
biometrics is by far the most discussed benefit in the official discourses, and 
so the question of uniqueness is also something that will be explored in this 
chapter. 
 
6.2 The essence of biometrics 
Starting with Orlikowski and Gash’s first dimension relating to philosophical 
aspects of technology, in this section I want to explore the contested ontology 
of biometrics in government discourses. This involves reviewing the wide 
range of descriptive frames that the government used in policy documents 
and public statements to explain what biometrics ‘are’ (see Table 6.1). Thus 
far we have read that biometrics are ‘information’ but that they are also 
‘attributes’. Perhaps this particular duality can be reconciled by describing 
biometrics as ‘information about attributes’, but other documents tell a 
different story about the potential ontology of biometrics. The descriptive 
frames that appear in government discourses on biometrics range from the 
literal and technical (e.g., biometrics as “data” or “technology”) through to the 
figurative (e.g., biometrics as a “safeguard” or a “gold standard”), and include 
the use of simile (e.g., biometrics as a “lock” on identity). Altogether, they 
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reveal an ongoing process of sense-making around biometrics in government 
policy discourses.
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What are 
biometrics? 
Illustrative quotation Comments 
Markers “The concept of a biometric 
marker on key documents 
used as evidence of identity 
has attractions.” (Cabinet 
Office 2002) 
This term has potentially 
negative connotations 
(i.e., “mark of the 
beast”). It was soon 
disused 
Attributes “Biometric identity: attributes 
that are unique to an individual, 
i.e. fingerprints, voice, retina, 
facial structure, DNA profile, 
and geometry, heat radiation, 
etc.” (House of Commons 
2004) 
Attributes are typically 
understood as 
properties that define an 
entity – this definition 
emphasizes those 
physical attributes that 
are “unique” to 
individuals 
What are 
biometrics? 
Illustrative quotation Comments 
Digital records “The Home Office described a 
biometric as ‘a digital record of 
a particular physical 
characteristic that is unique to 
each individual, such as 
fingerprints or the shape of a 
person’s face’.” (House of 
Commons Home Affairs 
Committee 2004) 
Not just a record, but a 
digital one; like some of 
the others, this definition 
stresses the physical-
ness and uniqueness of 
biometrics 
A concept “Initial responses to the use of 
biometrics depended largely on 
familiarity with the concept.” 
(Home Office 2004a) 
A more philosophical 
understanding of 
biometrics 
Part of the gold 
standard of 
identity 
“The rigour of the application 
process and the uniqueness of 
the biometric will mean that, in 
time, the identity card will 
become the gold standard way 
of proving identity throughout 
the UK.” (Home Office 2004b) 
In this analogy, 
biometrics are to identity 
as the gold standard is 
to the monetary system; 
that is, a stable and 
recognizable reference 
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What are 
biometrics? 
Illustrative quotation Comments 
A technology “Recent events have brought 
home how, in today's rapidly 
changing world, the need for 
trust and confidence actually 
require us to move beyond this 
and take the opportunity of 
new biometric technology 
which allows for a completely 
new level of verifying identity.” 
(Home Office 2004c) 
Is this a single 
technology, or many? If 
the latter, what 
important issues are 
obscured by reference 
to a singular biometric 
technology? 
Information “Recording biometric 
information will take place at 
local and regional, convenient 
access points and will help to 
ensure that an identity record 
is associated with information 
unique to that person.” (Home 
Office 2004c) 
Recordable information 
What are 
biometrics? 
Illustrative quotation Comments 
A use “Biometrics, the use of eyes, 
the use of fingerprints is now a 
certainty in a way that never 
was before so therefore 
identification either whether it 
be on border controls or 
whether we have to deal with 
stop and search in the street, 
anti-terrorism kind of activity or 
even along the normal way that 
police officers work would give 
a certainty we need.” (Home 
Office 2004d) 
Here biometrics are 
explained, not in terms 
of information, data, or 
technology, but as a use 
of particular parts of the 
body; where is IT in this 
conceptualization? 
Furthermore, biometrics 
are spoken of as a 
certainty – as something 
that will happen 
Characteristics “A biometric is a unique 
personal physical characteristic 
such as a fingerprint or iris 
pattern.” (Atos Origin 2005) 
As with attributes, 
characteristics are 
supposed to be 
distinctive 
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What are 
biometrics? 
Illustrative quotation Comments 
A procedure or 
process 
“There were few objections to 
biometric procedures among 
the able-bodied, but those with 
special issues expressed 
anxieties about the physical 
process and how it might 
cause them difficulties.  Muslim 
women also had worries about 
aspects of enrolment, 
particularly to do with possible 
physical contact and removal 
of hijab or burkha.” (Home 
Office 2005b) 
This quotation picks up 
on the physical nature of 
the processes of 
biometric enrollment. It 
captures how biometrics 
can be seen as more 
than simply data or 
information, but rather 
as part of a larger set of 
processes and 
experiences 
A capability “In the future, foreign nationals 
will have to invest their time to 
travel to an enrolment centre 
for their biometrics to be 
recorded and pay an additional 
price for biometric capability of 
a product.” (Home Office 
2005f) 
This speaks to the 
understanding of 
biometrics as a facility or 
potentiality, rather than 
an actuality 
What are 
biometrics? 
Illustrative quotation Comments 
Images “The chip will hold data in line 
with International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) 
recommendations, including a 
biometric image of the bearer's 
face.” (IPS 2006a) 
By this definition, a 
biometric can exist in the 
form of an image; it is 
thus a reproduction of 
something 
Data “The biometric data held by the 
Scheme has the potential to 
make the work of the police in 
detecting crime a lot easier.” 
(IPS 2006a) 
See the debates about 
the ontological 
differences between 
data and information 
(Boland et al. 1987; 
Buckland 1991)  
Traits “A measurable, physical 
characteristic or personal 
behavioural trait used to 
recognise the identity or verify 
the claimed identity.” (IPS 
2006b) 
Biometrics are not just 
any trait, but those that 
are measurable; this 
begs the question of 
what we mean by 
measurement 
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What are 
biometrics? 
Illustrative quotation Comments 
Features “Documentation issued to non-
British citizens will also include 
all the biometric features of the 
ID card and holders will be 
entered onto the National 
Identity Register, enabling 
them to prove their identity to 
the same standard as a British 
citizen.” (IPS 2006b) 
As with attributes and 
characteristics, features 
are usually considered 
distinct properties of 
something; thus, the 
distinctiveness of 
biometrics re-emerges 
as a frame 
A step change “The real step change in the 
National Identity Scheme is 
that biometrics, such as 
fingerprints, will be recorded 
and linked to a single, 
confirmed biographical record 
(covering name, address, etc.)” 
(IPS 2006c) 
This point connotes the 
perception that 
biometrics in this case 
are an innovation – a 
major change in identity 
assurance 
What are 
biometrics? 
Illustrative quotation Comments 
Part of a vision “Our vision is a universal identit
y management scheme with 
identity information securely     
linked to individuals through 
biometrics.” (Ryan 2006) 
I explore the role of 
biometrics in the 
government’s vision for 
identity management in 
this chapter 
Measures “Clients will demonstrate their 
right to that credential through 
the use of, in the case of digital 
certificates, a private key and 
using a password or biometric 
measure.” (Cabinet Office 
2006a) 
This again raises the 
question of what is 
being measured, and 
how 
Records “The increasing number of 
biometric records will also 
make it easier to detect illegal 
working.” (Home Office 2006) 
Full of interpretations 
(administrative, 
bureaucratic, technical) 
Link “Biometric technology now 
means that we can link people 
to a unique identity.” (Home 
Office 2006) 
It seems to be assumed 
that such links are 
strong ones; could there 
be weak links? 
 196
What are 
biometrics? 
Illustrative quotation Comments 
Group of 
technologies 
“The term refers to a group of 
technologies used for fully 
automated recognition of a 
person based on physiological 
(e.g. face, iris, fingerprints) or 
behavioural (e.g. signature 
dynamics, voice) 
characteristics.” (NAO 2007) 
Not just a single 
technology, but a family 
of them; note how 
biometrics are said to be 
fully automated, 
involving not just the 
physiology, but also 
behaviors 
Electronic 
records 
“The identity card will lock 
together your basic identifying 
details with a combination of 
your unique personal features 
– electronic records of your 
face and fingerprints – because 
these are very hard to forge, 
steal, forget or lose.” (IPS 
2008a) 
Biometrics are 
understood here as 
electronic records 
(rather than digital 
ones), which form an 
odd relationship with an 
identity card and one’s 
“identifying details”. 
Where is the person in 
this relationship? 
What are 
biometrics? 
Illustrative quotation Comments 
A safeguard “The major new safeguard 
included when you enrol for 
either a passport or an identity 
card will be an image of your 
fingerprints.” (IPS 2008a) 
If biometrics such as 
fingerprints are a 
safeguard, against what 
are they a precautionary 
measure? 
A fix “By recording a person’s 
fingerprints, we can now fix a 
person to a single identity 
making it simpler to check 
whether someone is who they 
say they are.” (UK Borders 
Agency 2008b) 
This terms engenders 
multiple meanings, 
including the 
stabilization of identity, 
but also its mending 
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What are 
biometrics? 
Illustrative quotation Comments 
A service For biometric information, we 
will initially use existing 
biometric systems used for 
asylum seekers and biometric 
visas to meet our short-term 
needs, moving to new 
biometric services when the 
NIR is fully operational.” (IPS 
2008c) 
This understanding of 
biometrics as a function 
or service to be provided 
by government (or a 
contracted third party) 
reflects a business logic; 
in treating biometrics as 
a service, do citizens 
therefore become 
customers? 
A tie “Biometrics will tie an individual 
securely to a single unique 
identity.” (IPS 2008c) 
Figurative language 
used to describe the 
processes of linking, 
fastening, and securing 
identity 
A bind(ing) “It will be reliable because it 
will use physical evidence – 
photograph and fingerprints – 
to bind personal information to 
its owner.” (IPS 2008d) 
Connotes the securing 
of identity through 
“physical evidence”; also 
note the reference to 
ownership 
What are 
biometrics? 
Illustrative quotation Comments 
Evidence “It will be reliable because it 
will use physical evidence – 
photograph and fingerprints – 
to bind personal information to 
its owner.” (IPS 2008d) 
Here biometrics are 
given an evidentiary 
status, using physical 
information as a “bind” 
Identifiers “Each person’s identity will be 
secured by the registering of a 
number of biometric identifiers, 
such as fingerprints and facial 
images. The recording of iris 
biometrics is also an option.” 
(IPS 2008e) 
An identifier is 
something that identifies 
and, thus, this definition 
is somewhat tautological 
Details “For customers who apply in 
person, rather than online, this 
service will help them through 
the application process, 
recording both their biographic 
and biometric details.” (IPS 
2008f) 
Conceiving biometrics 
as “details” takes them 
as something that can 
be treated granularly, 
such as a name or 
phone number 
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What are 
biometrics? 
Illustrative quotation Comments 
Lock “The person is then locked into 
the identity using biometrics –  
photograph and in future 
fingerprints.” (Hillier 2008a) 
This conceptualizes 
biometrics as both 
strong and durable 
Something “…something you are (e.g. a 
picture or other biometric such 
as fingerprints).” (Crosby 2008) 
This bypasses the 
representational aspect 
to explain biometrics as 
what we are 
Table 6.1: Descriptive frames for biometrics in analyzed government 
communications (presented chronologically and with emphases added)
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One might argue that this review of frames is nothing more than petty 
semantic hair splitting – that a certain degree of flexibility or looseness in 
terminology is to be expected and should not matter in the grand scheme of a 
project such as the NIS. Indeed, the organizing vision concept accepts that 
language about new technology will be incoherent and ambiguous, which is 
viewed as potentially a positive thing as it provides the vision “a capacity to 
grow, undergo refinement, and benefit from experiments-in-practice” 
(Swanson & Ramiller 1997, p.463). This may be so, but such looseness can 
also be detrimental in the long-term, especially in the technology policy arena 
in which the language used to describe and communicate ideas about 
technology has special import. I elaborate on these points later on. For now, 
what is important is to recognize that biometrics cannot be viewed as a single, 
unproblematic, unified thing – they are technologically multiple and 
ontologically ambiguous. 
 
Biometrics can be understood in many different ways, depending on who is 
speaking and the context in which s/he is communicating. Even these basic 
descriptive frames are rife with variation. More than simply varying, these 
understandings are also occasionally potentially contradictory; e.g., are 
biometrics something that we are, information (or data) about parts of our 
body, or the use of that information (or data)? It is these controversies about 
the nature and state of biometrics which provide an opening to interrogate the 
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contest of discourses and construction of meaning around the biometric 
artifact in this case study (cf. Venturini 2009). 
 
Problematic epistemologies 
The very initial proposal for biometrics in the first consultation document 
included explicit mention of three different biometric methods (i.e., fingerprint, 
iris, and face). The second passage made reference to fingerprints, iris 
patterns, and DNA profiles, as well as one’s physical appearance. 
 
In the many documents that I analyzed, the use of the term ‘biometrics’ is very 
often accompanied by particular examples of biometrics (primarily fingerprints, 
with the ‘other’ biometrics including digital photography and iris, and very 
infrequently more ‘traditional’ biometrics such as signatures). What is it about 
the concept of biometrics that, when it is communicated as part of the 
proposals for a national identity scheme, it must consistently be exemplified in 
this manner? 
 
In contrast, in the same policy documents other technological concepts such 
as ‘identity cards’, ‘passports’, and ‘databases’ do not require the same sort of 
explanation and exemplification. One might argue that this is due to the fact 
that identity cards, passports, and databases are ‘old’ technologies, and that 
biometrics are somehow newer and thus require more careful explanation. 
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Perhaps, but this distinction between new and old technology is dubious. The 
practice of biometrics has been around for centuries as part of traditional 
forensic techniques. On the other hand, national identity cards have an 
irregular history in the UK and are in some respects ‘newer’ in this context. 
Electronic databases are likewise a relatively recent invention. We therefore 
need to dig deeper to understand these discourses. 
 
I want to suggest that the concept of biometrics is vague, awkward, and even 
alien. It can be perplexing and its dictionary definition is largely unhelpful. It is 
not always entirely clear what is meant when people use the term, including 
government officials in the case at hand. Perhaps suspicious of this, during 
the consultation period for ‘entitlement cards’ and again during a subsequent 
consultation on ‘identity cards’, the government commissioned a series of 
studies on public perceptions in order to explore these very issues. 
 
One of the important findings from the first of these studies was that the “term 
‘biometrics’ was rarely known” by interview respondents (Cragg Ross Dawson 
2004c, p.59). In the Home Office’s summary of findings from the consultation 
on identity cards they noted that: “Awareness of the term ‘biometric 
information’ was low - at least 70% amongst each sample had not heard of 
the term before” (2004a, p.86). 
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As plans for identity cards progressed, these findings were echoed in Tracking 
Research surveys conducted by the Central Office of Information (COI) on 
behalf of the Identity and Passport Service (IPS), in which it was repeatedly 
found that less than half of the respondents were aware of the term 
‘biometrics’ (Central Office of Information 2007a; Central Office of Information 
2007b). I also observed this lack of awareness in my focus group interviews, 
in which my first mention of the term usually brought blank stares, so I can 
confirm these findings. 
 
This then raises a number of questions about the use of the term. If study 
after study concluded that the term ‘biometrics’ was confusing and alienating, 
why then did policy-makers continue using it in policy documents, speeches, 
and so forth? Why not revert to speaking specifically about the particular 
biometrics under consideration, such as fingerprints or irises? What can 
explain the term’s currency? 
 
I recall attending a public speech on ID cards at the Social Market Foundation 
in 2010 given by the (then) Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office, Meg 
Hiller, who momentarily went off-script to openly confess that she “hated” the 
term ‘biometrics’. Even so, she continued using the term that day as she 
promoted identity cards for the disempowered. Biometrics were obviously an 
important component of her vision for an inclusive national identity system, 
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even if the term itself was unsatisfactory. Why was such a frustrating term so 
convenient for the government sponsors of the NIS? 
 
In seeking answers we can look to the literature on technology and policy. 
Whitley and Hosein (2010, chap.7) have described a similar phenomenon as 
“intentional ambiguity” about technology, whereby members of the UK 
government appeared to intentionally obfuscate the issue of the voluntariness 
of the Scheme (that is, whether people would have a choice to enroll their 
data in the identity card program). Their point was that members of the 
government were intentionally equivocal in their public statements about the 
legal compulsion to apply for an ID card due to the political sensitivity around 
the issue.  
 
It is not clear if the routine use of the term ‘biometrics’ in this case qualifies as 
an instance of intentional ambiguity or if it represents another discursive 
dynamic. While it appears to have been a strategic discursive move – that is, 
part of a larger rhetorical plan to sell the merits of identity cards – in some 
ways it seems to have been a form of unintentional ambiguity. That is, 
uncertainty and ambiguity about a relatively unfamiliar concept – something 
which most people, including the politicians in this case, would probably know 
very little about and with which they would have had little or no prior 
experience using. In other words, if it was repeatedly discovered in the Home 
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Office’s research that people remained unaware of biometrics, then perhaps it 
is not too far of a stretch to think that policy-makers and political leaders were 
also inclined to misunderstanding, miscommunication, and ambiguity in their 
discourses. To take a particularly egregious example, in a House of Commons 
research paper from 2004 ‘ethnicity’ is said to be a “biometric detail” (2004, 
pp.37-38) (which, by nearly every expert account, it is not). 
 
On the other hand, one could argue that the term ‘biometrics’ served as a 
strategic discursive catch-all, which was used by officials in a way that made it 
difficult to question or take issue with certain aspects of proposals for the NIS 
without getting into the technicalities of biometrics. By speaking of ‘biometrics’ 
in general, they did not have to engage with the important differences among 
the various biometric modes (including error rates and the required 
infrastructures), while being able to convey a sense of progress and 
innovation in their proposals.17 
 
If the term ‘biometrics’ is difficult to comprehend, then perhaps talking 
specifically about the various biometric technologies that are of interest in a 
given project would help to alleviate some of this confusion. This is essentially 
the ‘exemplification strategy’ discussed above. However, this too brings with it 
certain problems, as these different technologies are also relatively novel and 
                                            
17 Indeed, in some of the documents I analyzed, ‘biometrics’ is a term that is used excessively 
– at times, it appears, as often as possible, even when the term adds very little to the 
meaning of a remark. 
 205
unfamiliar to many, particularly as part of a proposal for a national identity 
system (as opposed to the practice of fingerprinting in police work, for 
example). 
 
From the analysis of six years of policy discourses emerged a list of different 
terms that were used to describe the three ‘main’ biometrics proposed within 
the Scheme (see Table 6.2). 
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Fingerprints Iris (or eye) biometrics Face biometrics 
Fingerprints (276) Iris patterns (32) Facial image (48) 
Digital fingerprints (39) Iris biometric(s) (29) Digital photograph (39) 
Fingerprint biometrics 
(35) 
Iris image (16) Photo biometric (29) 
Fingerprint scan (8) Iris recognition (9) Facial recognition (26) 
Fingerprint images (8) Iris photograph (8) Facial biometrics (21) 
Biometric fingerprints (6) Iris scanning (8) Face biometrics (16) 
Fingerprint data (5) Irises (6) Photograph biometrics 
(11) 
Fingerprint checks (3) Eye biometrics (“any 
other part of the eye”) (5) 
Facial photograph (7) 
Fingerprint identifiers (2) Iris scans (4) Facial recognition 
technology (4) 
Fingerprint pattern (2) Eye, the use of (4) Face recognition (3) 
Fingerprint recognition 
(1) 
Iris features (3) Digital facial image (3) 
Fingerprint technology 
(1) 
Retina (3) Photograph of his head 
and shoulders (3) 
Fingerprint templates (1) Eye scans (2) Facial data (2) 
Fingers (1) Iris digital photograph (1) Facial digital photograph 
(2) 
  Iris imaging (1) Facial measurements (2) 
Iris picture (1) Facial recognition image 
biometric (2) 
Iris recognition data (1) Facial structure (2) 
Iris scan data (1) Digitalized photograph 
(2) 
A third biometric (iris) (1) Digitized facial image (2) 
Retinal patterns (1) Digitized photograph (2) 
  Photograph (2) 
Physical appearance (1) 
Picture (1) 
  
Face (1) 
Facial characteristics (1) 
 
Table 6.2: Terms used to describe fingerprint, iris, and face biometrics in government policy 
communications (the # in parenthesis beside each term denotes the frequency with which it 
appeared in the analyzed data) 
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While some of these distinctions might be understandable from a technical 
point of view (e.g., when distinguishing between a fingerprint template and a 
fingerprint image (see Chapter 2)), one could argue that the rest are simply 
different ways of describing the same general idea about a given biometric. 
 
However, these different understandings have import. What is of immediate 
interest is not the ‘correct’ interpretation of biometrics, but rather the different 
ways in which a new and uncertain technology is described and 
conceptualized in this policy context. For example, the uncertainty around the 
specifics of using the eye as a biometric identifier is common, so it is not 
surprising to see generic references to “eye scans” and the occasional 
reference to using retinas in government policy statements. In fact, this 
distinction between iris and retina biometrics became a major point of 
contention in public debates between politicians and experts involved in 
evaluating the Scheme, with strong accusations of technical incompetence 
charged at academics who attempted to engage the government concerning 
its proposals. In its interim report on the government’s proposals for identity 
cards, the LSE Identity Project mistakenly used the term ‘retina’ instead of 
‘iris’. Cambridge computer scientist John Daugman, then a government expert 
advising the Home Office on the biometrics component of the Scheme, picked 
up on these mistakes, calling them “persistent errors of fact” and using the 
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incident as evidence that the research team at LSE was determined to kill the 
Scheme no matter what (LSE Identity Project 2006). 
 
Another notable observation from the categories listed in Table 6.2 is the very 
different ways in which face biometrics are described. What explains this 
categorical uncertainty? Is a face biometric simply a picture? A picture of 
what? A picture of the face, or of the head and the shoulders? How important 
is the process of digitization to a picture becoming ‘biometric’? And when does 
the ‘recognition’ element of face biometrics come into play? That is, in what 
circumstances does a face ‘biometric’ lend itself to facial ‘recognition’? 
  
This takes us back to the second passage from the original consultation 
document on entitlement cards, about the circumstances in which a face 
biometric should indeed be considered biometric. From a technical 
perspective, a photo of a person’s face is said to be ‘biometric’ when it 
satisfies internationally agreed standards that dictate the arrangements of the 
environment where the image is captured, how features of the face such as 
the ears and eyes are presented, image resolution, and the data format 
requirements which permit it to be read by computers.  
 
Unsurprisingly, such technical specificity is lost in the vast majority of the 
policy documents that I analyzed pertaining to the case, in which there is a 
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enduring degree of uncertainty over the issue of if and when an image of the 
face is biometric or not. For example, in the Identity Cards Act 2006 – the 
legislation which enacted the Scheme – photographs of the face are listed 
separately from fingerprints and ‘other’ biometrics. 
 
The things that an individual may be required to do under subsection (4) 
are— 
(a) to attend at an agreed place and time or (in the absence of 
agreement) at a specified place and time; 
(b) to allow his fingerprints, and other biometric information about 
himself, to be taken and recorded; 
(c) to allow himself to be photographed; 
(d) otherwise to provide such information as may be required by 
the 
Secretary of State (2006, p.5, emphasis added) 
 
These are distinct discourses on biometrics and their relationship to 
photography that distinguish the former from the latter. 
 
Later in the Act, biometrics are defined as follows: 
“Biometric information”, in relation to an individual, means data about his 
external characteristics, including, in particular, the features of an iris or 
of any other part of the eye (2006, p.38, emphasis added) 
 
Here biometrics are understood in terms of both information and data, and are 
about one’s “external characteristics”. Specifying biometrics as “external” 
characteristics is significant for at least two reasons. First, by definition it 
precludes internal characteristics from being considered biometric, so for 
example hand vein pattern recognition systems (a set of emerging 
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technologies that are said to have great potential) would not qualify according 
to this legal prescription. Second, it is debatable whether irises, or even 
fingerprint biometrics are, in fact, external to the body. Irises reside within our 
eyes. Likewise, there are new fingerprinting techniques (including 
multispectral imaging), which read the information below the epidermis (as it is 
more stable than the information on the fingerprint ridges). In both cases, the 
external/internal distinction complicates such matters. 
 
In the same document, a photograph is specified as 
a photograph of his head and shoulders (showing the features of the 
face); (2006, p.42)  
 
This seems a clear enough legal description of a photo. However, in the 
various drafts of the Identity Cards Bill that circulated through the Parliament 
before the legislation was finally enacted, a photograph was described slightly 
differently. For example, in the first version of the Bill that was amended in 
Committee, a photograph is said to be 
a photograph of his head and shoulders; (2005, p.40) 
 
That is, not specifying that it need to highlight certain facial features. Whereas 
in related legislation known as the UK Borders Act 2007 – which, among other 
things, made way for the issuance of biometric identity documents to certain 
segments of foreign nationals – explicit mention of face biometrics is missing 
altogether. 
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(b) “biometric information” means information about external physical 
characteristics, 
(c) “external physical characteristics” includes, in particular— 
(i) fingerprints, and 
(ii) features of the iris or any other part of the eye (2007, p.10) 
 
Here we read that biometrics are again about “external” characteristics, and 
more specifically “physical” ones, but only fingerprints and “features” of the iris 
(or the eye) are explicitly listed. These shifting definitions of biometrics, which 
appear not just in any text, but in formal legislation that established the legal 
bases for two major government identity programs (national identity cards and 
biometric identity documents for foreign nationals, respectively), reflect the 
unsettled and uncertain organizational knowledge around biometrics in both 
the Home Office and Parliament. 
 
Signatures: the forgotten biometric 
Complicating this situation even further is the fact that signature biometrics – 
arguably the oldest form of recorded biometric – are absent in the first draft of 
the Identity Cards Bill, and only appear in later versions of the Bill. When they 
do appear, they do so not as a ‘biometric’ per se. Rather, they stand alone 
(like facial photographs). They are missing altogether in the UK Borders Act 
2007. 
 
This repeated omission is interesting because, as with photography (of the 
face), signature biometrics are arguably a less ‘sexy’ biometric and often 
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overlooked in popular discussions. Compared to fingerprints, which are easily 
the most spoken about biometrics in the policy discourses on the NIS that I 
analyzed (see Appendix 6), signatures very rarely get mentioned. This is 
notable considering the special historical and legal status of signature 
biometrics – they convey intentionality in ways that other biometrics do not –, 
as well as the ease with which they can be forged and misused. In many 
ways, signatures are the ‘forgotten’ biometric in the story of the Scheme. 
 
However, this is not absolute. As I write this section of my thesis, the new 
coalition government is in the process of nullifying the Identity Cards Act 2006 
and as part of that process a new piece of legislation (known as the Identity 
Documents Bill) is passing through the various committee stages. During the 
first sitting for the new Bill, former Under-Secretary of State Meg Hiller was 
keen to stress “biometrics include signatures” in response to a remark from a 
witness regarding the appropriateness of using biometrics in certain social 
contexts (Hillier 2010, col.3). Hillier’s point was to show that biometrics are 
mundane and resorted to the signature example to illustrate this point. 
   
Yet the question remains regarding whether and in what circumstances face 
images or signatures, or any use of the body for that matter, are ‘biometric’. It 
is becoming clear that there is no conclusive answer in the data. It seems to 
 213
depend, in part, on who is speaking and what they aim to achieve in their 
rhetoric. 
 
To explore this point further, let us review the wording of a survey conducted 
on behalf of the Home Office in the early days of the proposals for a national 
identity system, which again describes the different biometric modes in very 
particular terms and arguably in a way that helps to familiarize respondents to 
biometrics while demystifying them to an extent. 
To what extent are you in favour of or against providing the following 
biometric details? 
o Fingerprint (collected by pressing your fingers against a glass 
reader – no ink is involved) 
o Digital photograph of your face (like going into a photo booth) 
o Digital photograph of your iris (like going into a photo booth) 
(Home Office 2004a, p.84, emphasis added) 
 
Participants were told that providing face and iris biometrics to the Home 
Office is more or less the same as having a simple photograph taken. Note 
how the process of fingerprinting is depicted in terms that emphasize 
cleanliness, as opposed to, say, privacy or data security concerns. 
 
A similar conceptual tension arises in a 2005 briefing document on identity 
cards. 
We will record biometric information when the person applies.  Biometric 
information - such as fingerprints and iris patterns - is unique to each 
individual.  Recording this information takes just a few minutes and is just 
like having your photograph taken. Recording biometric information will 
mean that the scheme will be able to detect people who try to establish 
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more than one identity and who use multiple identities to hide criminal 
activities. (Home Office 2005c, p.6, emphasis added) 
 
As before, biometrics are described in terms of examples (i.e., fingerprint and 
iris biometrics this time around). The benefit frame of ‘uniqueness’ is present 
and the problem frame of ‘multiple identities’ likewise emerges. But more 
important to the current discussion is how biometrics are described as “just 
like” having one’s photo taken, resembling the previous description. These 
discourses convey that biometrics are “just like” older forms of photography. 
Note as well how facial photos are missing in this excerpt on biometrics. 
 
Elsewhere Baroness Scotland, former Attorney General under the Labour 
government, remarks that  
I'm afraid that I do not accept the argument that this legislation will 
change radically the relationship between the state and the individual. 
The relationship between the state and the individual did not change in 
1837 when it was made compulsory for every birth in England and Wales 
to be registered and recorded nationally, nor when similar provisions 
were introduced in Scotland in 1855 and in Ireland in 1864. The 
information to be held on the National Identity Register will not include 
highly sensitive personal information such as financial, medical or tax 
records. It will include biometric information to identify an individual 
(much as a photograph is used currently in a passport) as well as basic 
identity information such as an individual's name, address date of birth 
etc.--most of this information will already be known to government, for 
example in the existing records held by the UK Passport Service which 
already covers around 80% of the British population. (House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Constitution 2005, p.18, emphasis added) 
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Two points stand out here. The first, pertinent to this ongoing tension between 
photography and biometrics, is that biometrics are understood in this passage 
in terms of photography. Indeed, Baroness Scotland seems to be arguing that 
biometrics are, in fact, nothing special – they are something that have been 
included in passports for many years. Second, this rhetorical move of 
describing biometrics in terms of (facial) photographs allows her to argue that 
biometrics are not sensitive information, thereby nullifying a oft-repeated 
counter-frame used to contest the introduction of biometric systems. I return to 
this point about data sensitivity in a moment.18  
 
In official discourses on biometrics, therefore, face biometrics served as an 
important gateway for familiarizing debates and discussions. However, this 
rhetoric was neither neutral nor apolitical. Spokespeople could argue that, as 
a relatively established technology with which most people are familiar, facial 
photos would not introduce major cost concerns or present any real threat to 
privacy or data security, respectively. Accepting that biometrics (in the form of 
digital face photos) were already a reality in passports and other identification 
documents, it could then be argued that it is desirable to pursue more of them 
so as to enhance the security of identification systems. As David Blunkett 
                                            
18 Similar rhetoric has emerged in debates about the New York Police Department’s use of iris 
scanning technology. Civil society groups have argued that these measures are excessive, 
whereas proponents argue that they are nothing new. As Police Commissioner Raymond 
Kelly remarked, "We are authorized to take pictures. This is just a picture of your iris. ... We're 
matching that iris to see if you're the same individual. Our lawyers say we don't need any 
mandate to do it." (as quoted in Snow 2010) 
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remarked in 2004, “If we want, and we've already agreed as a nation that we 
do want, secure passports, the only way to get them is to use biometrics. So 
the question is do we use 1, 2 or 3? We think that we should endeavour to 
use 3 biometric identifiers as a safeguard for all of us.” Speaking to and on 
behalf of the nation, Blunkett was calling for multiple biometrics as the logical 
next step in pursuing digital photo-based electronic passports. However, this 
logic would be questioned. 
 
The discussion to this point has focused on revealing the conceptual 
uncertainty around biometrics in government discourses. This uncertainty did 
not result in the government dropping its plans. Official spokespeople were 
able to leverage the concept in the government’s pursuit of the proposals. In 
the following sections I move away from this conceptual deconstruction to 
explore how the black-box of ‘biometrics’ was discursively deployed along the 
other six dimensions offered by Orlikowski and Gash, focusing first on the 
reasons for pursuing biometric technologies in the ID card scheme. 
  
6.3 Initiating biometrics 
The analysis now moves to explore issues relating to the motivations for and 
initiation of the use of biometrics in the Scheme (i.e., dimension 2 in 
Orlikowski and Gash’s guiding framework). This dimension concerns the 
knowledge, expectations, and experiences that individuals and organizations 
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have about a technology’s initiation. As such, it dovetails nicely with the 
legitimizing function of an organizing vision. In this section I want to explore 
three main areas: government discourses on the ‘international obligations’ for 
biometrics, the government’s desire for the United Kingdom to become an 
international leader in biometrics, and the government’s discursive reasoning 
regarding what policy problems biometrics were supposed to help to address. 
 
Obligations for biometrics? 
Government talk about duties and obligations for biometrics was common 
throughout the course of the Scheme. At one point during the roll-out, the 
government argued that it would be a “dereliction of duty” in the “modern age” 
for it not to “protect the public” using biometrics (Ryan 2006, p.6). In framing 
the issues in this way, biometrics were made out to be a part of good 
governance – something all governments should be doing for their citizens. 
This rhetoric of obligation often transcended the domain of national 
governance, however, to include international obligations. 
 
By far, the most persistent justification regarding the decision to collect 
biometrics as part of the NIS revolved around supposed international 
obligations to incorporate them into passports. These ‘requirements’ were said 
to be imposed on the UK government by different external bodies, including 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the United States, and the 
European Union. In its most basic form the argument was that, because the 
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UK was obliged to collect biometrics for passports anyway, it might as well 
use them in its new national identity card program. There are several 
problems with this argument, including what exactly these obligations required 
in terms of the type and number of biometrics and whether the UK was, 
indeed, obliged to follow them. 
 
Concerning the ICAO requirements for ‘biometric passports’, the government 
stated in 2004 that: 
Since the terrorist attacks of 2001 the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) has been pressing for travel documents to be 
standardised worldwide and to incorporate a "biometric". A biometric is a 
unique identifying physical characteristic such as facial recognition, iris 
pattern or fingerprints. The ICAO has nominated facial recognition as the 
primary biometric for travel documents, with iris pattern and fingerprint as 
secondary but not mandatory. In line with these recommendations, the 
UK Passport Service is planning to implement a facial recognition image 
biometric in the British passport book from late 2005/early 2006. The 
biometric can be derived from a passport photograph and will be in 
accordance with ICAO standards. (House of Commons 2004, pp.24-25) 
 
Note that the only requirement that the ICAO imposes on governments is for a 
digital face biometric, to be included on a chip in the passport document. 
Other biometrics, such as fingerprints or irises, were (and as of 2011 still are) 
strictly optional. This facial biometric requirement involves the digital capture 
of facial photographs, which must be taken in accordance with certain 
standards. Importantly, this digitization process can be applied to images that 
are taken and submitted by applicants, thus building on well-established 
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application processes. The collection of fingerprints or irises is not possible in 
the same way, as these require special equipment and expertise. 
 
Related to this ICAO requirement for face biometrics in electronic passports is 
the visa waiver program in the United States, which UK passport holders are 
eligible to participate in. The visa waiver program requires citizens of certain 
countries to hold a ‘biometric passport’ (with only a facial image, following to 
the ICAO standard) in order to remain eligible for visa-free travel to the US. 
 
A second biometrics-related travel program in the US is the US-VISIT system, 
which mandates the collection of face and fingerprint biometrics from all 
foreign travelers as they enter the United States through certain ports of entry. 
This includes British citizens. Thus, British travelers to the US are required to 
hold ICAO-compliant facial biometric passports, and will also have their 
fingerprints collected as they enter the country, although these are distinct 
programs. 
 
Yet these two programs were often described as international developments 
which necessitated the collection of multiple biometrics from UK citizens by 
the UK government, but it is not the case that the US government expected or 
required the UK to take fingerprints from its own passport holders. Moreover, 
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these two programs were occasionally confused in government discourses 
about the need for biometrics. For example: 
The US has already imposed a fingerprint requirement on all visitors to 
the US who have historically not required a visa (‘the visa waiver 
scheme').  This includes British citizens. (Home Office 2005a, p.4) 
 
To be clear, the visa waiver program does not (as yet) include a fingerprint 
requirement. The biometric requirement is simply for digital face biometrics to 
be stored in the passport document – in other words, the ICAO requirement. 
Fingerprints are collected under a separate program, by US border officials as 
travelers enter the country. 
 
The third and final ‘international obligation’ repeatedly referred to by 
government officers was that EU requirements somehow mandated the UK 
government to collect biometrics from its citizens. In fact, this requirement only 
applies to members of the Schengen travel area, which the UK opted out of. 
Then-Junior Minister Andy Burnham made such an obfuscated argument in 
2006 in a letter to Labour MPs in advance of a vote on the Identity Cards Bill. 
Irrespective of the Identity Cards Bill, people will have to register 
fingerprint biometric information when applying for a passport from 
2008/09 to keep us in line with standards being adopted in the rest of the 
EU. (Burnham 2006, p.2) 
 
Or as was later stated in an IPS policy document: 
 
Why do I have to record my fingerprints? 
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The identity card will lock together your basic identifying details with a 
combination of your unique personal features – electronic records of your 
face and fingerprints – because these are very hard to forge, steal, forget 
or lose. 
 
The UK is also committed to following new EU standards which are 
designed to make EU passports the most secure in the world and require 
all passports to include fingerprints on their electronic chip from 2012. So 
even if you don’t want or need an identity card, you will still need to 
record your fingerprints as part of your passport application. (IPS 2008a, 
p.14, emphasis added) 
 
The UK’s “commitment” to collect fingerprints from its citizens according to EU 
standards was, in reality, strictly voluntary. It was not a legal requirement 
imposed by European authorities, but rather an opportunity for the UK 
government to pursue a policy that it had mooted for years. In fact, the 
government even brought a legal challenge to the European Court of Justice 
to be allowed to participate in the regulation of biometric passports, from 
which it had been excluded because it is not signee of the Schengen 
Agreement. Ultimately, it lost its case and conceded to pursue fingerprint 
biometrics in passports voluntarily, fearing that otherwise the British passport 
would be seen as “second class” (Hillier 2008b). 
 
Throughout these discourses on ‘international obligations’, the term 
‘biometrics’ was regularly used by authorities to obscure the actual 
requirements for the inclusion of digitized facial images in passports with both 
optional extras such as the collection of fingerprints or other biometrics (ICAO 
secondary options) or standards that were inapplicable to the UK (Schengen). 
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These discourses permitted government actors to speak of obligations for 
‘biometrics’ while obscuring the legal and technical specifics of these 
requirements. 
 
International leadership 
This brings us onto a second factor which motivated the government’s pursuit 
of biometrics. If, indeed, there was no real legal requirement for the collection 
of biometrics on the scale proposed in the NIS (that is, collecting multiple 
biometrics such as face, fingerprint, and potentially iris from not just passport 
holders but all citizens), then perhaps we can look elsewhere for explanations. 
We catch a glimpse of such motives in a series of statements about the 
Scheme and the opportunity it provided the UK to lead the world in the 
development of biometrics. As Joan Ryan remarked to attendees at a 
biometrics conference in London: 
And the last thought I want to leave you with is that the UK is ahead of 
many others in setting out its plans for a secure biometric identity card. 
With your help we can be at the forefront of these technologies and have 
the opportunity to be a centre of excellence for identity management and 
biometrics. (Ryan 2006, p.8) 
 
Or as the Home Office wrote the same year: 
The UK will continue to take a leading role in developing the use of 
biometrics and information technology to secure our borders, working 
with other governments to increase security around the world. (Home 
Office 2006, p.10) 
 
And as Jacqui Smith argued in 2008: 
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Britain leads the world in successfully delivering biometric visas, with all 
those coming to the UK on a visa now required to provide a fingerprint. 
So far, more than one million biometric visas have been issued, to 
travellers from 135 countries around the globe. (Smith 2008b, p.7, 
emphasis added) 
 
These discourses on international leadership in the domain of biometrics 
reveal the UK’s desire to be a global champion of the technology. Far from 
being forced to pursue biometrics by external forces such as the US and 
Europe, it seems these were policies and technologies that the UK 
government wanted to engage and lead on.  
 
One could argue that the original discourses on international obligations 
provided an opening for the Home Office to initiate its pursuit of biometrics in 
various security and immigration-related programs. Following this, then, it was 
able to begin championing the continued development and use of biometrics 
on the basis of not being outdone by other international players, for biometrics 
were (and still are) seen as a major business opportunity for those with the 
expertise and know-how to undertake and implement them. 
 
Biometrics: a panacea for our ills  
We can also explore the government’s motivations by analyzing the numerous 
policy discourses on biometrics. Across the many government policy 
documents that were analyzed, biometrics were said to be capable of solving 
or contributing to solutions in wide-ranging policy arenas, including identity, 
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crime (of various types), public service delivery, commerce, immigration, and 
terrorism, among others. The common theme across these policy areas was a 
perceived limitation in existing means of identifying and authenticating people. 
The vast majority of these discourses were positive regarding what biometrics 
are capable of, although some dissenting discourses did emerge in the official 
policy communications. 
 
The policy area of ‘identity’, broadly defined and understood, was by far the 
most frequently discussed ‘problem’ for which biometrics were said to be an 
ideal solution. In these discourses, the relationship between biometrics, 
identity, identification, and various identity-related artifacts is complex and 
multifaceted. 
 
Biometrics and identity 
The various government documents related to the NIS articulated the 
relationship between biometrics and identity in several different ways. At 
different points in the history of the Scheme, biometrics were said to be about 
“securing”, “linking”, or “fixing” a person to a “single”, “core”, or “unique” 
identity. They were also described as a “guard” or “protector” of identity. 
Furthermore, it was claimed that biometrics were a “stronger” or the “best 
proof” of identity, as compared to other means such as passwords and PINs. 
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A quotation which nicely illustrates this rhetoric about biometrics and identity 
states that 
The Scheme will secure identity to the highest standards by, for 
example, the use of fingerprint biometrics. (IPS 2008c, p.16, emphasis 
added) 
 
Biometrics and identification processes 
Beyond the vague concept of ‘identity’, the processes of identification were 
also said to benefit from the government’s plans for biometrics. For example, 
biometrics would improve the “integrity” of enrollment processes. They would 
also to make identity checks “faster”, “easier”, “stronger”, and “more 
confident”. Likewise, biometrics would “simplify” and “strengthen” 
authentication and verification procedures. 
 
Towards the end of the Scheme’s life, biometrics were also repeatedly said to 
provide citizens with a means to prove their identity with a “high degree of 
assurance”. 
 
As part of a number of methods offered to verify a person’s identity, the 
introduction of biometrics will also enable individuals, when appropriate, 
to easily prove their identity to a high degree of assurance by providing a 
biometric for verification against the biometric recorded when the ID card 
was issued. (IPS 2008b, p.13, emphasis added) 
 
This rhetoric of identity assurance was part of a larger set of discourses 
surrounding so-called citizen-centric identification, popularized with the 
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publication of the Crosby report (2008), which was about empowering citizens 
through digital identity systems. However, the sort of thinking reflected in the 
quotation above assumes that a very specific identity infrastructure is in place 
– one which would permit more or less real-time biometric checking against a 
record (stored either on a card or in a database elsewhere). These discourses 
thus served as a medium for framing expectations about how the proposals 
would work in the future – expectations that assumed a lot of the biometrics in 
the Scheme. 
 
Biometrics in the identity ecosystem 
It was not just ‘identity’ or the generic processes of identification which 
biometrics were supposed to secure. They were also implicated in certain 
other relationships and configurations in the larger identity ‘ecosystem’. 
Biometrics were variously said to be able to “secure” or “protect” not just our 
identity information, but also identity records as well as identity tokens. Within 
the identity ecosystem these are distinct artifacts, with, for example, identity 
information being stored as records on databases or on storage devices within 
the tokens themselves. Three quotations illustrate the range of these 
discourses: 
 
Our vision is a universal identity management scheme with identity 
information securely linked to individuals through biometrics. (Ryan 
2006, p.7, emphasis added) 
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Registering the biometrics of people who want to visit the UK lets us vet 
visa applicants for previous immigration or criminal history in the UK, and 
create a secure record on our databases. (Home Office 2006, p.8, 
emphasis added) 
 
Inserting a microchip containing facial image data into the passport book 
will improve the security and integrity of the passport by linking the 
passport holder to the passport book more tightly via the biometric. 
(UKPS 2006, pp.12-13, emphasis added) 
 
In some of these discourses, it is not entirely obvious what it is that biometrics 
are supposed to secure. For example, 
The use of biometric information to link a person to a passport will 
enhance security. (UKPS, as cited in House of Commons 2005, p.30) 
 
Sometimes it is the identity information, record, or token itself (e.g., the ID 
card or passport) which is made secure through their inclusion. 
Over the coming year we will complete the introduction of ePassports, 
where a facial biometric is stored on a chip in the passport; this will 
enhance both the integrity of the document and strengthen our 
authentication processes. (IPS 2006b, p.5, emphasis added) 
 
But at other times it is the link or connection between these objects (such as 
the individual and his or her passport or record in the NIR), which is said to 
benefit from the introduction of the technology.  
The first generation of biometric passports will be issued from 2006.  The 
use of facial biometrics will make a more secure link between the 
passport and its holder. (Home Office 2005c, p.6, emphasis added) 
 
There were thus various configurations in the proposed identity ecosystem 
that were said to benefit from biometrics. Importantly, these different 
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envisioned configurations assumed particular technological and organizational 
arrangements within the identity system. That is, different visions insinuate 
different information systems. We discuss these different visions for the 
eventual use of biometrics, and the architectures they assume, in later 
sections. 
 
Biometrics and identity ‘exploitation’ 
Managed correctly and to high standards of privacy, security and choice, 
it is clear to me that the use of biometric cards and passports can be an 
important part of the scheme that allows us as citizens to easily assert 
and prove our identity, and that prevents our identity from being exploited 
or stolen by others. (Smith 2008b, emphasis added) 
 
Much of the government’s discourse on biometrics resembles the passage 
above, which addresses the various risks to identity which biometrics would 
help to prevent. These risks include the fraudulent use of someone else’s 
identity, identity “theft”, and the enrollment and use of “duplicate” or “multiple” 
identities. More often than not, these risks to identity were accepted as real 
and unproblematic – not as social or media constructs (cf. Poster 2006, 
chap.5). In these discourses it was assumed that the category of ‘identity 
crime’ was obvious and self-evident. 
 
The inclusion of biometrics in one’s record on the NIR was said to be an 
obvious way to protect them from “identity fraud”. Note again how the 
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following discourse frames a certain pattern of practices around the NIS, 
which would require regular biometric checks to reduce the risks of identity 
fraud. 
Preventing identity fraud and other criminal activity 
 
Because your name will be linked by your fingerprints to a unique entry 
on the National Identity Register (NIR), you will have much greater 
protection from identity fraud: to impersonate you, a fraudster will have to 
have and be able to mimic your biometrics. At the moment, they may be 
able to forge an identity just by finding out your name and address and 
personal details. Benefit fraud based on false or multiple identities will be 
much easier to stop. (IPS 2008c, p.11, emphasis added) 
 
Such discourses were especially prevalent in parliamentary debates and 
media coverage following the HMRC data breach, so we will return to this 
discussion in the second part of the analysis (chapter 7). 
 
In addition, the belief that biometrics can prevent duplicate or multiple 
identities was also common in these discourses. The basic argument was that 
once you have enrolled your biometrics alongside an identity, it is impossible 
to re-enroll to obtain another identity because biometrics are unique. In 
practice, this would require one-to-many biometric matching. 
Each person's identity will be secured by the registering of a number of 
biometric identifiers, such as fingerprints and facial or iris images. The 
biometric information will make it much easier to detect attempts to 
record duplicate identities. It will also enable individuals, when 
necessary, to easily prove their identity to a high degree of assurance by 
providing a biometric for verification against the biometric recorded when 
the ID card was issued.  (IPS 2006a, p.12) 
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From a sociological perspective, it is interesting how duplicate identities are 
treated as a something worthy of suspicion, particularly in an age in which 
technology allows us to reinvent ourselves and assume new identities such as 
in on-line environments. Notably, other countries that use biometrics in their 
national identity schemes are not as concerned with biometric ‘de-duplication’.  
Moreover, there are important off-line scenarios in which people are expected 
to be able to hold multiple ‘official’ identities, such as for people in police 
protection (e.g., spouses who require protection from their abusive partners) 
or members of the security services who assume different identities as part of 
their work. These exceptions did not make their way into the government’s 
discourses on the harms of duplicate identities. 
 
Similarly, a lot was said about biometrics and their capacity to make it much 
more difficult for people to register so-described false identities.  
 
The National Identity Register will hold a small amount of personal 
biographic details separately from biometric fingerprints and 
photographs, making it incredibly difficult for anyone to steal or exploit 
another’s identity.  (Smith 2008b, emphasis added) 
 
By recording biometric data it will be much harder for people to register 
with the ID Cards Scheme under a false identity, and the scheme will 
make it far easier to detect people attempting to register more than once 
(as their biometrics would be detected), so people who assume a false 
identity will be stuck with it. This will help to curtail the illegal activity of 
terrorists and organised criminals. (IPS 2006a, p.6, emphasis added) 
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However as the second passage concedes, biometrics are incapable of 
preventing someone from registering under another’s identity. It is just that, 
assuming the biometrics used are unique and individuating, he or she will be 
“stuck” with this other identity (at least until the identity’s ‘true’ owner attempts 
to register the same details with different biometrics). Note also how it is 
argued that the prevention of ‘false’ identities will somehow prevent acts of 
terrorism or organized crime, without a clear explanation of the link between 
identity and these activities. This association was made frequently in the 
government’s discourses. 
 
A few dissenting voices did emerge in the policy communications, mostly in 
the consultation documents, which argued that biometrics may in fact increase 
the risks to identity, such as through malicious intent or human error. For 
example: 
People were concerned that when appointments were made there might 
be a possibility of information being misappropriated, and at the point 
when biometric information was provided, that it might be possible for 
this to be illicitly taken and used or forged. (Cragg Ross Dawson 2004a, 
p.56) 
 
Or: 
Errors during data capture can lead to complications – e.g., biometrics of 
a person attached to another person’s identity. (The Faith Community 
Consultation Consortium 2005, p.12) 
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Biometrics and public policy 
Moving from these discussions about identity to more specific applications, we 
find that biometrics were said to have a role to play in several different 
government policy areas. 
 
Public service delivery 
 
In selling the idea of biometrics to the public, the government argued that 
biometrics would help to create efficiencies in public service delivery while 
also restricting access only to those eligible for services. As concerns the 
latter objective: 
Would Jean Hutchinson [a benefits fraudster] have been able to commit 
her crimes if she had been asked to give a photo and fingerprint as proof 
of her identity when she registered each new benefit claim? 
 
The answer is no. A simple check against the National Identity Register 
would have revealed the real person's face and fingerprints. (Smith 
2008c) 
 
Likewise, biometrics were said to be a part of the government’s strategy for 
“transformational government” (Cabinet Office 2006b, p.20). 
 
Immigration 
 
In terms of immigration, biometrics were framed as being able to prevent 
illegal immigrants from defrauding the system while providing a means for 
legal immigrants to prove their entitlement. 
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Foreign nationals come to the United Kingdom for a wide range of 
reasons such as to study or work. Using advances in biometric 
technology we can reinforce our business processes and cut illegal 
working, protect legal migrants, and identify those trying to evade our 
rules and laws. This will help strengthen border security and lay the 
foundation for the wider National Identity Scheme. By recording a 
person’s fingerprints, we can now fix a person to a single identity making 
it simpler to check whether someone is who they say they are. The card 
will make provide [sic] reassurance and identity protection to the many 
here legally. (UK Borders Agency 2008b, p.4) 
 
In this context, recall the earlier discussion about whether the use of 
biometrics would alter the relationship between the government and citizen. In 
contrast to arguments that this relationship would not change, discourses 
such as the one above seem to presume guilt or wrongdoing on the part of 
foreign nationals, who must prove, with biometrics, that they are who they say 
they are and entitled to be in the UK. 
 
Personal finance 
 
Biometrics were also tied discursively to concerns about securing financial 
transactions and combating fraud. 
Financial security: The ID card will provide a more secure way for you to 
apply for financial products and perform financial transactions, whilst 
making it more difficult for someone else to try fraudulently to access 
your finances. It is more secure as your ID card is linked to your 
biometrics (e.g. fingerprint) which are unique to you and no one else can 
use it. (Home Office 2005f, p.23) 
 
Again, these discourses assume that banks, for example, would have the 
capacity to scan fingerprints and perform biometric checks. 
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International travel and trade 
 
As with the use of biometrics for public service delivery, in the context of 
international travel and trade they were ascribed a dual role – as a means of 
securing activities from ‘bad’ elements and as a way of facilitating ‘legitimate’ 
travel and commerce. 
Biometric documentation will be used to increase security and to 
facilitate the passage of legitimate passengers and trade. (UK Borders 
Agency 2008a, p.6) 
 
Borders 
 
Similarly, biometrics were seen as a way of ’off-shoring’ borders such that 
individuals could be screened throughout their journey before arriving to the 
UK. 
Border control can no longer just be a fixed line on a map. Using new 
technology, particularly biometrics, and new approaches to managing 
risk and intelligence, we must create a new offshore line of defence, 
checking individuals as far from the UK as possible and through each 
stage of their journey. Our aim is to make legitimate travel easier, yet 
prevent those who might cause us harm from travelling here. (UK 
Borders Agency 2008a, p.6, emphasis added) 
 
Terrorism 
 
On certain occasions, the government tried to argue that biometrics would 
help to prevent acts of terrorism, claiming that false or multiple identities were 
a staple of rogue actors intent on doing wrong. 
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Terrorists and criminals use false and multiple identities to avoid 
detection and enable them to ‘launder’ money. The Identity Cards 
Scheme will make it easier to detect people attempting to register more 
than once (as their biometrics would be detected) helping in the fight 
against terrorism and organised crime. (Home Office 2005c, p.21) 
 
However, these discourses on terrorism were challenged by various actors, 
including civil society groups such as Privacy International and Liberty, who 
disputed the capacity of biometrics to prevent people from organizing and 
executing acts of terror. For example, as the Home Affairs Committee noted in 
2004: 
There is little reason to believe that terrorism would be so undermined.  
Privacy International has supplied us with a list of a number of countries 
that have suffered most from terrorist attacks since 1986. Eighty percent 
of these have long-standing identity card systems, of which a third 
contain a biometric such as a fingerprint. (House of Commons Home 
Affairs Committee 2004, p.85) 
 
In response, the government claimed that the important difference between 
the experiences of these countries and its own proposals was the role of the 
central database of biometrics within the NIS. 
When [the Home Affairs Committee] put this argument to the Minister of 
State for Citizenship and Immigration, he replied that other countries did 
not have the biometric database that was being proposed as part of this 
scheme, and that this, rather than the card, was the defence against the 
use of multiple identities. (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 
2004, p.29) 
 
Here we see that it is not simply biometrics but rather a specific proposal for 
an information technology architecture and set of organizational practices and 
routines around biometrics which would supposedly impede terrorists’ 
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attempts to enroll multiple identities. However, this discourse still begs the 
question of how biometrics (and their supposed defense against multiple 
identities) would prevent terrorism, which is, to say the least, a very difficult 
political problem involving more than just the possession of multiple identities. 
 
Crime detection 
 
The government mooted using biometrics, and in particular the fingerprints 
which were originally to be collected for the Scheme, to help to solve crime. 
Their plan was to cross-reference fingerprints stored in the identity card 
database against those collected from crime scenes.  
The ability for the police to compare their 900,000 outstanding crime 
scene marks with fingerprints held on the National Identity Register will 
provide a significant opportunity to increase detections. This is estimated 
to have a benefit of £40m pa by reducing the social and economic costs 
of crime. (Home Office 2005d, p.8) 
 
In making such arguments, the government overlooked a wide range of 
important concerns about privacy (i.e., secondary usage of information and 
proportionality) and civil liberties. It also fuelled concerns that the NIS would 
result in ordinary citizens being treated as potential criminals. 
 
Police administration 
 
Last, beyond potentially using fingerprints from the Scheme to investigate 
unsolved crimes, there were also proposals for the police to use biometrics 
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routinely to identify members of the public. In a rather odd twist of logic, this 
was seen as being more “convenient” for the public. 
Allowing for more efficient use of police resources.  There is 
considerable scope for reducing the administrative burden on the police 
in dealing with the routine identification of individuals with their consent 
e.g. motorists. The voluntary production of an ID card ­ or a biometric 
‘card not present' check ­ would save police administrative costs and be 
more convenient for the general public. (Home Office 2005a, p.16, 
emphasis added) 
 
6.4 Implementation 
Having discussed the ‘why’ of biometrics in the NIS, we now move to issues 
surrounding implementation; that is, the ‘how’. This analysis follows from the 
third dimension of Orlikowski and Gash’s framework, encompassing issues to 
do with the knowledge, expectations, and experiences that individuals and 
organizations have about the design, development, and installation of a 
technology. In particular, this section focuses on two sets of concerns that 
emerged during the debates about identity cards in the UK: the costs related 
to ‘doing’ biometrics and how the Home Office and IPS would establish, run, 
and manage a nationwide network of equipment for recording and reading 
biometrics. Importantly, these concerns are rife with future expectations about 
an implementation that never happened. 
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Costs 
The monetary costs of their implementation in the NIS were by far the most 
regularly discussed issue related to biometrics. As already mentioned, this 
was partly due to a critical report released by the LSE Identity Project (2005), 
which questioned certain of the government’s cost projections for the Scheme, 
including those costs related to nationwide biometric enrollment. There is, 
therefore, plenty of discourse in the data on which to build an analysis. 
 
The costs of the Scheme were always said to depend on whether and which 
biometrics would be chosen, and importantly, how they would be collected 
and used in the future. For example, in its very initial consultation document, 
the Home Office conceded that: 
Photograph recognition could be less costly to implement than 
fingerprints or iris patterns as it would not require a regional network of 
devices to record applicants’ information. (Home Office 2002, p.108) 
 
Of course, this sort of discourse implied that photographs would be submitted 
by applicants to the Home Office, for example by post, and then digitized, 
rather than being taken in-person by a trained official. As an aside, it should 
be noted that this means of collecting face biometrics introduces various data 
integrity and security concerns (see, for example, Linder 2007). 
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By framing the pursuit of biometrics as an international obligation, as 
discussed, the government could also argue that (most of) the costs would be 
incurred anyway. For example: 
The US has already imposed a fingerprint requirement on all visitors to 
the US who have historically not required a visa (‘the visa waiver 
scheme’).  This includes British citizens. The EU will be mandating 
biometric passports for its citizens in the next few months. The costs of 
recording biometric information and issuing more secure identity 
documents (in the form of biometric passports) is [sic] therefore 
unavoidable. (Home Office 2004d, p.4, emphasis added) 
 
Or as stated elsewhere: 
Given that we will be introducing biometric identifiers for the 80% of our 
citizens who are passport holders and also for foreign nationals, we 
believe we can - for slightly more investment - yield much wider benefits 
for individuals and society [in the form of a biometric national identity 
card]. (Home Office 2005c, p.4) 
 
There were also concerns about which organizations or individuals would 
incur these costs associated with using biometrics. While some assumed the 
Home Office would be paying for the entire Scheme, including the start-up 
and maintenance costs across all public sector organizations using the 
system, it eventually emerged that it intended only to cover the capital costs to 
its organization. This meant that other organizations would need to cover their 
own costs of using the system (Burnham 2005b; Whitley & Hosein 2010, 
p.173). As was explained to the Home Affairs Committee: 
The Home Secretary told us that this figure does not include the costs of 
biometric readers and other equipment to be installed in other 
Departments, such as the Department for Work and Pensions, or the 
National Health Service. The overall costs of these would, in any case, 
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be difficult to establish as there is little if any certainty about the numbers 
and types of readers required. (House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee 2004, p.53) 
 
Private sector organizations would presumably also pay to use the system, 
including equipment costs but also for every biometric check against the 
Register. 
 
Growing concern and mounting pressure about escalating costs in the 
Scheme led the IPS to suspend the idea of pursuing iris biometrics, as 
mentioned, and later to initiate a process to outsource the collection of 
fingerprint biometrics from citizens. These were two major events for 
biometrics in the Scheme’s history. Therefore, financial concerns (as opposed 
to, say, security or reliability motivations) were arguably the most important 
driver of policy decisions about the implementation of biometrics in the 
Scheme. 
We will look at new ways of recording fingerprints and photographs to 
make it easy and convenient for individuals. For example, we are looking 
to a future where the market would provide biometric enrolment services, 
giving citizens a choice of competing services which should maximise 
convenience and drive down price. (IPS 2008c, p.8, emphasis added) 
 
This policy decision also meant that citizens would be responsible for paying 
to have their biometrics collected, thus shifting the cost obligation from 
government (funded by the taxpayer, of course) to the citizenry, who would 
pay directly out of pocket to have their biometrics recorded. By doing so, the 
 241
government was able to claim cost savings in its regular reporting to 
Parliament. 
 
Furthermore, the central database on which all the biometrics in the NIS were 
to be stored went through different re-configurations as a result of concerns 
about costs. Originally the Home Office intended to build a brand new 
database, which would segregate citizens’ biometric and biographical data for 
security reasons. Eventually they opted instead to re-use existing biometric 
systems for asylum seekers and biometric visas, with the aim of moving to a 
new system once the Scheme was operational. These design changes were 
driven by short-term cost concerns (IPS 2006c, p.10) in an apparent attempt 
at showing that the Scheme could be made to work in an affordable way, 
particularly before the general election of 2010, after which the Scheme’s 
future would be in even greater doubt. 
 
Throughout these discourses on costs, much was uncertain about the ‘true’ 
costs of doing biometrics. Cost projections were loaded with assumptions 
about technological advancements, economies of scale, and the possibility of 
cheaper equipment being available in the future. For example, when it came 
to costing readers, the government noted that: 
We expect that the various reader technologies will have moved on by 
the time that the scheme rolls out. In particular one might expect better 
integration of these devices, for example a less fragmented face 
recognition market and better performance from low-cost sensors. This 
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makes it dangerous to predict reader costs, although the scheme does 
take a view on all of these types of sensors. (IPS 2005, p.5) 
 
This discussion on costs leads us into an analysis of the discourses on the 
government’s changing strategy for implementing biometrics in the Scheme. 
 
Implementing infrastructures 
Recall from the literature review that, in practice, doing biometrics involves 
two major steps: the initial enrollment of biometrics from a person and the 
subsequent comparison of his or her biometrics against the previously 
enrolled data, during either an identification or verification mode. 
 
From the beginning of proposals for the NIS, the government paid 
considerable attention to how it might enroll the nation’s biometrics. For 
example, noting the significant “learning curve” associated with implementing 
biometrics (Home Office 2002, p.64), it sought opinions on this issue during 
the very first consultation exercise. 
The Government would like to hear the views of potential partners on 
how a nation-wide network of easily accessible biometric recording 
devices could be established and operated, how people who are not 
mobile or who live in sparsely populated areas could be served and what 
other value added services potential partners might offer. (Home Office 
2002, p.110) 
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Such discourses explained the importance of providing biometric enrollment 
facilities in locations across the UK, and where that proved impractical the use 
of mobile recording devices. 
As well as local centres there will also be mobile centres for sparsely 
populated areas. (Home Office 2005c, p.4) 
 
However, much less attention was paid to how these enrolled biometrics 
would then be used in practice, particularly in ways that benefited the citizen 
whose data were being used. That is, the government’s priority seemed to be 
figuring ways of collecting and storing everyone’s biometrics in the first 
instance, and not how they would be subsequently used. Indeed, as a focus 
group interviewee from one of the early government’s consultation exercises 
complained: 
"For [biometrics] to be beneficial all these places would have to have 
finger scanning and eye scanning facilities. Otherwise it's pointless." - 
Christian white male and female 31-50 London (Cragg Ross Dawson 
2004a, p.55) 
 
One could argue that the government was especially focused on enrolment 
because it is a necessary first step in doing biometrics and that other 
concerns would be addressed later on. Indeed, the government admitted in 
the beginning that, in the initial stages of Scheme, the use of biometrics would 
likely be limited, with the focus being on checking that people were not 
enrolling more than once. 
The use of any of the above types of biometric information (or a 
combination of these) would probably be limited in the early stages of an 
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entitlement card scheme to ensuring that a person could not establish 
multiple, false identities. (Home Office 2002, p.105) 
 
A further argument is that it was up to the organizations that would eventually 
use the NIS to decide when and how they would make use of biometrics. That 
is, that it was the government’s job only to provide the basic infrastructure for 
an identity scheme and that the eventual use of biometrics by public and 
private sector organizations should be demand-led and not dictated by the 
government. 
 
However, the government’s marketing activities for biometrics in the Scheme 
never extended beyond enrollment issues, with various attempts at forging 
relationships with organizations capable of enrolling large volumes of 
biometrics, without a clear explanation of how these would be used afterward. 
This further fuelled speculation amongst critics that the Scheme was one 
massive government data collection exercise, with little eventual benefit to the 
citizen. 
 
Another aspect of implementing biometrics has to do with the human 
resources required for such an undertaking, including both specialist training 
for facilitating and overseeing the enrollment process but also identifying and 
acquiring the expertise necessary for dealing with system errors and other 
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anomalies as they emerge during biometric checking (cf. Davis & Hufnagel 
2007). 
 
A major concern in the government discourses was whether the public sector 
had suitable human resources to conduct large-scale biometric enrollment. At 
first, the need for trained specialists was downplayed by the Home Office. 
The Government envisages a much simpler scanning system than that 
used by the police or the Immigration Service, which would probably 
involve just the scanning of four fingers. The prints would not be scanned 
to a legal standard of proof of identity. The staff taking the fingerprints 
therefore would not need to be as highly trained as those working for 
police forces of the Immigration Service and there would be no need for 
trained fingerprint officers to interpret the results of any potential matches 
detected by the computer. (Home Office 2002, pp.115-116, emphasis 
added) 
 
Government discourse shifted in later documents, with revised claims that 
while expertise was needed, there were sufficient human resources already in 
the civil service on which to found an expert base. For example in the 
Strategic Action Plan the government stated: 
We will put in place the skills and expertise to support large-scale use of 
biometric matching. Biometric technology identifies small percentages of 
what are known as ‘false matches’ or ‘false non-matches’. These need 
expert human assessment to ensure that matches are being made 
correctly. For this, we will build on resources which currently exist within 
government. (IPS 2006c, p.15, emphasis added) 
 
Soon thereafter the discourses about biometrics training and expertise began 
to change again, with an emphasis being placed on the need for support 
services. As was admitted in the Strategic Supplier Framework Prospectus:  
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With the use of probabilistic biometric matching technologies, there may 
also be associated biometric support services within this package (i.e. 
those services requiring expert human intervention). (IPS 2007b, p.34) 
 
The question, of course, was where this expertise would come from. While the 
government claimed that the UK Borders Agency (UKBA) (which was then 
actually two separate departments: the Border and Immigration Agency and 
the UKVisas) was developing the relevant human resources through its 
programs for collecting asylum seekers’ biometrics and issuing biometric visas 
to foreigners, the size of these programs was dwarfed by the potential scale of 
a national identity program. Concurrently, the government began articulating 
the need for “biometric enrollment services” for the NIS, to be developed and 
provided by the market. 
The capacity to handle these enrolments – in terms of high street 
estates, personnel and technology – does not exist today. The Biometric 
Enrolment Service would need to deploy a nationwide capacity capable 
of handling five million+ enrolments a year, in a way that is convenient 
for customers, efficient and of high integrity. (IPS 2007b, p.39) 
 
Yet again, the focus was on the human resources needed for the initial 
enrollment of biometrics for second generation (fingerprint) biometric 
passports as well as identity cards, rather than how these biometrics might be 
later used in various identification contexts and the potential human resources 
required for facilitating such activities. As noted earlier, a greater 
consideration of how to use biometrics and the attendant human resource 
implications might have emerged once the system had matured, with a 
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significant number of people’s biometrics having been enrolled, but this never 
came to fruition. 
 
6.5 Biometrics in use, or expectations thereof? 
We now move to focus on the fourth dimension of Orlikowski and Gash’s 
framework, related to issues around use. They see this dimension 
encompassing knowledge and organizational experience of the use of a 
specific technology and perceptions of the technology’s attributes, among 
other aspects (1992, p.6).  In an important sense, the discourses surrounding 
the use of biometrics in the Scheme were highly speculative and far removed 
from practical contexts. If we consider the events that make up the life and 
demise of the Scheme, the reasons for this become clear. 
 
Depending on how you define the scope of the program, biometrics were 
rarely ever actually used in the NIS. There was the Atos Origin trial of face, 
fingerprint, and iris biometrics, but this was only a small trial, as well as the 
‘roadshow’ for biometrics in the early stages of the Scheme. There are also 
those foreign nationals who were issued biometric immigration documents 
(which included face and fingerprint biometrics) starting in late 2008, but this 
program technically fell outside the scope of the NIS, despite certain 
government discourses which tried to blur the distinction between the two 
programs. In addition, there were the first generation ‘biometric’ passports 
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(with digital facial images), but these were not a central part of the NIS (and, 
indeed, passport documents were not “designated” identity documents under 
the Identity Cards Act 2006). Therefore, most of the activity related to the use 
of biometrics in the short-lived program was actually discursive; that is, talk 
about their potential future use. Setting aside discourses about enrollment for 
the time being (as we already explored these in the previous section on 
implementing biometrics), we now explore what was said about the use of 
biometrics. Most of these discourses were framed in terms of when, where, 
why, and how to do biometric ‘checks’ at some undefined point in the 
Scheme’s future. 
 
The original consultation document for an entitlement card system in the UK 
offered two scenarios for biometrics check: off-line and on-line checking (see 
Figures 6.3 and 6.4). 
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and are removed from any real-world context, but the important point is that 
the major distinction being made in the diagrams is between off-line and on-
line checks. Interestingly, both of these scenarios for checking biometrics 
involve the use of information technology. Elsewhere, the role of technology in 
using biometrics is depicted otherwise. 
 
In a subsequent consultation document (on identity cards, in 2004), the 
government provided some further detail on how biometrics could be used by 
certain organizations. 
Banks or building societies might check a person's biometric (using a 
card reader) and verify this against the National Identity Register before 
opening an account. (Home Office 2004c, p.28) 
 
And there were even visions for ‘card not present’ biometric checks, especially 
for police use. 
The intention is that people will be able to have their biometrics checked 
against the Register even in the absence of a card on a voluntary basis 
in order to be able to demonstrate their identity if, for example, they are 
stopped by the police. (Home Office 2004c, p.34) 
 
In 2004, the Home Affairs Committee commented that the government 
needed to provide more specific information regarding how biometrics would 
be used in practice. 
We note that at the moment there is very little clarity about the level and 
nature of checks that will be required and carried out, even though this is 
fundamental to the whole scheme. We recommend that the Government 
should provide estimates of the proportion of checks that would be 
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biometric and therefore highest security. (House of Commons Home 
Affairs Committee 2004, p.72, emphasis added) 
 
Subsequently, Home Office research found that respondents approved of 
biometric checks during “high risk, high value transactions” (Home Office 
2005a, p.7) or situations involving an “application” (Home Office 2005e, p.8). 
Opening a bank account is an obvious example of a situation in which people 
complete an application to access services, where many would probably 
deem providing biometrics unproblematic. However, there are other services 
requiring applications for which providing biometrics might be considered 
unreasonable or disproportionate, such as joining a gym or frequent traveler 
program, or applying for a supermarket loyalty card. Hence, it is not 
immediately apparent what transactions or interactions would require 
biometric checks. This lack of clarity persisted throughout the course of the 
Scheme. 
 
On other occasions, the government argued that public sector organizations 
could use biometrics to regulate claims to social benefits, but as already 
discussed this sort of cross-departmental co-operation was never achieved in 
the NIS. 
Benefit fraud will be easier to detect and prevent. Tighter identity 
requirements and better checking services will make it harder for people 
to abuse the system. Biometric ID can be checked against centrally held 
records, which will make it harder to use a false identity or make 
repeated claims successfully. Sharing data about identity between 
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government services will make it easier to check eligibility and detect 
multiple applications and duplicated records. (Home Office 2006, p.9) 
 
Such visions of real-time, on-line, on-the-spot biometric checks against a 
central store recurred often in the government’s discourses; however the 
actual practice of identity checks turned out to be much more mundane. This 
was a necessity as the vast infrastructures required for biometric checks 
never came to be during the brief existence of the Scheme. During the roll-out 
of foreign national biometric identity documents in 2008, the government 
provided guidance to the organizations that would encounter the newly issued 
cards. Rather than elaborating the merits of electronic fingerprint checks 
against information held on the card or against the Register, the Home Office 
offered up another form of ‘biometric’ verification.  
As it is made entirely from polycarbonate, [the card] will have a 
distinctive sound when flicked, and the holder’s image will always be in 
grey-scale. (UK Borders Agency 2008c, p.3) 
 
These are a very low-tech means of assuring an identity. The second part of 
the comment describes a process of visually verifying an image on the card, 
as border officials currently do during traditional passport checks. The contrast 
between such a ‘low-tech’ process and the “satisfyingly hi-tech” biometric 
checks (as they were once described in Home Office public engagement 
documents (Cragg Ross Dawson 2004c, p.14)) is stark. Yet again, this 
exposes a tension in the potential meanings of ‘biometrics’. Whereas in the 
original diagrams biometric checks were understood to require the use of 
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technology in reading the body and settling identity claims, organizational 
realities dictated a different process. 
 
Characterizing the attributes of biometrics 
As Orlikowski and Gash (1992) focus, in particular, on perceptions of technical 
attributes within this dimension of their framework, we now turn to review the 
frames that emerged from the government discourses on biometrics regarding 
their supposed traits and qualities. This review exposes other discursive 
trends. Beyond the ontological question of what biometrics are (e.g., a 
process, a technology, data, etc.), it is interesting to explore how the 
perceived characteristics of biometrics were portrayed and framed by 
government actors and the meanings that these frames provided the biometric 
concept. 
 
The following frames emerged through the coding process (see Table 6.5). At 
various stages during the development of proposals for the NIS, biometrics 
were described as follows: 
 
Frame Context 
Personalized “…proceeding towards more secure passports and driving licences based on 
biometric technology ­ with personalised, specific identifiers” (Home Office 
2004c) 
Specific 
Sensitive “Secondly, it was argued that there would be a new requirement to register 
information, including sensitive personal biometric data, with the state. This is 
a significant new obligation on the individual citizen which will be intrusive in 
operation.” (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2004) 
Personal 
Intrusive 
Unique “A biometric is a unique identifying physical characteristic such as facial 
 254
Identifying recognition, iris pattern or fingerprints.” (House of Commons 2005) 
Reliable “Biometrics are being developed around the world to improve the security and 
reliability of identity documents including fingerprint biometrics on visas and 
our own facial image biometric passport to be introduced next year.” 
(Burnham 2005a) 
Secure “I would argue that in the modern age, failing to offer the ability for people 
to link their personal data to secure biometric information would be a derelicti
on of our duty to protect the public.” (Ryan 2006) 
Measurable “A measurable, physical characteristic or personal behavioural trait used to 
recognise the identity or verify the claimed identity.” (IPS 2006b) 
Singular “Biometrics will tie an individual securely to a single unique identity.” (IPS 
2006c) Unique 
Difficult to 
forge, steal, 
forget, forget 
or lose 
“Why do I have to record my fingerprints? The identity card will lock together 
your basic identifying details with a combination of your unique personal 
features – electronic records of your face and fingerprints – because these 
are very hard to forge, steal, forget or lose.” (IPS 2008a) 
Table 6.5: Attribute frames assigned to biometrics in analyzed government communications 
(ordered chronologically)  
 
As before, the review of terminology reveals more than semantic hair-splitting. 
The choice of terms used to frame biometrics is significant for a number of 
reasons. From a legal perspective, the classification of data as ‘personal’ 
brings with it certain legal rights and protections, which can differ depending 
on the legal and regulatory context. Indeed, as I draft this section, the 
Information Commissioner’s Office in the UK is seeking to clarify the meaning 
of ‘personal data’ within the Data Protection Act, stating that new technologies 
and forms of identification are complicating these issues and the 
organization’s capacity to regulate (ICO 2010).  
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Following from this legal classification are certain technical implications. For 
example, the ICAO (the body responsible for setting standards for travel 
documentation) requires that the use of fingerprints in travel documents such 
as passports be protected by special advanced cryptographic means, known 
as Extended Access Control (EAC), because fingerprints are considered 
‘personal’ data. These protections do not apply to facial biometric data 
because, in contrast, they have been determined not to be personal (NAO 
2007, p.20). 
 
A story from the US further illustrates how these meanings matter. In 2008, 
the former US Secretary of Homeland Security sparked controversy when he 
referred to fingerprint data as “hardly personal” and “not particularly private” in 
the context of discussions on the international sharing of citizens’ biometrics. 
This drew criticism from Canadian privacy regulators, among others, who 
called fingerprints “extremely personal” (Swire 2008). Such disputes about the 
meanings and attributes of new technologies are ongoing. 
 
Another related dispute emerges around whether biometrics are ‘identifiable’. 
In general, fingerprints are considered identifiable information, whereas 
photos of the face are not. However, if the facial recognition process is 
computerized and automated, and satisfies certain performance requirements, 
then face biometrics can be said to be identifiable. In these scenarios, 
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information technology plays a central role in determining the identifiability of 
biometrics. Importantly, this debate about the identifiability of certain data 
extends beyond biometrics such as fingerprints, to other technologies and 
policy arenas. For example, recently courts in the US and EU have debated 
whether Internet Protocol (IP) addresses should be considered identifiable 
information. The US has declared that they are not whereas the EU is leaning 
in the other direction (Anderson 2008; Whitten 2008). 
 
Moreover, DNA – a very special type of biometric – presents further 
complications to this thinking, as it can be used to identify not just certain 
individuals, but also their genetic relatives (i.e., family members) (Bieber et al. 
2006). These ongoing debates about how different types of data engender 
varying interpretations and degrees of identifiability beg the question of what 
we really mean by identity and identification. 
 
While some of the frames from Table 6.5 appear relatively infrequently in the 
policy communications (e.g., biometrics as ‘identifying’; ‘measurable’; 
‘singular’), others recur regularly (biometrics as ‘personal’; ‘secure’; ‘unique’). 
Some were even repeatedly recycled verbatim throughout the government’s 
discourses (biometrics as ‘personalized’; ‘specific’). This recycling of 
discourses about biometrics and other components of the Scheme in policy 
documents complicates the project of studying organizational discourses on 
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the proposals. That is, how original are these frames for biometrics and where 
do they originate? How can one assess the extent of organizational 
knowledge when much of these communications appear to be boilerplate? 
What do decision-makers truly understand about what they are saying in 
these situations? 
 
Certain of these frames about the attributes of biometrics were contested by 
other actors. For example, the question of whether biometrics are ‘sensitive’ is 
challenged in the policy discourses that I analyzed, with the Home Affairs 
Committee describing them as such, and Baroness Scotland sharply disputing 
this claim by noting their previous, uncontroversial inclusion in passport 
documents (in the form of facial photos) (House of Lords Select Committee on 
the Constitution 2005, p.18). 
 
Another contested frame is the reliability of biometrics. When the Scheme was 
first launched, the predominant sentiment in much of the expert testimony, 
studies of public attitudes, and Home Affairs Committee discourses was that 
there were outstanding concerns and misgivings about the reliability of 
biometrics. 
Some concern was expressed on what the public reaction would be to 
the concept of biometrics. Other comments were on the expense of 
setting up systems subject to change and rapid advancement. Systems 
could also be error-prone and unreliable initially. (Home Office 2003a, 
p.102, emphasis added) 
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Or as the Home Affairs Committee noted: 
The security and reliability of biometrics are central to the Government’s 
proposals. No comparable system of this size exists. (House of 
Commons Home Affairs Committee 2004, p.4) 
 
And as was stated in a House of Commons research paper on identity cards 
from 2004: 
The Association of Payment and Clearing Services, which has taken the 
lead in credit and debit card security, is reported to have doubts about 
the quality of biometric identification. Such a system was under 
consideration for the new generation of chip and PIN credit and debit 
cards but it was reportedly rejected because no system was found to be 
reliable enough. (House of Commons 2004, p.42) 
 
In these discourses, reliability was conceived in very different ways, ranging 
from security concerns, to questions about the technological maturity of 
biometrics, to doubts that biometrics would prevent people from enrolling 
multiple identities. It was a very loaded category. 
 
Over the course of the proposals, the government seized on these various 
disputes around the reliability of biometrics and began targeting its discourses 
to address the issue. In doing so, government actors re-framed the debate by 
removing one of the perceived barriers to using biometrics in the NIS. If 
biometrics were understood as reliable, then the identity systems based on 
biometrics being pursued by the Home Office could be said to robust and 
practicable. As such the Home Office went to great lengths to demonstrate 
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their ongoing successes and achievements with biometrics – that is, to prove 
their reliability. 
[The] UK Border Agency will be launching identity cards for foreign 
nationals on 25th November [2008]. The robustness of the UK Border 
Agency process and technology has been tested through a pilot phase in 
Croydon. To date in the region of 12,000 migrants have already had their 
fingerprints recorded and checked against immigration records under the 
pilot biometric enrolment process. (IPS 2008e, p.3) 
 
Or as former Home Secretary Jacqui Smith noted in a public speech a week 
later, regarding the same pilot tests of biometrics 
To date, more than 15,000 people have enrolled, and we have identified 
a number of fraudulent applications and people trying to use multiple 
identities. The technology is working well ­ and in case you're wondering, 
there have been no cases where we've been unable to enrol someone's 
fingerprints. (Smith 2008a, p.4, emphasis added) 
 
Simultaneously, a report from the IPS stressed that 
[The National Identity Scheme] will be reliable because it will use 
physical evidence – photograph and fingerprints – to bind personal 
information to its owner. These are more difficult to lose, steal or fake 
than paper, password or signature. (IPS 2008d, p.15, emphasis added) 
 
These discursive attempts at settling the reliability debate drew on apparently 
successful uses of biometrics. Whether these successes would continue as 
the technology was scaled did not appear important at the time. What 
mattered was exhibiting that biometrics were reliable and that the government 
was capable of using them in its program for national identity cards. 
 
Unquestionably unique? 
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The most repeated claim about the use of biometrics in the NIS, by far, was 
that they would provide a ‘unique’ form of identity to everyone who enrolled. 
This argument was predicated on the common assumption that biometrics are 
indeed unique to an individual. This belief is best summed up by the saying 
that ‘no two fingerprints are alike’, although it can be applied to other 
biometrics. For many actors within government, the entire point of biometrics 
was to achieve uniqueness in identity. The frame recurred throughout the 
government discourses that I analyzed. To present just a small fraction of 
these discourses: 
1) Things which you ‘are’ i.e. your biometric identity. These are attributes which are unique 
to an individual and include fingerprints, iris patterns (the coloured part of the eye around the 
pupil), and DNA profile. (Home Office 2002) 
2) It is recognised that the inclusion of a biometric encrypted on a smartcard chip would be a 
way to link identity to a particular person by way of a ‘unique' physical characteristic. (Home 
Office 2003a) 
3) What is biometric information? A unique identifying physical characteristic. (Home Office 
2003b) 
4) A biometric is a unique identifying physical characteristic. (Home Office 2004c) 
5) The Government intends to introduce a national compulsory ID cards scheme using unique 
biometric identifiers linked to a new national database. (Blunkett et al. 2004) 
6) Most [respondents] seemed to know that fingerprints and iris patterns are unique and 
understood that they could be used to generate a unique record of identity for each card 
holder. (Cragg Ross Dawson 2004c) 
7) It is known that around 35% of those involved in serious organized crime and terrorism 
routinely use false or multiple identities. The use of a secure and unique biometric identifier 
will disrupt their activities by making it impossible for them to enrol more than once on the 
Register. (Home Office 2004b) 
8) The rigour of the application process and the uniqueness of the biometric will mean that, in 
time, the identity card will become the gold standard way of proving identity throughout the 
UK. (Home Office 2004b)  
9) The benefits of using biometrics were largely undisputed – almost all knew that fingerprints 
and iris patterns are unique, and accepted that their use would probably make ID cards more 
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difficult to forge or misuse. (Home Office 2004a) 
10) There can't be 2 people with the same biometric on the same database claiming to be the 
same person. I think it's quite important to spell that out because there is terrific 
misunderstanding about the issue about being able to forge or multiply identity. (Blunkett 
2004) 
11) As with any project of this size and complexity there is a great deal of development work 
to be done before it is possible to finalise all the operational details, including the precise 
technical arrangements for recording biometric identifiers such as facial image, finger scans 
and iris images, which will provide a way of uniquely confirming the identity of cardholders. 
(Home Office 2004c) 
12) A biometric is a unique personal physical characteristic such as a fingerprint or iris 
pattern. (Central Office of Information 2004) 
13) The Register will also link each individual's record to a biometric that is unique to that 
person. (House of Commons 2004) 
14) A biometric is a unique identifying physical characteristic such as facial recognition, iris 
pattern or fingerprints. (House of Commons 2004) 
15) The database linked to the cards will carry only basic information such as name, address 
and date of birth, besides the unique biometric information – such as the image of your face, 
iris, or fingerprints – which ensure your identity is protected for use by you and you alone. 
(The Faith Community Consultation Consortium 2005) 
16) A biometric is a unique personal physical characteristic such as a fingerprint or iris 
pattern. To what extent do you think having biometric details on your identity card will be 
effective at stopping other people stealing your identity and using your card, making it easier 
to prove your identity (e.g. by not having to remember a PIN number) (Home Office 2005b) 
17) Why now? Now is the right time to introduce an ID cards scheme because of advances in 
technology.  An ID cards scheme is more than just issuing pieces of plastic. It is about 
recording on a central database basic personal information such as name, address and date 
of birth securely. This data is then linked to biometric information - such as facial image, 
fingerprints and iris patterns - which is unique to that individual. (Home Office 2005c) 
18) Financial security: The ID card will provide a more secure way for you to apply for 
financial products and perform financial transactions, whilst making it more difficult for 
someone else to try fraudulently to access your finances. It is more secure as your ID card is 
linked to your biometrics (e.g. fingerprint) which are unique to you and no one else can use it. 
(Home Office 2005e) 
19) Police checks: The ID card will make it easier for the Police to make our society safer. ID 
Cards carry our biometrics which are unique to each one of us - no one else can use them. 
This means the police will more easily trace and identify suspects. (Home Office 2005e)  
20) The creation of a register of limited registrable facts where a person's record is linked to a 
set of unique biometrics will combat attempts to create multiple identities. (Home Office 
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2005h) 
21) As the ID card will link your identity to your unique set of biometrics, it will be much more 
difficult for fraudsters to use this document in order to impersonate others. (IPS 2006a) 
22) Biometric technology now means that we can link people to a unique identity. (Home 
Office 2006) 
23) Identity authentication through biographics does not, however, provide proof of 
uniqueness of an identity. For this, biometric data is required. (Crosby 2008) 
24) The [foreign national identity] card will contain details about the holder’s immigration 
status and entitlements in the UK which include their unique biometric data. This will enable 
us to tie an applicant to a fixed identity. (UK Borders Agency 2008a) 
Table 6.6: Instances of biometrics being described as ‘unique’ in analyzed government texts 
(ordered chronologically) 
 
From Table 6.6 it is evident that the uniqueness of biometrics was virtually 
unquestionable in these communications, even as other aspects of the 
Scheme were so uncertain. For example, as is stated in the quotation from the 
Identity Cards Bill Regulatory Impact Assessment (number 11 in the table), 
the project for biometrics was deemed large and complex and most of the 
operational aspects of the system, such as how biometrics were to be 
recorded and used, remained unknown for most of the Scheme’s lifespan. 
Yet, having noted the very tentative state of biometrics and the many 
uncertainties surrounding them, the Home Office then went on to re-iterate the 
apparently obvious claim that biometrics provide a way of "uniquely 
confirming" identity. It is as though this point was indisputable, even while 
everything else was unsure. 
 
However, the debate about uniqueness and the claims that can be justified by 
the supposed uniqueness of biometrics such as fingerprints encompasses 
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several complex issues. Cole (2009) summarizes the epistemological 
problems with many of these claims. 
 
First, the generally accepted understanding that biometrics are unique is not 
uncontroversial. There is a growing consensus in the academic literature 
(particularly the forensics literature) that the uniqueness of biometrics remains 
unproven and is, perhaps, something that cannot be proven or disproven. It is, 
in many ways, a thing of faith that both the general public and many 
professionals working in the fields of forensics and law, for example, assume 
to be true. The subsequent claim that biometrics can be used to individuate 
(Cole uses the term ‘individualization’) because they are unique is equally 
specious he says. Going further, Cole claims that the entire discussion about 
uniqueness is both irrelevant (2009, pp.241-242) and banal, arguing that what 
really matters is having the analytical tools necessary to distinguish one 
fingerprint from another, for example, or knowing the sample size for 
comparison. “Since all objects in the universe are in some respects the ‘same’ 
and in other respects ‘different’ from all other objects in the universe, 
according to Wittgenstein, what really matters is not uniqueness but rather 
what rules we articulate by which we make the determinations of ‘sameness’ 
and ‘difference’” (2009, p.243). Recognition of these criticisms of the frames of 
uniqueness was entirely absent in the government’s discourses. 
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6.6 Defining and measuring success 
The fifth dimension of Orlikowski and Gash’s framework relates to the success 
of new technology, how to define it, and the assumptions that factor into 
determining how it should be assessed. They argue that these criteria may be 
based on business-related concerns, technical capabilities, or some other 
aspect such as usability. 
 
The definition of success and how to measure it with respect to biometrics in 
the UK case is a wholly complicated issue. On one level, we could argue that 
the biometrics in the NIS were a failure, especially considering the high 
visions for the technology in the early stages of the Scheme and its eventual 
demise. But this would be unfair considering how the program ended; that is, 
with the election of a new government intent on scrapping the system 
wholesale. One could argue instead that biometrics were never really given a 
chance to succeed. 
 
To start, as we have already established, biometrics are not a unified thing. 
The criteria for determining the extent of success in deploying iris or 
fingerprint biometrics should therefore probably differ from those criteria for 
measuring the implementation of digital facial photographs in e-passports, for 
example. While the former programs never really got off the ground, the latter 
venture did, with the National Audit Office reporting in 2007 that the IPS had 
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achieved important successes, with certain provisos. However, recent media 
reports are casting doubt on the successes of facial biometrics in passports as 
well (see, for example, Hough 2010).  
 
Questions of success and failure also depend on the level of analysis. The 
meaning of successful biometrics for the Home Office or IPS will differ from an 
individual’s experience of having his or her biometrics accepted or rejected 
during enrollment or when trying to access a vital medical service that 
requires a fingerprint scan, for example. Success is, of course, a relative 
concept. Moreover, the metrics used to rate success are very often political 
artifacts that must not be taken for granted. 
 
This section critically explores how the ‘success’ of biometrics was articulated 
in different government discourses. There are two parts to this analysis. The 
first part deals with the discourses used by the government to demonstrate 
their achievements in biometrics. These are discourses on technological 
successes. The second part explores success in terms of ‘customer 
satisfaction’ with biometric identity cards. 
 
In its discourses on biometrics in the NIS, the Home Office was keen to draw 
attention to its successes in other programs: in issuing biometric visas, new 
passports, and biometric identity documents for asylum seekers, as well as in 
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the Iris Recognition Immigration System (IRIS) used in select UK airports, and 
the use of mobile biometric readers by police, among other systems (Home 
Office 2006, pp.6-7). For example, in response to a question during an on-line 
web chat about the lack of usability trials for biometrics in the NIS, the former 
chief executive of the IPS stated that 
We are planning trials during the procurement process. And this is not 
new technology - we have already issued three million passports with 
facial biometrics. If you are concerned whether or not it works, and you 
have an ePassport, you can take it to any of our regional offices to test 
that it can be read. And 400 passengers a day are using IRIS at 
Heathrow airport. (Hall 2006) 
 
In trying to foreshadow the future success of biometrics in the Scheme, Hall 
relies on drawing attention to the accomplishments of other ongoing Home 
Office-sponsored biometrics programs. The thinking being, if the technology 
works in other application areas, there should be no problems with using 
biometrics in a national ID scheme. Likewise, as Jacqui Smith stated in a 
speech on ‘making identity cards a reality’: 
Since April, our fingerprint enrolment pilot [for foreign national biometric 
identity documents] has demonstrated how important these checks can 
be in weeding out those who have no right to stay.  
 
To date, more than 15,000 people have enrolled, and we have identified 
a number of fraudulent applications and people trying to use multiple 
identities. The technology is working well ­ and in case you're wondering, 
here have been no cases where we've been unable to enrol someone's 
fingerprints. (Smith 2008a, p.4) 
 
In both examples, we read that the technology works – that there is no reason 
to doubt its eventual success in the NIS. Of course, this way of thinking about 
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success overlooks a host of political, social, and economic concerns which 
might hinder the success of using multiple biometrics in a national program for 
identity cards.  
 
The government was also interested in demonstrating customer satisfaction 
with the use of biometrics. It ran ‘customer proposition’ studies in the early 
days of its proposals to gauge the public’s reaction to the prospect of using 
biometrics. Recall also that the Atos Origin trial was said not to be a trial of 
technology but rather a trial of ‘customer experience’. Later on, as the IPS 
began exploring options for outsourcing the biometrics function of the ID cards 
program, it stated that 
The introduction of 2nd biometric passports and ID cards transforms 
IPS's application and enrolment customer service proposition, not least 
in moving from a model where IPS services only a small percentage of 
customers in person to one where all customers will need to be serviced 
in person.  In bringing this new model of operation into service, IPS 
intends to increase efficiency, reduce fraud and maintain its very high 
levels of customer satisfaction. (IPS 2007b, p.35, emphasis added) 
 
Besides the interesting point that these discourses speak of ‘customers’ rather 
than ‘citizens’, thus reflecting an ideology of ‘new public management’ (cf. 
Hood 1991; Osborne & Gaebler 1992; Mosse & Whitley 2009), they also imply 
that the perceived success of biometrics in the NIS depended, in part, on 
customer satisfaction. 
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To show the extent to which the IPS went to demonstrate ‘successes’ in 
customer satisfaction with respect to biometric identity cards, we briefly turn to 
a remarkable episode. In a (much delayed) response to a Freedom of 
Information Act request submitted by the No2ID activist group, the IPS 
revealed that of the nine people quoted on a section of its website dedicated 
to sharing positive customer experiences with biometric ID cards, eight of 
these ‘happy’ customers “at the time either worked for the Identity and 
Passport Service, the Home Office or another government department or 
agency" (IPS 2010). Such “astroturfing”19 of customer satisfaction (as it was 
described at the time in media reports (Lettice 2010)) lends further support to 
idea that, as an organization the IPS was so concerned with demonstrating 
success, particularly as it appeared that a new government administration 
might terminate the Scheme, that it was willing to manufacture it as 
necessary. 
 
6.7 Anticipating impacts 
The sixth dimension in Orlikowski and Gash’s framework relates to the 
impacts of a technology on individuals and tasks, as well as an organization’s 
strategy, structure, culture, and way of doing business. Considering the scope 
of the proposals for the NIS, we target this dimension of their framework to 
                                            
19 “Astroturfing” is a pejorative term to describe the use of political, advertising, or public 
relations campaigns that are formally planned by an organization, but disguised as 
spontaneous grassroots movements. 
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examine discourses around the expected social impacts of deploying 
biometrics. 
 
During the literature review on biometrics we summarized a paper by Clarke 
(2001), calling for social impact assessments to be conducted with any new 
biometrics implementation. Such assessments would provide an opportunity 
for sponsors to a) disclose fully the technologies they are interested in and 
how they would be used, b) analyze the potential social impacts of these 
technologies, c) publish their results for public consultation, and d) accordingly 
involve the public in the design of new systems. These steps can be 
considered as best practices for trying to understand the eventual impact of 
launching a new technology such as biometrics. Importantly, they assume a 
certain level of specificity regarding the plans for biometrics, without which 
assessing impacts will be difficult. 
 
Any discussion about the expected social impacts of introducing biometrics in 
the UK as part of the NIS therefore ought to acknowledge and understand the 
impact assessments that the government conducted during the course of its 
proposals, including a regulatory impact assessment and a race equality 
impact assessment, as well as a separate equality impact assessment for 
foreign national biometric ID documents. The preparation and publication of 
these documents granted the government and Home Office a chance to 
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consider the various problems that might arise as a result of their proposals. 
From these documents, we can discern two main groups that the government 
thought might have been impacted by its proposals: both private and public 
sector organizations, and citizens. 
 
In its regulatory impact assessment, the Home Office stated as a matter of 
fact:  
The Bill as drafted places no burdens on business, charities or voluntary 
bodies. There are no provisions in the Bill which will allow the 
Government to require business, charities or voluntary bodes to make 
identity checks using the identity cards scheme. The required identity 
checks power relates only to public services. (Home Office 2004d, p.3) 
 
However, while the legislation did not mandate the use of identity cards and 
biometrics by businesses, it was generally understood that for the Scheme to 
have any longevity the private sector’s participation was crucial. Furthermore, 
the extent of public sector organizations’ participation in the Scheme was 
equally important yet just as uncertain throughout the course of Scheme. 
 
Concerning biometrics in particular, the regulatory impact assessment 
conceded that the details of biometrics remained underspecified, thus 
complicating the effectiveness of any impact assessment.  
As with any project of this size and complexity there is a great deal of 
development work to be done before it is possible to finalise all the 
operational details, including the precise technical arrangements for 
recording biometric identifiers such as facial image, finger scans and iris 
images. (Home Office 2004d, p.2) 
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Elsewhere, we discover a range of other discourses related to the potential 
social impact of the widespread use of biometrics in British life. Many of these 
discourses emerged in the early stages of the Scheme, following public 
consultation by government. The concerns raised in these discourses include 
questions of accountability, civil and human rights, privacy, cultural and 
religious objections, discrimination as the result of the uneven use of 
biometrics (as is the case currently in the National DNA Database in the UK), 
embarrassment (if and when systems were to fail), empowerment, exclusion 
(as a result of a medical condition preventing someone from being able to 
provide biometrics), gender issues, health risks related to hygiene and 
biometric scanners, safety, and aspects of resistance to biometrics. 
 
It is laudable that so many of these issues received attention and were subject 
to public debate, albeit to varying degrees. For example, ID cards and 
biometrics for transgendered people was an issue of special concern for the 
government (see, for example, IPS 2009), whereas the question of exclusion 
was a tricky one to settle, especially with the disappearance of iris over the 
course of the proposals. Other concerns might have been reconciled had the 
Scheme survived the general election (e.g., ensuring that female attendees 
were available to oversee the enrollment of Muslim women’s biometrics). 
However, for most of these concerns, including the issues of privacy, security, 
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and accountability, the government paid minimal attention to the complexity of 
the problems. For example, the issue of accountability was understood in very 
simplistic terms. 
Finally, there is a requirement for accountability. The National Identity  
Register (NIR) will set new standards for best practice in protecting 
document, physical, staff and building security.    
 
The IT systems holding the National Identity Register biographical and 
biometric information will be fully accredited by the government's security 
authorities. (Byrne 2007) 
 
As in this quotation, one of the fundamental problems with these discourses 
was a lack of specificity regarding how biometrics would be used in practice, 
especially post-enrollment. We have already noted some of these issues. 
Statements such as “the process will be quick, easy, and safe” (Cragg Ross 
Dawson 2004c, p.95) provided very little detail on which to appreciate the 
numerous issues that might arise in practice; that is, the real life ‘impacts’. 
This is partly a limitation of impact assessments in general, but moreover it is 
an outcome of a general vagueness and degree of uncertainty in the 
government’s discourses about its plans. 
 
6.8 Framing publics 
The final dimension in Orlikowski and Gash’s analytical framework regards 
relations with other players in the computing social world, including actors 
such as managers, users, and technologists; and third parties such as 
 273
vendors, consultants, customers, and government regulators. We already 
identified many of these actors in chapter 5, and then again throughout the 
course of this chapter, including the different branches of Parliament that 
oversaw developments in the Scheme; external actors such as the ICAO, EU, 
and US which emerged discursively to justify certain policy decisions 
regarding biometrics; activists, experts, and academics who regularly provided 
informed criticism of the government’s decision-making; and various 
commercial actors with an interest in the Scheme, among many others.  
 
Instead of repeating these efforts in this section, my aim is rather to focus on 
one actor (or set of actors). That actor is the public, or perhaps more 
accurately stated, the ‘publics’ of biometrics (Michael 2009). These are 
interesting for a number of reasons. 
 
First, in a literal sense, without the public biometrics simply cannot happen. 
That is, as a concept, a technology, or a process, biometrics necessarily 
involve people and the recording and reading of their bodies. Within the IT 
domain, biometrics are fairly unique in this respect. Therefore the public-
technology relationship, and the discourses that address it, are particularly 
important in this case. Second, the critical public understanding of science 
undercurrent to this thesis persuades us to examine not only the discourses 
that constitute new technology, but also those about the people who are said 
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to benefit from technology. By analyzing these government discourses about 
the public, we can better understand how certain actors actively and 
strategically framed publics in ways that were favorable to the aims and 
objectives of the NIS. Last, critical discourse analysis is particularly interested 
the study of social relations, of which government-citizen relations are an 
important component. 
 
The public made numerous appearances in the government’s discourses, 
including discourses about their perceptions and understandings of biometrics 
and whether they approved of and accepted the technologies. We covered 
some of these in the first section of this chapter as we tried conceptualizing 
biometrics through government discourse. In what follows we explore the 
discourses on the different publics rendered by biometrics, including the 
various ‘others’. 
 
An important discursive distinction made in the data is between those who are 
capable of using biometrics and those who are not. These discourses divide 
the population of potential publics of biometrics into two categories: the ‘able-
bodied’ and the ‘biometrically-challenged’. As regards the former category, we 
were told throughout the course of the Scheme that they were more or less 
OK with the concept: 
There were few objections to the proposed biometric procedures among 
the able bodied. (Home Office 2005b, p.15, emphasis added) 
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The latter category, however, proved much more complicated to resolve in 
government discourses. For the government, the solution for such individuals 
was technological in nature. That is, during the Home Office’s market 
soundings, specialized equipment was pursued for those with physiological or 
psychological problems that would prevent them from ‘doing’ biometrics 
properly.  
Suppliers are encouraged to provide additional or specialised equipment 
to assist with the recording of biometrics that may be challenging to 
record successfully on standard equipment (meaning that standard 
equipment that is suited to the general working population may not be 
ideally suited to persons whose biometrics are challenging to record 
successfully) (Home Office 2005g, p.23) 
 
Such discourses connote a ‘standard’ or ‘general’ population, and a group of 
biometric ‘others’. These others – those with bodily or mental ‘challenges’ – 
included the blind, the disabled and ill (e.g., those with Parkinson’s disease), 
the vulnerable and elderly, children, the homeless population, and people with 
“complex lives”. Rather than re-thinking its decision to pursue biometrics for 
these people, the government made efforts to be as inclusive as possible. In 
its discourses the government was careful to promote “a scheme that works 
for everyone”, with according processes for biometrics. 
We will work with such organisations to agree, for example, how we 
enroll people with complex lives such as the homeless and how an 
address should be recorded for them – such lifestyles will not be a barrier 
to enrolling. Special provisions will be required, for example, for the small 
group of people transitioning between genders who have complex 
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identity needs but will not be excluded from the Scheme – we will offer 
an identity card in both genders – or for those unable to give full facial or 
fingerprint biometrics due to disability, for example. (IPS 2008d, p.13, 
emphasis added) 
 
On the one hand, these discourses could be seen as being about empowering 
publics through biometrics, and thus resonate with arguments that in certain 
contexts surveillance can be empowering for some segments of society (see, 
for example, Murakami Wood & Firmino 2010). On the other hand, these 
discourses appear not to have appreciated the logic of arguments by authors 
such as Lyon (2002), who points out that biometrics are discriminatory by 
design – that the Scheme would not “work for everyone” in the same way and 
that there are large swathes of the population that would be treated differently 
simply because of the use of biometrics (e.g., those without readable 
fingerprints or irises suitable for biometric scans). However, we ought to be 
careful not to assume too much about the future practices of the Scheme, as it 
is these that determine the degree to which biometrics would have been 
empowering or repressing, and as we know the Scheme never got to this 
stage. 
 
Furthermore, in these discourses public acceptance and resistance was 
framed in a very instrumental fashion. Resistance was seen as something that 
could and should be squashed, through the right mix of public engagement 
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and public relations activity, thus smoothing public acceptance. For example, 
regarding the possibility of resistance to biometrics, the Home Office stated: 
It was thought that the public may be wary of providing fingerprint details 
as this was associated with criminality. Whilst there was potential for 
some resistance to the provision of iris imaging, it was considered that 
this could be overcome rapidly. (Home Office 2003a, p.113) 
 
When Gordon Brown stated in an interview in 2008 with the Guardian 
newspaper that, “in fact, I don't actually think most of the general public think 
that the use of biometrics is in itself wrong, either for private transactions or for 
passports or whatever” (Watt 2008), it was not entirely clear who he believed 
this “general public” to be. Presumably, they were the ‘able-bodied’ public 
assumed by most of the policy discourses on the NIS, but might they have 
included the ‘biometrically-challenged’ as well? We need to move beyond 
moral discussions of right and wrong to understand how these ‘others’ of 
biometrics might have taken issue with the introduction of a technology that 
presented such challenges to so many different people. 
 
And, of course, public acceptance and resistance meant something very 
different to the foreign nationals and asylum seekers who were mandated to 
provide their biometrics to the UK government in order to enter and reside in 
the country. As previously mentioned, these publics technically do not belong 
to the case of the NIS, as the programs fall under different legislation than the 
Identity Cards Act 2006. However, as we are interested in the statements that 
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exist within discourses about the case of the NIS, we find that these publics 
made repeated appearances in government talk about the Scheme. A brief 
exploration of these discourses reveals the other ‘other’ of biometrics in the 
case at hand. 
 
If the ‘biometrically-challenged’ were the ‘other’ to the ‘able-bodied general 
public’ of biometrics, then the various foreigners who unwillingly took part in 
different government-led biometrics programs, and provided ‘evidence’ that 
biometrics are workable in a national identity card program, can be considered 
another ‘other’.  
 
As we have seen, the UK government mandated certain (non-EEA) foreign 
nationals and asylum seekers to provide biometrics (including 10 fingerprints). 
This collection of biometrics meant that the Home Office was able to develop 
a capacity for biometrics whilst it tried to sort out the numerous kinks in the 
NIS. Remarking on the successes of these programs, Liam Byrne said in 
2007 that: 
Already we have found 4,000 hits against immigration databases. 70% 
were applying for visas from abroad, had already claimed asylum in 
Britain.  Many claimed in [sic] a different identity.  Nearly 1 in 10, we 
found was subject to removal directions. Including a Ghanaian, who 
applied for a visa in Accra, who biometric checks established had 
claimed asylum in the UK under a different identity as a Liberian national. 
(Byrne 2007, pp.1-2) 
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The programs underpinning these discourses provided the government an 
opportunity to build the infrastructure necessary for biometrics, making asylum 
seekers and foreign nationals the guinea pigs for the testing of biometrics. 
This is a point that was lost on many of the critics of the NIS, who did not take 
issue with the use of biometrics in these other areas, failing to fully appreciate 
the role that the development of infrastructure for biometric immigration 
documents played in the national ID card scheme. And now that the Identity 
Cards Act 2006 has been abolished by the new Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition government, it is only these foreigners who are required to 
participate in the government’s biometrics programs. 
6.9 Conclusion 
This chapter presented a critical discourse analysis of various statements 
about biometrics from government communications found in legislative and 
parliamentary texts, policy reports, research publications, corporate 
documents, public presentations and speeches, public interviews, corporate 
newsletters, leaked documents, and publicly-available responses to Freedom 
of Information requests. The analysis revealed how government actors 
strategically framed the concept of biometrics in their arguments about the 
Scheme, the changes these frames underwent over time, the underlying 
uncertainty and ambiguity in much of this ‘talk’ about a new technology, and 
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the politics that were played out in these discourses. The next chapter further 
elaborates on these ideas by exploring additional streams of public discourse. 
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Chapter 7: Analysis (II) 
Experts admit that biometrics, the storing of genetic data, is not infallible. 
People can have fake fingerprints - if they can have penis extensions live 
on television weekly, then that's really not an issue. – Column from the 
Independent (2005) 
 
You’ve got to laugh. Apparently people with fat fingers cause problems 
with the ID card technology. What? We can send men to space but that's 
the extent of the high-tech, high-cost cards? – Letter from a Sun (tabloid) 
reader (following the publication of the Atos Origin biometrics trial 
results) (2005) 
 
The shadow chancellor, George Osborne, described the security breach 
as "catastrophic", urging Gordon Brown to drop his search for a vision 
and "just get a grip". He said: "Public confidence in the government and 
its ability to protect information has been destroyed." – Guardian article 
reporting on the parliamentary debate following the large-scale loss of 
data by HMRC (2007, emphasis added) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we analyze two streams of data which run in parallel to the 
discourses analyzed in chapter 6. The data sources are the Hansard record of 
parliamentary debates and the mainstream UK newspaper coverage, both 
centered upon discourses on biometrics in the National Identity Scheme 
(NIS). As explained in chapter 4, these two sets of data do more than simply 
provide us with more of the same; rather, they provide new perspectives on 
the underlying dynamics of the case. Whereas the official policy statements 
found in the speeches and documents reviewed in chapter 6 were surely 
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carefully prepared and edited before their dissemination, the debates in 
Parliament produced a more spontaneous set of discourses with which to 
understand the trajectory of biometrics. Even if these parliamentary speeches 
are based on previously drafted notes, the venue permits questioning and 
dialogue around these scripts. Analyzing the media coverage allows us to 
track how the messages about biometrics travelled once government 
discourses ‘entered the wild’. 
 
Whereas the data in chapter 6 were analyzed around the seven dimensions 
from Orlikowski and Gash’s framework for understanding new technology and 
organizational change, this chapter is structured around the six critical events 
first identified in chapter 5, drawing, of course, on the debates and themes 
identified in chapter 6. These events represent moments when either the 
Scheme or biometrics in particular underwent significant policy activity, 
whether highly publicized (such as with the HMRC data breach) or muffled (as 
in the case of the government’s de-emphasizing the role of iris biometrics). As 
with the data analyzed in chapter 6, I conducted a critical discourse analysis 
on the Hansard and media discourses, leveraging the micro-analysis 
approach where useful (Corbin & Strauss 2008, p.59). 
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In the sections that follow I very briefly re-summarize each of critical events, 
recapping why they are important, before presenting an analysis of the 
relevant Hansard debates and the attendant media coverage that occurred. 
 
7.2 Re-introducing the Identity Cards Bill 
The first event in our timeline is the re-introduction of the Identity Cards Bill to 
Parliament after the general election of 2005. The Bill that was presented in 
May 2005 was virtually the same document that had been previously 
unsuccessful. However, having won the 2005 election, the re-invigorated 
Labour government was determined to pass its legislation, arguing that 
national identity cards were an election manifesto commitment. At the same 
time, the government released findings from the trial of biometrics conducted 
by Atos Origin, thus piquing public interest in these technologies. 
 
During the period following the re-introduction of the Bill, much of the 
parliamentary debate about the proposed Scheme focused on concerns 
related to the expected costs of issuing biometric passports and the uncertain 
reliability of biometrics. As regards the latter, there were several discussions 
about the outcomes of the Atos Origin trial, with government ministers 
stressing in Parliament that “the objective of the trial was to test the 
processes, and record customer experience and attitude during the recording 
and verification of facial, iris and fingerprint biometrics. The trial was not 
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aimed at testing the biometric technology”  [9 Jun 2005: Column 655W-
656W20, emphasis added]. 
 
However, at the time there was another recurring theme in the parliamentary 
discourses which was less prevalent in the official policy documents about the 
Scheme. This topic concerned the possibility of including DNA information in 
identity cards. On two separate occasions shortly following the Bill’s re-
introduction the issue of DNA was raised. The first instance is as follows: 
Mr. Gordon Prentice: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department what assessment he has made of the merits of using DNA 
identifiers in the proposed identity cards; and if he will make a statement. 
[3175]21 
 
Mr. McNulty: The Identity Cards Scheme is not proposing to use DNA as 
one of the biometric identifiers. Clause 43 of the Identity Cards Bill 
defines a biometric as data about a person's external characteristics, 
e.g., facial image, iris pattern or fingerprints. DNA is not included in the 
list of information at schedule one of the Identity Cards Bill that may be 
held on the National Identity Register and there is no power under clause 
five of the Bill (applications relating to entries in the register) for the 
Secretary of State to require a person to provide a DNA sample. [13 Jun 
2005: Column 159W] 
 
In his response Tony McNulty, then-Minister of State for Immigration, 
Citizenship and Nationality, dismisses the possibility of using DNA in the 
Scheme, justifying his reasoning with reference to the language about 
biometrics in the Bill. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
                                            
20 This notation designates the location of the exchange in the Hansard record. 
21 These numbers are Parliamentary Question reference numbers. 
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language concerning biometrics in the various drafts of the Identity Cards Bill 
was far from unambiguous. Indeed, it is very open to interpretation whether 
the collection and use of DNA in the Scheme would have been impossible 
according to the terms of the legislation. For sure, it would have been a 
different and difficult project compared to collecting digital photographs of 
people’s faces, but that is not to say it could have been ruled out entirely 
based simply on a reading of the proposed legislation. 
 
One week later a similar question was posed in Parliament. Using virtually the 
same language, McNulty restates the government’s intentions not to enroll 
DNA in the Scheme, again citing the Bill’s language on biometrics as the 
reason why. In addition, medical records are mooted and subsequently 
dismissed, although as is acknowledged in the final part of the quotation 
below, the legislative language about what data could be stored on the 
National Identity Register (NIR) was not as firm as one might expect. 
Mr. Khan: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
whether there are plans to include (a) DNA and (b) medical records on 
the National Identity Register in the second stage of the identity cards 
process. [4172] 
 
Mr. McNulty: The Identity Cards Scheme is not proposing to use DNA as 
one of the biometric identifiers. Clause 43 of the Identity Cards Bill 
defines biometric information as data about a person's external 
characteristics, e.g. facial image, iris pattern or fingerprints and therefore 
excludes DNA. DNA is not included in the list of information at Schedule 
one of the Identity Cards Bill that may be held on the National Identity 
Register and there is no power under Clause five of the Bill (applications 
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relating to entries in the Register) for the Secretary of State to require a 
person to provide a DNA sample. 
 
The Identity Cards Scheme is not proposing to include medical records 
on the National Identity Register. Clause one and Schedule one of the 
Identity Cards Bill sets out what information could be held on the 
Register. In general the storage of medical information on the Register 
would not be allowed by the Bill as medical information does not fall 
within the definition of registerable (sic) facts as set out in Clause 1(5) of 
the Bill. 
 
The Bill does allow for the storage of voluntary information with the 
consent of both the person who is registered and the Secretary of State. 
[20 Jun 2005: Column 763W-764W] (emphasis added) 
 
These discussions about DNA and identity cards would not end here. The 
topic would re-emerge in later debates. The recurrence of the DNA option in 
parliamentary talk about the government’s program for identity cards 
represents a confounded state of affairs. For many in the technical 
community, DNA-based identity cards are still very much a thing of science 
fiction. However they were an alluring prospect for politicians and policy-
makers, who were captivated by the power of DNA and genetics. We return to 
this point shortly.  
 
In the media coverage during this period, specific discussions about 
biometrics are absent in many of the reports on the proposed Scheme. When 
biometrics do appear in these articles it is very often as a passing remark to 
‘biometric passports’, for example, without much engagement with the 
concept of biometrics itself. However, on other occasions the coverage is 
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especially critical and focused on the poor performance of biometrics in the 
Atos Origin trial (despite the government’s pleas that it was not supposed to 
be a technology trial). Oddly, in a Guardian article from this period Tony 
McNulty is quoted as claiming that the poor performance of biometrics in the 
government’s trial was a reason to collect even more biometric information 
from people. In doing so, however, he appears to be contradicting the 
government’s stance that the biometrics testing was not a technology trial. 
The Home Office minister Tony McNulty, said the failure rates were 
partly the reason the decision had been taken to incorporate all three 
forms of biometric on the identity card/passport. 
 
"Those who know far better than I say things are going in the right 
direction," he said. "The combination of the three biometrics add (sic) to 
the integrity of the process. Some say that goes too far." (Travis 2005) 
[26 May: The Guardian] 
 
In this passage, McNulty conveys his relative ignorance of technical matters 
(“those who know better than I”). We are not told who these experts are, or on 
what basis they are making this assessment. And again, we are confronted by 
the issue of the role of expertise in technological decision-making. 
 
Debates about the costs of biometrics also emerged following the release of 
the LSE Identity Project’s interim report on 29 May 2005. In particular, the 
media focus was on the cost of biometric readers and the cost of frequent re-
enrollment. Notably, the frame of ‘uniqueness’ is much less prevalent in these 
media discourses around the first critical event, in contrast to the government 
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discourses. However, the debates about international obligations do make 
their way into the media coverage, with inaccurate reporting being the norm. 
The Identity Card Bill has another great advantage. The United States 
and the European Union are forcing Britain to use biometric data on 
visas and passports. So the Government might as well look as if it is 
bravely taking the lead rather than meekly following one dictated from 
elsewhere. (Smith 2005, emphasis added) [31 May: The Times] 
 
This is an odd take on the motivations behind the government’s pursuit of 
biometrics. While obfuscating the issues by stating that the US and EU were 
forcing the UK to adopt biometrics (recall that the only international obligation 
was the ICAO requirement for facial images in passports), it also claims that 
the government was putting on a brave face by taking the reins and collecting 
their own biometrics from citizens. 
 
7.3 Identity Cards Act 2006 
Attaining Royal Assent on 30 March, the Identity Cards Bill therewith became 
the Identity Cards Act 2006. For such a momentous period, both the 
parliamentary activity following its passage and the media reporting of the 
event was rather muted. This is, perhaps, the result of fatigue, as the Bill was 
debated and ‘ping-ponged’ in Parliament for several months until its eventual 
passage. 
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The only biometrics-related exchange to take place in Parliament the week 
following the passage of the Act dealt, yet again, with the possibility of using 
DNA information in ID cards. In response to a question about collecting DNA 
from foreign nationals entering the country, Andy Burnham (then-
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State) remarked that the extent of the 
government’s plans for foreign nationals was to collect “external identifiers, 
commonly known as biometrics”. (Burnham seemed unaware that DNA is, by 
definition, a biometric identifier.) Unsatisfied with this response, the inquisitive 
MP (Spink) then turned to take issue with the reliability of biometrics. 
 
Bob Spink: The Minister might not be aware that the Science and 
Technology Committee has looked at biometrics, including iris and facial 
recognition and fingerprints, and found no evidence from any large-scale 
project that using multiple biometrics in the way that the Government 
propose would work technologically. The Government are simply making 
an assumption that they would work, but there is no evidence of that. In 
the absence of a working biometrics system, would the Minister consider 
the use of DNA? 
 
Andy Burnham: No, I would not. I do not believe that people would 
accept that. Even for someone often accused, as I am, of not having 
regard for such matters, it would raise substantial civil liberties 
implications. On that basis, I would rule it out categorically. As to the 
questions that the hon. Gentleman raises about the effectiveness of 
biometrics, I do not accept that that is the case. I do not know whether he 
has travelled to the United States recently, but it has a large-scale 
immigration system that uses biometric information extremely 
successfully. His assertion that there is no evidence of external 
biometrics providing a higher standard of identification in travel 
documents is therefore wrong. [30 Mar 2006: Column 1126] 
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Again, we encounter discourses and counter-discourses regarding the 
appropriateness of using DNA in an identity card scheme. What is especially 
peculiar about this exchange is that it is based on doubts about whether other 
biometrics such as fingerprints, irises, and facial images are practicable at the 
scale of a national identity program. Spink does not seem to have the same 
doubts about DNA. However, as mentioned above, the use of DNA in a 
national identity card system is a qualitatively different type of undertaking 
than using other biometrics. Most experts in biometrics discount the idea of 
using DNA in such day-to-day citizen identification and authentication contexts 
as wishful thinking, which is motivated by Hollywood’s portrayals of the 
technologies (a controversial phenomenon that is referred to in the social 
science and criminology literature as the ‘CSI effect’ (cf. Shelton 2008; Ley et 
al. 2010; Cole & Dioso-Villa 2009)). Why, then, did certain political decision-
makers consider the idea tenable, when the science and technology 
necessary for such a project was highly tentative at best? These discussions 
about using DNA in the NIS would persist, with the media reporting as late as 
March 2007 that certain government figures (e.g., Charles Clarke) wanted 
DNA to be stored on identity cards (see, for example, Buchanan 2007). 
 
The media coverage of the passage of the Identity Cards Bill is similarly thin. 
The major focus in the coverage is on the so-called compromise reached 
between the House of Commons and the House of Lords which allowed 
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citizens who renewed their passports before 2010 to opt out of receiving an 
identity card. Only a few outlets picked up on the point that while ID cards 
might have been optional for those citizens renewing their passports early, 
their biometrics would still be stored on the NIR. This “compromise” did not 
affect the biometrics component of the Scheme. It appears the most intuitive 
and historically salient aspect of the Scheme (i.e., possessing and showing an 
ID card) was the most worrisome. 
 
7.4 De-emphasizing iris biometrics 
The next major event in the Scheme in terms of biometrics was the eventual 
disappearance of iris biometrics in government discourses. More accurately 
stated, iris biometrics began to be de-emphasized and spoken of as a future 
“option” towards the end of 2006, following the Identity and Passport Service’s 
(IPS) publication of its Strategic Action Plan for identity cards. This publication 
initiated a series of debates in Parliament about the future of the NIS; however 
none of these specifically addressed the question of the role of iris biometrics. 
In fact, during this period the two instances of parliamentary questioning 
involving the topic of irises in the Scheme were both about the (extremely 
unlikely) prospect of the government recording iris images for passports.22 
Lord Roberts of Llandudno asked Her Majesty's Government: How iris 
scans and fingerprints for the new passport interview regime will be 
obtained by the video links for remote areas. [HL758] 
                                            
22 Note that no country in the world is collecting iris information for storage in passports. 
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Baroness Scotland of Asthal: The new passport interviews being 
introduced in 2007 will not require any iris scans or fingerprints to be 
recorded from passport applicants. The identity interview, for first-time 
applicants over the age of 16 only, can therefore be accomplished by 
video link for those in remote areas. [15 Jan 2007: Column 780W] 
 
Or as transpired two weeks later: 
Mr. Gordon Prentice: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department whether iris scans are to be included in passport chips; and 
if he will make a statement. [111276] 
 
Joan Ryan: The e-Passport, which was introduced in 2006, contains an 
embedded chip which holds data on the bearer in line with ICAO 
(International Civil Aviation Organisation) recommendations. At present 
this data is limited to biographical data such as name, date of birth etc. 
and a digital photograph of the passport holder. In the future, in line with 
other European countries, we plan to include images of two of the 
passport holder's fingerprints but we have no plans to store images of 
the passport holder's irises on the passport chip. [31 Jan 2007: Column 
360W-361W] 
 
Thus, while the IPS was downplaying its plans for iris biometrics in the NIS, 
Members of Parliament were wondering about their (improbable) inclusion in 
passports. This line of questioning is significant for at least two reasons. First, 
during debates about the NIS a great deal was said about the public’s lack of 
awareness of biometrics, continuing through the Tracking Research 
conducted by the COI on behalf of the IPS until early 2009. These studies 
repeatedly ‘found’ that public awareness of biometrics was ‘low’ or that the 
public “had limited understanding of biometric technologies” (Home Office 
2004c, p.76). These discourses mirror the assumptions of certain traditional 
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approaches to studying the public understanding of science, in which the 
public’s awareness or understanding of technology is treated as a measurable 
entity. Where deficiencies are detected, they ought to be rectified (so the 
thinking goes), hence the Home Office’s efforts to provide ‘accurate’ 
information on biometrics in their various marketing materials. However, these 
statements about iris biometrics in passports reflect a lack of awareness 
among parliamentarians regarding the possibilities and plans for these 
technologies. The iris incident provides an opening to appreciate different 
forms of public ‘misunderstanding’ of biometrics, including the 
misapprehensions of political decision-makers. As we have seen, these 
concerns apply to many other aspects of biometrics in the Scheme as well. 
What does this mean for the processes of technological decision-making? We 
will reflect on these issues in the next chapter. 
 
Second, this incident also raises questions about how organizations such as 
the Home Office, which are responsible for implementing and managing large-
scale, technologically complex programs such as a national biometric identity 
system, should communicate details of their plans and major policy changes 
to oversight bodies such as Parliament. It appears that as iris biometrics 
became less explicit in Home Office’s plans for the Scheme, current 
organizational thinking was not clearly and timely communicated to 
parliamentarians and to the public, and thus the implications of this shift were 
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not fully considered or appreciated. These are issues that I discuss in the next 
chapter. 
 
Accordingly, the media coverage of this incident (that is, the shelving of iris 
biometrics in the Scheme) was especially quiet. Following the publication of 
the Strategic Action Plan, media reports were focused on the government’s 
plan to re-use existing databases and the implications for costs and data 
security. It was not until late January 2007, over a month later, when media 
outlets first started reporting on the implications of dropping iris biometrics 
from the NIS. As was very succinctly reported: 
Iris scan 'optional' 
 
Plans to use scans of both eyes in biometric data for the national identity 
card scheme have been shelved owing to technical uncertainties and 
cost. Despite previous ministerial statements that iris scans were vital in 
making the cards secure, a strategic plan published last month said iris 
scanning was only an option. (Anonymous 2007b) [22 January: The 
Times] 
 
This delay could be explained by the timing of the release of the documents 
(which took place in December, just before the Christmas holiday). Journalists 
might have required extra time to review and digest contents of the Strategic 
Action Plan. 
 
With the policy decision not to pursue iris biometrics, many of the claims about 
what biometrics would do needed to be re-evaluated. For example, the policy 
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aim of ‘securing’ everyone to a ‘unique’ identity turned even more unrealistic 
and unattainable with the decision not to use iris biometrics in a country with a 
population of over 60 million people. However these implications were not fully 
appreciated by many of the actors in the case, despite warnings from its own 
experts (see, for example, Daugman in BBC News 2007). 
 
7.5 Strategic Supplier Framework 
The fourth event is the IPS’s publication of its Strategic Supplier Framework in 
August 2007, which initiated the procurement process for the identity cards 
program. Among those technologies, resources, and services being procured, 
many were for implementing biometrics. The future direction of the Scheme 
was plotted in this procurement framework, with plans to outsource a large 
portion of the program to the private sector. The publication of this document 
was an important milestone in the Scheme’s ongoing development as it 
marked the first step in the formalization of relationships with technology and 
security companies such as IBM, Thales, CSC, EDS, and Fujitsu Services. 
 
The silence in Parliament during this period can be explained by the political 
calendar: it was summer recess. Later on, however, parliamentary questions 
about the framework began to emerge and focused on whether short-listed 
suppliers were forced to sign non-disclosure agreements [252607]; the value 
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of the contracts issued under the framework [318321]; and the value of any 
penalty and cancellation clauses in the contracts [224720] in the event that a 
new government decided to cancel the Scheme (which, indeed, happened in 
the end). 
 
This event resonated in many of the mainstream UK newspapers, some of 
which covered biometrics-related aspects of the framework. For example, 
noting the absence of iris biometrics in the strategy document, both the Times 
and the Independent reported the Home Office’s plans to suspend its pursuit 
of irises. This policy was finally being publicly discussed, with the Guardian 
quoting then-CEO of the IPS, James Hall, as stating that 
Our current plan is to capture 10 fingerprints and record those. They 
won't all necessarily be on the card but we will have a record of them. I 
say 'current plans' because we are continuing to review every opportunity 
to reduce cost and risk. (Hall as quoted in Woodward 2007) [10 August: 
The Guardian] 
 
Such statements reaffirmed the ongoing uncertainty in the Scheme. The 
business-friendly Financial Times also covered the developments around the 
release of the Strategic Suppler Framework. Regarding the status of iris it 
reported that 
In an effort to keep costs down and the initial technology relatively 
simple, the cards will use fingerprints rather than the more complex iris 
technology as the initial identifier. 
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But with 100,000 frequent-flyer passengers now registered with the iris-
reading system at Heathrow, Mr. Hall said "if in due course we want to 
move to a second biometric, iris would be the obvious place to go". 
 
The IPS was continuing to refine its thinking, he said, and was 
determined to keep the scheme cost-effective. It planned to use 
framework contracts that would be able to adapt as new technology 
came forward. (Timmins 2007b) [4 August: Financial Times] 
 
These reports are the closest the IPS came to publicly acknowledging their 
intent not to incorporate iris biometrics in the Scheme. All of the Financial 
Times’ reports were critical of the state of the program at this juncture, 
referring to the Scheme as either “controversial” or “contentious”, or quoting 
business representatives with certain misgivings about the government’s 
approach (Palmer 2007; Timmins 2007a; Timmins 2007b; Eaglesham 2007). 
 
7.6 HMRC data breach 
In November 2007 UK government officials revealed that Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) had lost two compact discs with the personal 
records of 25 million British citizens stored on them. This unexpected data 
breach is the only event on this timeline which is not technically part of the 
NIS. However, while it occurred outside the case itself, its impact on the case 
study should not be understated. The proposals for identity cards had 
remained relatively controversial yet salvageable in the months preceding the 
data loss, but the government’s announcement in Parliament about the 
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misplaced discs initiated a period of sustained criticism and public skepticism 
regarding the future of the Scheme, despite the fact that the breach did not 
occur within the Home Office but rather HMRC. 
 
Following the announcement of the breach, ministers and officials worked 
furiously to manage public perceptions of the government’s handling and 
processing of personal data. This was discursive work. Many of these debates 
took place in Parliament, with attempts to “enroll” (Callon 1986) biometrics into 
the debates as a means of preventing or mitigating any future data loss. 
During this period there was a flurry of talk about biometrics, some of which I 
quote in extended form below. This talk revealed very important tensions in 
the hopes for, and known realities, of biometrics. 
 
Alistair Darling, then the Chancellor, was questioned in Parliament about how 
his announcement affected plans for national ID cards: 
Mr. Douglas Carswell (Harwich) (Con): If the Government have managed 
to lose 25 million confidential personal records in this way, how can we 
possibly trust them to run an ID card scheme nationally? 
 
Mr. Darling: As I said, one of the problems is that the information we 
have at the moment can, in certain circumstances, be used for fraudulent 
purposes by people who have no right to use it. The point about ID cards 
is that because they will introduce biometric information they will mean 
that one can be more certain that the person asking for or dealing with 
that information has a legal right to do so. 
 
Mr. Andrew Robathan (Blaby) (Con): The Chancellor has given my right 
hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr. Lilley) and my 
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hon. Friend the Member for Harwich (Mr. Carswell) reassurances that 
any personal information stored for ID cards will be safe. However, after 
this astonishing display of incompetence, why would anybody have any 
faith in the Government or trust them to be able to keep personal 
information secure? 
 
Mr. Darling: For the reason that ID cards match up biometric information 
with the information that is held, so that the person holding the 
information knows that the person asking for it is legally entitled to it. 
That is the difference between many other systems, which do not have 
that biometric lock, and the ID card system, which would have that 
biometric lock. It seems to me that that would give me and the hon. 
Gentleman, as individuals, far more protection than there is at the 
moment. [20 Nov 2007: Column 1110] (emphasis added) 
 
Speaking in the vaguest of terms, Darling assures his inquisitors (and the 
interested public) that biometrics would somehow provide security against 
future risks to information held by government, without providing substantive 
details. The choice of the term “lock” can be understood as a strategic 
rhetorical frame to assure listeners of the security of the Scheme, yet we are 
left wanting details about how these locks would secure personal information. 
 
The following day, the then-opposition leader and now current Prime Minister 
(David Cameron) asked the then-Prime Minister (Gordon Brown) specifically 
about the repercussions of the breach on the Scheme. 
Mr. Cameron: If the Prime Minister really wants to learn some lessons, 
will he recognise that this appalling blunder comes at a time when the 
Government are planning a national identity register to draw together 
private and personal details of every single person in this country? Will 
the events of the past few days cause him to stop and think about that 
policy? 
 
 300
The Prime Minister: I have already announced the inquiries that we have 
set up, but let me say that 22 out of 25 European countries have identity 
cards. The right hon. Gentleman's own security adviser proposes identity 
cards. His own reviewer of the national police force - the border force - 
says that he is in favour of identity cards. What we must ensure is that 
identity fraud is avoided, and the way to avoid identity fraud is to say that 
for passport information we will have the biometric support that is 
necessary, so that people can feel confident that their identity is 
protected. [21 Nov 2007: Column 1181] 
 
We are told again that it was the biometrics in the proposed Scheme which 
would have provided the necessary support, confidence, and protection to 
citizens. These words came from not just anyone: This was the leader of the 
UK government speaking for biometrics in front of an eager Parliament.  
 
Days later MP David Davis returned to the issue of data security, focusing on 
the issue of the irrevocability of biometrics; in other words, the problems with 
using biometric data once they are compromised. This was a topic that 
hitherto had not been discussed in the policy discourses about the Scheme 
and it was unusual to see such a technical topic raised in Parliament. It is a 
complicated issue which then-Home Secretary Jacqui Smith tried to sidestep, 
providing what appears a rote response about the merits of biometric security. 
David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con): May I ask the Home 
Secretary about the subject of identity cards? If the Government give 
away someone's bank account details, that is a disaster, but at least they 
can change their bank account. What, precisely, does someone do if the 
Government give away their biometric details? 
 
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jacqui Smith): There 
is of course an important protection in an identity card system, through 
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the use of biometrics. Biometrics will link a person securely and reliably 
to his or her unique identity. It will therefore become much more difficult 
for people to misuse other people's identity, even if full details of their 
biographical information are already known. The current plan for the 
national identity register is for biometric information to be held separately 
from biographical information, thereby safeguarding against the sort of 
eventuality that the right hon. Gentleman described. 
 
 
In an unusual turn of events, Davis then asked the Home Secretary about an 
EU data-sharing initiative (known as STORK), which she seemed unaware of 
– calling his query an “allegation”. Again she reiterates the merits of 
biometrics. 
 
David Davis: I do not look forward to the day when the National Audit 
Office or anybody else asks for that information and is sent it. Let us look 
at the other aspect of identity cards: the question of protection. The 
Home Office is currently prototyping a European-wide identity card 
project called Project Stork. How will it prevent a repetition of the disaster 
of the past few weeks when sensitive personal data are held not by one 
Government but by 27? 
 
Jacqui Smith: If the right hon. Gentleman wants to give me more 
information about the particular allegation that he is making, I will of 
course be willing to follow it up, but the point that I made remains. The 
advantage of a national identity register is that it enables the linking of 
biometric information, maintained on one database, with biographic data, 
maintained on another, thereby strengthening the protection for 
individuals in circumstances where, for example, biographic data were 
stolen or went missing. That is a strengthening of the current position, 
which is why any Government or Opposition who are serious about 
public protection and identity fraud should be thinking seriously about 
how we address those issues, instead of making hay. [26 Nov 2007: 
Columns 17-18] 
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In fact, STORK (“Secure idenTity acrOss boRders linked”) is a project for 
building interoperable identity systems across the EU, which the Home Office 
has been involved in for years. It appears the Home Secretary was either 
uniformed or misremembered this program when she was confronted about it 
in Parliament. 
 
In a final exchange, a member of the Labour government (Kali Mountford) 
suggested that the NIS would permit on-line, ‘card-not-present’ biometric 
checks against a central database. When questioned on this vision, she 
backtracked to offer a much more modest claim that biometrics merely 
provide “added protection”. 
Kali Mountford: The Opposition’s suggestions about ID cards would 
result in our throwing the baby out with the bathwater. ID cards are a 
separate issue. Everyone always forgets that our biometrics stay with us 
continually. We would not have to carry cards; that is a separate issue. 
We cannot leave home without our biometrics; they are with us always. 
To say that, because of this one mistake- [ Interruption. ] It is a huge 
mistake; I do not take issue with that fact. But however big it is, and 
wherever those discs are, my biometrics are with me now, and no one 
can take them off me. Wherever I go, they are with me. I could go into a 
bank and put my fingerprint down, but it would not be on that database 
because it would be separate from my biographical details.  
 
Stewart Hosie: The hon. Lady is making a valiant case, but she seems to 
be suggesting that any transaction that she wishes to carry out will 
require her to be scanned and checked against a central repository. I am 
sure that that contradicts the answer that we got from a Minister some 
time ago. From memory, I think that we were told that it would be up to 
each organisation to determine how the system was used. Is the hon. 
Lady really suggesting that every single transaction would be checked 
against a central repository? 
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Kali Mountford: I obviously did not say that, but Opposition Members 
have been implying that this mistake means the end of ID cards. I was 
simply suggesting that an added protection for us, in having an ID 
register, is the fact that it contains our biometrics. It is there in the 
proposed legislation that, if organisations want to use our biometrics, that 
additional safeguard is there for us. I think that it is an additional 
safeguard that many people would want to have. [28 Nov 2007: Column 
318-319] 
 
During this abnormal period of discursive activity about biometrics in 
Parliament, there was also extended media coverage of the issues. Most of it 
was damning regarding the future prospects of the Scheme following the 
HMRC data breach. Some, but not all, of the media’s coverage engaged the 
specific issue of the role biometrics in these information-sharing practices, 
with representatives from the Home Office emerging immediately in some 
news reports to attempt to manage public perceptions. 
The Home Office insisted that the biometric elements in its database, the 
electronic fingerprints and facial scans, will keep it secure and proof 
against identity theft, even if there were to be a major breach and stolen 
confidential data. 
 
"The biometric means that it will be much more difficult to use somebody 
else's identity, as they will have to provide the correct fingerprint or facial 
image at the same time. You can't create a fingerprint or a face," said a 
Home Office spokesman. He also emphasised that the identity register 
would also be protected by a chip-and-PIN with severe penalties for 
those who tried to access the database illegally. (Travis 2007, emphasis 
added) [21 November: The Guardian] 
 
Again, these discourses assumed a set of practices around the use of identity 
cards and biometrics, which in this instance would involve regular biometric 
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checks. Such discourses aimed to set expectations about the future use of 
biometrics, and in so doing assuage concerns about potential identity fraud in 
relation to the government’s identity program. 
 
At the time a former Home Secretary, David Blunkett, also wrote to the Sun to 
express his beliefs about the role of biometrics post-HMRC data loss. 
We must separate our understandable concern about access to specific 
databases from the issue of identity. 
 
A clean biometric identity base, like the one to be used for ID cards, is 
not the issue. Those who say it is are simply using it as a smokescreen 
because they never wanted them for phoney 'civil liberties' reasons. 
 
In reality, cards will make it EASIER to protect your identity because they 
stop other people being able to pretend they are you just because they 
know your details. (Blunkett 2007) [22 November: The Sun] 
 
Here, as before, Blunkett tried to separate the issue of the data loss from the 
future prospects of the NIS. He painted concerns about privacy as “phony” 
and re-iterated the much-exercised claim that biometric ID cards would, in 
fact, protect against future harms rather than aid them. 
 
Despite such assurances from the government that biometrics would prevent 
this from happening again, some journalists used the occasion to ponder 
futuristically and humorously about what a loss of biometric data on the scale 
of HMRC’s breach might be like. 
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Tomorrow’s news today. On the eve of the issue of compulsory ID cards 
all round, a computer disc packed with the highly personal biometric 
details of 30 million people, that were to have been transferred to the 
plastic pocket-sized cards once fingerprints and iris-scans had been 
checked to prevent forgery, has vanished into thin air. 
 
This means, in effect, that for all official purposes, unless the 
unencrypted disc turns up behind the cushion or stuck to somebody's 
shoe, half the population no longer exists. (Waterhouse 2007) [26 
November: The Daily Mail] 
 
The episode even resulted in a Bad Science article, in which science journalist 
Ben Goldacre mixed scientific wit and sarcasm to criticize the government’s 
discourses around biometrics. 
Sometimes just throwing a few long words about can make people think 
you know what you're talking about. Words like "biometric". When Alistair 
Darling was asked if the government will ditch ID cards in the light of this 
week's data cock-up, he replied: "The key thing about identity cards is, of 
course, that information is protected by personal biometric information. 
The problem at present is that, because we do not have that protection, 
information is much more vulnerable than it should be." 
 
Yes, that's the problem. We need biometric identification. Fingerprints. 
Iris scans. Gordon Brown says so too: "What we must ensure is that 
identity fraud is avoided, and the way to avoid identity fraud is to say that 
for passport information we will have the biometric support that is 
necessary."… 
 
So will biometrics prevent ID theft? Well, it might make it more difficult for 
you to prove your innocence. And once your fingerprints are stolen, they 
are harder to replace than your PIN number. But here's the final nail in 
the coffin. Your fingerprint data will be stored in your passport or ID card 
as a series of numbers, called the "minutiae template". In the new 
biometric passport with its wireless chip, remember, all your data can be 
read and decrypted with a device near you, but not touching you…. 
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Ah biometrics. Such a soothingly technical word. Repeat it to yourself. 
(Goldacre 2007) [24 November: The Guardian] 
 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this entire episode is how the 
controversy around HMRC’s data breach implicated the ID cards program so 
strongly; however, it did not affect most of the government's other large IT 
projects in the same way (i.e., with public calls originating from various 
corners that the systems be immediately scrapped). 
 
7.7 ID cards for foreigners and a market for biometric 
enrollment 
The final event on our timeline is, in fact, a double event.  In November 2008 
the Home Office launched new biometric identity documents for foreign 
nationals. These were technically visa documents based on new storage and 
security technologies, but in their discourses about these documents officials 
regularly referred to them as ‘identity cards’, even holding a press conference 
at which (then) Home Secretary Jacqui Smith posed for photographs with a 
card. The same day, the Home Office published another strategy document 
relating to so-called front office services. Its intention was to reach out to the 
market for help in enrolling the country’s biometrics. 
 
Taken together, these events generated lots of parliamentary activity. In one 
exchange, it was admitted that the recurring government vision for on-line 
 307
biometric checks against the NIR was something that would only occur in the 
most exceptional of circumstances. 
Lynne Jones: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
whether the process of verification of an individual's biometric identifiers 
for the identity card scheme will check the biometric against a local copy 
held on the card or against the biometric stored on the National Identity 
Register. [219764] 
 
Meg Hillier: Verification checks of biometrics identifiers will be made 
against the card in most cases using the biometrics stored in the chip, for 
example if the facial image or fingerprint biometrics are verified as part of 
an immigration check at the border. Only in specific circumstances, for 
example if an ID card has been lost, would verification of identity take 
place against the biometrics held on the National Identity Register. Such 
checks will provide a very secure and reliable means of proving identity. 
[17 Nov 2008: Column 52W] 
 
As late as November 2008, these debates in Parliament reflected the 
continuing uncertainty about the Scheme and biometrics therein, even as 
foreign nationals were being issued biometric identity documents. Much of this 
uncertainty was technical in nature, but these technical uncertainties had 
unknown organizational consequences. Another of these was revealed when 
the (then) Under-Secretary of State was asked about the errors that would 
likely arise with the use of fingerprints in one-to-many biometric checks in the 
NIS. 
Lynne Jones: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
what estimate she has made of the number of false matches likely if 
fingerprint biometrics alone are used for the biometric verification for the 
identity card scheme after the enrolment of (a) one million, (b) six million, 
(c) 40 million and (d) 60 million individuals. [219765] 
 
 308
Meg Hillier: The Identity and Passport Service is still in the process of 
procurement of specific biometric systems, hence we are unable to give 
an estimate of false matches that may occur. In the event of an uncertain 
fingerprint match the scheme will make use of human fingerprint experts 
to resolve uncertain fingerprint matches from the automated fingerprint 
matching system. 
 
This procedure is used in all large-scale fingerprint systems to control 
false matches and the process will apply irrespective of the size of the 
database. 
 
In her response Hillier made assurances that human experts would reconcile 
false matches, arguing that these measures would apply “irrespective of the 
size of the database”. This point ignores the need for significant numbers of 
human experts capable of analyzing increasingly large numbers of false 
matches as a database the size of NIR grows over time. Consider that the 
current back-logs in forensic fingerprint analysis in police departments in the 
US have been blamed on insufficient organizational capacity, including low 
numbers of trained fingerprint analysts (see, for example, Rubin & Winton 
2008). 
 
In similar fashion, Hillier deflected a question about the need for biometrics 
‘exception handling’ in the Scheme. This was an issue raised by the Home 
Office’s own biometrics expert body. 
Lynne Jones: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
what response she has made to the views expressed in the annual 
report for 2007 from the Biometrics Assurance Group on exception 
handling and fingerprint biometrics of the over 75 year olds for the 
purposes of the identity card scheme. [224278] 
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Meg Hillier [holding answer 12 September 2008]: Responses were only 
made to the specific recommendations of the Biometrics Assurance 
Group and as no specific recommendation was made regarding 
exception handling or the collection of fingerprint biometrics for the 
elderly, no comment was made. [17 Nov 2008: Column 53W] 
 
Further technical queries in Parliament brought similar non-responses. 
Lynne Jones: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
what discussions she has had with the police on the use of (a) non-
unique digital representations of fingerprint biometrics and (b) unique 
pure biometric images obtained via the National Identity Card scheme. 
[219756] 
 
Meg Hillier: The Identity and Passport Service holds regular discussions 
with the police on all aspects of the performance of biometric systems 
and their relevance for the operation of the national identity scheme, via 
the National Policing Improvement Agency. [20 Nov 2008: Column 
724W] 
 
During this period ministers also claimed that the excessive collection of 
fingerprints from foreign nationals who were then applying for identity 
documents was needed as a precautionary measure. However, in doing so 
they risked portraying fingerprint biometrics as unreliable. 
Mr. Grieve: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department for 
what reason 10 fingerprints will be collected from foreign nationals 
applying for identity cards instead of the two fingerprints required under 
EC Regulation No. 380/2008. [226409] 
 
Jacqui Smith [holding answer 13 October 2008]: Capturing and enrolling 
all 10 fingerprints onto our system will allow us to search other biometric 
databases providing a more robust approach to confirming identity. In the 
unlikely event we are unable to make a match against the two 
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fingerprints held on the identity card for foreign nationals, we can make a 
further check against the applicant's other fingerprints. 
 
In addition, we can verify identity with other fingerprint records we hold. 
As such, we are able to tie a person to a single identity which will help 
tackle immigration abuses and identity fraud. [24 Nov 2008: Column 
823W-824W] 
 
The media coverage during this period focused on the prospect of citizens 
enrolling fingerprints at places such as post offices or high-street shops. Some 
reports claimed that this was a way for government to channel new business 
into the struggling post office network, thus propping up the Royal Mail. In 
these news reports it was understood that the decision to outsource the 
enrollment of biometrics was driven by concerns about managing the costs of 
the Scheme, although it was not pointed out that the costs would simply be 
deferred to citizens rather than be saved. 
 
The mainstream newspaper reports on the launch of biometric immigration 
documents for foreign nationals were few and far between and framed in very 
particular ways. Only a few of the major broadsheets and tabloids covered the 
event, and when they did they tended to blur the distinction between identity 
cards (for UK citizens) and immigration documents (for foreign nationals). For 
example 
The first compulsory identity cards in Britain since the 1950s will be 
issued this week to thousands of foreigners living in this country, the 
Home Office will announce today. (Ford 2008) [25 November: The 
Times] 
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This was, in part, due to how the government publicized the Scheme. In 
branding the biometric immigration document as an ‘identity card’ in its 
informal public discourses, it was able to prove its successes in delivering the 
proposals. The week following the announcement of foreign national ‘identity 
cards’, only one of the mainstream newspaper articles drew the connection 
between the collection of fingerprints from foreign nationals and the eventual 
use of the technologies in the NIS. 
For the first time since 1952, the British government is issuing identity 
cards. In order to test the system and ease its introduction, there is to be 
a cynical requirement for foreign nationals resident in the UK to register. 
To begin with, this will affect students and the foreign spouses of British 
citizens. The fact that they already possess an identity document - a 
passport and/or a visa - does not seem to enter into the Government's 
thinking, principally because they are guinea pigs. Over time, residents 
from outside Europe will be fingerprinted and have to account for their 
movements. Starting in 2010, so will the rest of us. (Anonymous 2008) 
[26 November: The Daily Telegraph] 
 
This comment piece noted that the people from whom multiple biometrics 
were then being collected were the ones who already possessed identity 
documents in the form of passports, which they required to enter the UK in the 
first place. Issuing them with a new document seemed overkill – unless, of 
course, what mattered was not the ID document itself but rather the additional 
information that was being collected during the document issuance process, 
including fingerprint information. Requiring foreigners to attend a special 
appointment to enroll these biometrics, which often involved travelling long 
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distances, created additional burdens as they endured what was supposed to 
be a “quick, easy, and safe” process. It was in this respect that foreign 
nationals were said to be the “guinea pigs” for another government biometrics 
program: the National Identity Scheme. 
 
However, as it turned out, “the rest of us” were never mandated to enroll our 
biometrics for identity cards. This was not because the technology failed 
miserably during experiments on the foreign national “guinea pigs”, but rather 
due to the political forces that resulted in a change of government in 2010 and 
eventually legislation that terminated the program for national identity cards. 
Yet it is still compulsory for non-EEA foreign nationals to submit their 
biometrics in exchange for the right to remain in the UK and, in doing so, 
endure many inconveniences and doubts about issues of proportionality. It is 
not the case that the experiments are over. They are ongoing, although the 
media attention on these issues remains especially limited. 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter built on the initial analysis of government discourses on 
biometrics by exploring how parliamentarians discussed the concept during 
certain moments of interest in or around the NIS, as well as the attendant 
media coverage of these events. We discovered what appear to be 
misunderstandings about biometrics in Parliament, in addition to some highly 
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politicized exchanges following HMRC’s data loss. Over time, the media 
reporting on the Scheme became increasingly critical, although the coverage 
of the biometric component was patchy and usually lacking in detail. In the 
next chapter we further reflect on these discourses and the role they play in 
innovation and policy processes. 
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Chapter 8: Concluding discussion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This final chapter presents an extended discussion on the major findings from 
the case study analysis. These findings offer contributions to knowledge, 
including an extension of theory on visions and new technology. The insights 
drawn in this chapter are applicable to ongoing worldwide efforts to replace 
existing methods of identifying, profiling, monitoring, and tracking individuals 
with high-technology applications meant to improve organizations’ ability to 
perform these tasks. If this research is to offer an enduring scholarly 
contribution, it is likely that the lessons learned about the technological 
discourses and visions from the case of the National Identity Scheme (NIS) 
will be applicable in other settings where there is an apparent rush to embrace 
high-technology solutions to myriad and complex policy dilemmas (real or 
perceived), even whilst the direct and broader implications and consequences 
of applying the technologies are largely unknown. 
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Looking back 
Before delving into these findings and discussing their implications, I first want 
to revisit the intellectual journey to this point. This summary will help us to 
appreciate the scope, significance, and limitations of the research findings. 
 
A critical review of the relevant technology and social science literature 
revealed that the research, to date, has not analyzed biometrics as a political 
and organizational process. The computer science literature remains focused 
on refining the technologies and techniques for bodily identification, largely 
unconcerned with larger social and political implications of ‘perfecting’ the 
technology. In contrast, an important limitation of the social science literature 
is that it often reifies the concept of biometrics and ignores important 
differences between and within the different technologies (other than 
sometimes acknowledging performance variances). These ethical and 
sociological critiques frequently take biometrics and their practicability as a 
given, rather than as a complex outcome of various political, organizational, 
and technological negotiations. 
 
Finally, the information systems research on biometrics has to date been 
committed to building and improving technology acceptance models. Such 
approaches take user acceptance as a generally positive and desirable goal. 
These technology acceptance studies fail to accommodate the role that 
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context plays in adoption-related decisions; that is, how context constructs 
and gives meaning to the technological artifact, as well as how it affects 
acceptance and resistance dynamics. Moreover, these studies do not 
explicitly acknowledge that in many contemporary adoption contexts, 
biometric technologies are compulsory or pseudo-voluntary, which upsets the 
notion of ‘acceptance’. 
 
I chose to use discourses about biometrics as a means of representing 
context because in the case biometrics were largely the product of language 
and discourse. In other words, our access to the technology was through the 
words used by actors to describe, frame, and makes sense of the 
government’s proposals. Furthermore, the timing of the case study and the 
eventual demise of the program meant that our primary analytical access to 
‘biometrics’ in the Scheme was not through actual interaction and/or use, but 
instead through the public discourses intending to bring them to life. 
 
To address the research lacunae in the literature, I proposed to leverage the 
concept of organizing visions, in particular, to explore the organizational 
discourses that accompanied the proposals for biometrics in the NIS. I chose 
to supplement this concept with ideas from the sociology of expectations – 
which implore us to interrogate the different functions of future-oriented 
discourses around new science and technology – as well as critical 
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approaches to the study of the public’s understanding of technology. This 
theoretical framework provided a conceptual guide to address three research 
questions: 
1. How did government spokespeople portray a vision for biometrics in 
the National Identity Scheme, and to what extent did this vision 
organize efforts and mobilize actors to innovate? 
2. How did policy debates and attendant media reportage discursively 
capture biometrics, and what were the limitations of these discourses in 
revealing the complexities and perplexities of the technologies? 
3. How were the ‘publics’ of biometrics portrayed in these discourses? 
 
To answer these questions, I chose to analyze every publicly available 
government-issued policy-related document pertaining to the NIS published 
between 2002 and the end of 2008. These documents conveyed the 
government’s vision for the implementation and eventual use of biometric 
identity cards throughout the UK. In particular, my focus was on public 
statements made about biometrics and their perceived attributes, applications, 
reliability, and social impact, as these issues were flagged by Orlikowski and 
Gash’s framework. These statements were analyzed using techniques from 
critical discourse analysis, in which language is understood as a form of social 
practice that should be contested and unpacked by informed researchers. 
 
Beyond these formal policy documents, I also analyzed the parliamentary 
debates and media reportage about biometrics, revolving around certain 
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‘critical moments’ during the development of the Scheme. These were 
moments when the NIS was in the public spotlight following a major event or 
when biometrics underwent an important policy re-think. The discourses that 
emerged in these arenas provided different perspectives on the government’s 
vision for biometrics and the public life of a controversial technological 
innovation. 
 
Through this two-part analysis, we found answers to the research questions. 
Section 8.2 reviews the history of the government’s vision and summarizes 
the answers to the first and second questions. The timing of the case study 
and coincidental demise of the National Identity Scheme allowed us to go 
beyond simple exploratory questions to look more closely at why the 
government’s vision did not succeed, which we do in section 8.3. Section 8.4 
focuses on the theoretical contributions emerging from the discussion on 
visions and technology. Section 8.5 summarizes the findings from the third 
research question, concerning technological publics, and observes some 
areas for theory development. Section 8.6 reflects on the insights afforded by 
my research lens, which combined a qualitative IS approach with ideas from 
science and technology studies (i.e., sociology of expectations and PUS). This 
in-between position allowed me to view biometrics in novel ways, 
differentiating my approach from the technical studies on biometrics and the 
 319
critical sociological studies. Sections 8.7 and 8.8 discuss the limitations of this 
project and areas for future research, respectively. 
8.2 The unraveling of biometrics 
In chapter 3 we explored the concept of an ‘organizing vision’, which tries to 
explain how organizations seeking to develop and implement new 
technologies deal with their inherent uncertainty and ambiguity. By unifying 
and coordinating discourses, organizing visions help to reduce doubts or 
unknowns about the future adoption and use of technology. With a single 
vision and a single goal, it becomes easier to implement a new technology, all 
the more so if potential defects or imperfections can be discursively 
diminished. These discourses draw on a pool of conceptual resources that 
exist within and beyond the organization, and which are shared by a larger 
community that is also interested in the technological innovation. When the 
organization brings together these cognitive and discursive resources in a 
cohesive manner, the organizing vision is said to be more stable, and thus 
sustainable. However, problems may arise – “where the innovation entails 
novel technology, this task can appear especially speculative and 
problematic” (Swanson & Ramiller 1997, p.459). In these cases, formulating 
and sustaining an unproblematic vision may prove difficult. 
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Recall that the basic functions of an organizing vision include interpretation, 
legitimation, and mobilization. Because new technology is always uncertain 
and its essential features are difficult to articulate pithily, an organizing vision 
provides a means for actors to interpret novelty within conveniently limited 
cognitive boundaries – to imagine complexity without polysemy – whilst 
bestowing upon the technology and its purpose a coherence and simplicity 
that are required for non-experts to talk meaningfully about it. 
 
The organizing vision’s legitimizing function seeks to answer the question: 
‘Why do it?’. If the vision provides a clear and intelligible rationale for pursuing 
an innovation, then another crucial hurdle to success is lowered. An 
organizing vision mobilizes actors by activating, motivating, and structuring 
the forces needed to realize the innovation, including actors within the 
organization as well as external players (such as those in the marketplace). 
 
In the case of the NIS, the government attempted to develop a vision for 
introducing and scaling biometrics, although it was ultimately stillborn. What 
happened? 
 
In the nascent stages (2002-2004) of the UK government’s proposals for a 
national identity system, the vision for biometrics was bold and aspirational. 
The stated goal was to collect at least four biometrics (face, fingerprint, iris, 
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and signature) from virtually everyone in the country, including citizens and 
long-term visitors. Certain politicians also openly contemplated the collection 
of everyone’s DNA. The government’s aim was to provide ‘unique identities’ to 
everyone in the UK and biometrics provided a technological means to achieve 
this goal. In these early moments, the stated purposes of enrolling and 
storing multiple biometrics were focused primarily on facilitating and managing 
access to social entitlement programs, although the prime motivation was said 
to be the international requirement for biometrics in next-generation travel 
documents. Specific details regarding how the government would collect, 
store, and use these data were sparse at this point, for in these early days the 
objective was to aim high and captivate both citizens and the public sector 
and business organizations that would need to be involved in 
the government’s project. It was literally visionary. 
 
As time went by, and following the high-profile terror attacks of July 2005, the 
government’s stated reasons for collecting extensive biometric data shifted to 
emphasize security and counter-terrorism priorities, thereby focusing less on 
social welfare. In their public discourses, the government remained intent on 
enrolling face, fingerprint, and iris biometrics, although as 2006 closed iris 
biometrics featured less prominently in government discourses. Influenced by 
growing concerns about costs (that had been spurred by academic 
researchers and civil society groups), the government concurrently 
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began stressing that the Home Office already had the requisite skills and 
expertise in-house, which were being developed in its visa and asylum 
programs, to accomplish its mission for the national biometrics program. 
Different components of the vision for biometrics were being reformulated in 
response to external resistance. 
 
By 2007 it became apparent in government discourses that iris biometrics 
were no longer an immediate option in the Scheme, which affected the stated 
aim of securing unique identities for everyone in the UK. This made the vision 
for biometrics less compelling, for iris recognition was both the most futuristic 
and best performing (in terms of match rates) of the different technologies. It 
is plausible that, had the government excluded iris biometrics from its 
proposals prior to the parliamentary passage of the Identity Cards Bill, it would 
have been much more difficult to make a convincing case that the choice of 
biometrics was capable of achieving the aim of uniqueness. But once the Bill 
had officially become an Act, there was less pressure on the government to 
justify certain design decisions to Parliament, so it was able to shelve the iris 
biometrics component of the Scheme without major political backlash. 
 
During this period, government discourses on the reasons for using biometrics 
increasingly centered on resolving or fixing a generic set of identity-related 
problems and crimes. It was as though the messaging on their motivations for 
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using biometrics grew less specific as time passed – that the reasons for 
pursuing biometrics were obvious. Claims of achieving unique identities 
through biometrics persisted, despite doubts about the technologies’ capacity 
to fulfill these hopes. In 2007 it was also revealed through a leaked Home 
Office document that there were doubts within the organization about the 
need to fingerprint everyone in the Scheme, although these were not reflected 
in the public discourses on the project, which would soon begin attempting to 
mobilize a market for biometric enrollment involving private sector 
stakeholders. 
 
Before these efforts to involve the private sector in the collection of citizens’ 
biometrics were ramped up, however, an unexpected data breach at HMRC 
dealt a serious blow to the government’s proposals. The vision for 
securing citizens’ identities through biometrics became less believable once 
the government announced that 25 million personal records had been lost 
during a routine data transfer. The government made attempts to discursively 
portray biometrics as a solution to, rather than a victim of the breach, but 
these did not resonate amongst the media and public, who grew increasingly 
skeptical. Resistance to the program was mounting and the future of the 
Scheme grew increasingly in doubt. 
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Political parties took varying positions on the proposals for biometrics and 
made them an important point of policy differentiation. While the Labour party 
stuck to its guns and continued to endorse its policy, every other major UK 
political party came out in opposition to the program as the 2010 general 
election neared (Whitley & Hosein 2010a). With the main political opposition 
(i.e., the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats) intensifying their anti-ID card 
rhetoric throughout 2008 in the run up to the election, which further 
jeopardized the future of the Scheme, the Home Office aimed to demonstrate 
that identity cards were already a reality (so as to try to prevent the Scheme 
from being terminated in the event of a change in political leadership). It did so 
on two different fronts. First, by issuing biometric identity documents to non-
EEA foreigners from November 2008 and labeling them ‘ID cards’ in their 
public rhetoric. Second, by offering national ID cards to a limited number 
of citizens (who already held e-passports) starting in 2009. These national ID 
cards were biometric in the sense of involving the collection of face and 
fingerprint data from citizens, but this outcome was a far cry from the 
original vision of capturing multiple biometrics, including iris, with which to 
conduct 1-to-many biometric checks against a large centralized data store in 
real-time. 
 
These politics also affected the content of the government’s vision for 
biometrics, with spokespeople reworking the main message to focus on 
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frames of ‘empowerment’ and ‘inclusion’ as the Scheme’s fate grew more and 
more uncertain. But in the end, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government dismantled not just the NIS and biometric identity cards, but also 
plans for second-generation biometric passports (with fingerprint data), 
sparing only foreign nationals from their change of plans. The government’s 
vision had unraveled and the coalition’s counter-vision triumphed. 
 
Concerning the second research question, on the capacity of policy debates 
to capture the complexity and perplexity of biometrics, we discovered several 
dynamics. First, the technical complexities of biometrics emerged when MPs 
such as Lynne Jones quizzed ministers in Parliament on technical specifics. 
How would the Home Office approach ‘exception handling’ in the event of 
biometric errors? Would the NIS store raw images of fingerprints or biometric 
templates? However, by and large these technical and scientific deliberations 
were absent from the public discourses. They were virtually non-existent in 
the policy documents reviewed in chapter 6. In Parliament, spokespeople 
mainly provided non-answers to such overtly technical queries and stayed on 
script to highlight the ‘obvious’ strengths of biometrics, such as the 
‘uniqueness’ of identity they afford every individual. 
 
The government also obscured or avoided the technological when it proved 
rhetorically convenient to do so. Talk of ‘international obligations’ for 
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biometrics overlooked the exact requirements for particular biometrics (i.e., 
facial images) in passport documents, which were more relaxed than those 
envisioned in the NIS. Spokespeople deflected or shied away from questions 
about the limitations of fingerprints in achieving ‘unique’ identities (after iris 
biometrics were ruled out on costs grounds). In these instances, the 
technological was conspicuously and strategically left out. Generic talk about 
‘biometrics’ facilitated many of these discursive strategies. 
 
Finally, in the case study many of the political discourses on biometrics tried 
to simplify complexity and de-politicize the choice of technology. In certain 
instances, biometrics were described as “just like having a picture taken” 
(Home Office 2005c, p.6). On other occasions, talk about the benefits of 
‘biometric checks’ grossly simplified the complexity of 1-to-many identification 
against large numbers of enrolled records. Spokespeople sought to 
proactively set public expectations by asserting, for example, that the 
biometric process would be “quick, easy, and safe” (Cragg Ross Dawson 
2004c, p.95). 
 
8.3 From muddled discourses to stunted visions 
One outstanding matter concerns the reasons the government’s vision failed 
to organize the actors and resources necessary to realize its innovation. Why 
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did the vision fail? The answers are complex. What is clear from the narrative 
above is that the term ‘biometrics’ served an important interpretative function 
in the government’s vision. As we first discovered in the analysis, the concept 
provided a convenient discursive catchall for capturing a variety of different 
technologies and techniques, including not only fingerprinting, iris scans, and 
facial recognition, but also modes such as signatures (at least when it was 
rhetorically convenient). ‘Biometrics’ was an ambiguous and unsettled concept 
in this vision. Being perhaps unfamiliar with the intricacies of the technologies, 
government actors were often inexact and unclear in their discourses on the 
subject. They nonetheless spoke in terms of ‘biometrics’ and roughly 
communicated their plans and objectives for the technology in the Scheme, 
particularly focusing on assigning everyone a unique identity.  
 
These are observations that fit within Swanson and Ramiller’s organizing 
visions theory, which permits a degree of flexibility in actors’ interpretations of, 
and discourses on, what technologies do and what they can be used for, 
especially in the early stages of innovation. A relatively plastic vision allows 
different actors to assign their own meanings to a new technology and work 
locally with the concept, with each more or less believing in their contribution 
to the greater vision. 
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However, it is arguable that in the case the government’s use of the term 
‘biometrics’ was too loose, especially in the later stages of the Scheme’s 
development when it was realized that specific technologies (such as iris) 
would not be used and when more meaningful messaging was required to 
mobilize external actors. While the ambiguity inherent in the term often 
afforded spokespeople a degree of rhetorical currency, there were important 
occasions when the complexity and diversity of the concept was lost on many 
actors (such as after HMRC’s data loss). Over time, the government’s 
messages on biometrics – and particularly those by public-facing politicians – 
turned increasingly mixed and confounded23 and its vision for biometrics was 
stunted.  
 
The second function of an organizing vision is its capacity to legitimize an 
innovation. To that end, the case study revealed that biometrics were paired 
to a wide range of pressing governance priorities, which changed over time. 
Beyond being an international obligation or something that all ‘good’ 
governments were doing, they were variously supposed to provide every 
individual with a unique and secure identity (although this alone did not 
provide a policy motivation for biometrics – secure, unique identities for 
what?), improve public service delivery and make it more efficient, assist in 
                                            
23 For example, I recall attending a public lecture in 2009 by Labour MP Meg Hillier on the 
topic of ID cards. After her speech, experts from the IPS felt it necessary to approach the 
journalists in the room (with whom I was sitting) to correct many of her statements about the 
Scheme, including those about biometrics. 
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immigration procedures, aid and secure personal finance, facilitate 
international trade and travel, secure the UK’s borders, help to fight terrorism 
and prevent crime, and ease the administration of police work, among other 
policy goals. In sum, government actors found the concept of biometrics so 
compelling that they attempted to discursively frame the technologies as a 
solution to a wide range of different policy problems. But this failed to 
convincingly legitimize their use. 
 
One of the reasons for such sweeping enthusiasm was the immense chorus 
speaking for the technology, including numerous politicians, many of whom 
experienced abbreviated terms in office, and also various civil servants. 
Representatives from the Home Office and its sub-departments (the Identity 
and Passport Service (IPS) and the Borders Agency), and the Cabinet Office 
all chimed in. But their reasons for doing so were diverse.  At times this 
resulted in mixed discourses that confused the overarching vision. The 
trustworthiness of the vision’s authors also emerged as a problem, with 
increased skepticism of the government’s motives apparent in media reporting 
on the NIS. And occasionally the content of the government’s discourses was 
in competition. A vision incapable of organizing and mobilizing due to such 
factors eventually unraveled and debilitated, destabilizing the project as a 
whole.  
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According to Swanson and Ramiller, the extent to which a vision supports the 
interpretation and legitimation functions depends on how compelling it is. They 
speculate that a vision’s compellingness is based on a number of factors, 
including its a) distinctiveness (does it attract and hold actors’ attention?), b) 
intelligibility (is the vision coherent?), c) informativeness (is it rich in 
meaning?), d) plausibility (can it realistically be achieved?), and e) perceived 
practical value (is it worth pursuing?). I contend that during the rollout of the 
Scheme, the government only satisfied the first and last of these factors (i.e., 
distinctiveness and perceived practical value) in its discourses. As the factors 
that went unaccomplished: 
 
Intelligibility: While the government’s plans for biometrics were grand and 
attractive, they lacked an enduring coherence, both in terms of what they were 
supposed to accomplish and the government’s plan for making the system a 
reality. 
 
Informativeness: The discursive fixation on uniqueness resulted in a 
superficial and relatively uninformative vision that could not convincingly 
explain how biometrics would achieve unique identities in practice and why 
uniqueness was even necessary. It was not enough to simply say that 
biometrics were unique; assuming that they are, this presumed characteristic 
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needed to be consistently linked to a pressing policy priority for it to be 
informative and worth pursuing. 
 
Plausibility: The vision’s plausibility was undermined as the Scheme unfolded, 
as it remained highly uncertain throughout the case how the government 
would achieve its program. Although there was arguably considerable 
practical value in the idea of using biometrics as the cornerstone of a national 
identity system (especially in a country such as the UK without a legacy ID 
system), the government failed to formulate a compelling discourse on how it 
would garner the technological and organizational resources required to make 
it happen, which hindered the processes of mobilization. 
 
And thus, the third function of an organizing vision involves mobilizing actors 
for the purposes of materializing an innovation. There were at three main 
groups of actors that the government aimed to mobilize in the case: the 
companies engaged to help the Home Office build the NIS – including 
systems procurement and the outsourcing of biometric enrollment; a wide 
range of other public sector departments (which were expected to adopt the 
technologies and contribute to their diffusion); and the public, who were 
supposed to be the eventual end users of the system. 
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We will never know for certain whether the vision for biometrics would have 
successfully mobilized industry to develop and implement the biometric 
systems and services required for the NIS had the Labour won the 2010 
general election. By 2008, several firms had been engaged through the 
Strategic Supplier Framework, and certain contracts had even been agreed, 
but the program for biometric identity cards was ended well before large-scale 
procurement and system design were completed. Before, during, and after the 
election, we witnessed the demise of the Scheme, not because there were not 
any commercial actors willing to work with the Home Office, or because the 
technology failed to live up to expectations, but rather due to the course of 
political change. In brief, mobilization efforts were cut short by politics and in 
the process the debates about the technology’s readiness, reliability, and 
practicability were never entirely resolved. 
 
As of 2010, none of the government departments that were expected to take 
up the biometric systems being developed for the Scheme had committed to 
using them (with the possible exception of the UK Border Agency, which was 
already collecting biometrics from foreigners24). Champions of the NIS had 
failed to mobilize these important organizational actors into their cause. But as 
                                            
24 The National Identity Scheme and the UKBA’s program for biometric immigration 
documents were different programs despite the public discourses that regularly blurred the 
distinction. In addition, the UKBA’s systems were arguably easier to implement because they 
owned the operational spaces in which the systems would run. They were also the sole 
intended users of these systems, unlike the NIS, which was expected to operate across public 
and private sector organizations. 
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before, this was arguably a matter of timing. The Home Office had cautioned 
that uptake by government departments would only begin once its identity 
infrastructure was in place. The general election disrupted the original time 
frames for this project. 
 
Finally, the third set of actors to be mobilized in the Scheme was the public. 
Suffice it to say, this was an enormous and diverse group of people, whose 
bodies were intended to be read, recorded, and repeatedly validated by 
biometric devices. Their mobilization was especially critical to the Scheme’s 
success but the government’s program for identity cards and new (fingerprint) 
biometric passports was terminated before the public were to begin enrolling 
their biometrics en masse. The systems required for mass enrollment were 
never implemented. Critics such as No2ID had argued that it was at the point 
of enrollment that public resistance would mount, but this is a hypothesis that 
remains untested. What is known is that by the time the Scheme was finally 
scrapped, only 14,670 Britons had volunteered for an identity card. A 
significant fraction of these – nearly 3,000 airside workers from select airports 
– received their identity cards for free. In addition, an unknown number of the 
enrollees were civil servants who were privately encouraged to apply for an 
identity card before the election (Lettice 2010). I further explore the category 
of the ‘public’ later in this chapter, where I focus on the discourses on the 
public and its understandings of biometrics. 
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Table 8.1 summarizes the outcomes of the three functions of the 
government’s vision for biometrics in the Scheme and offers summary 
explanations for the failed vision. 
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Function Findings Explanation 
Interpretation The term ‘biometrics’ played an important 
interpretive role in government discourses, 
providing a generic yet attractive concept with 
which to sell the merits of the Scheme. But it 
was not robust enough to sustain a long-term 
vision. The discourses that comprised the 
vision could not cope with the complexity and 
diversity of the technologies being proposed. 
They failed to capture the important 
differences across the various techniques and 
technologies under consideration, particularly 
as iris recognition disappeared in government 
discourses and was excluded from 
procurement documents. The concept’s 
interpretive value diminished over time. 
The interpretive function of an 
organizing vision must be able 
to bestow meaning to a novel 
technology and sustain it. The 
concept of ‘biometrics’ failed to 
do so in the case study. Despite 
being relatively distinctive and 
offering some practical value, 
the vision was not sufficiently 
intelligible, informative or 
plausible to enable the intended 
innovation in the case. 
Legitimation The many different reasons espoused for 
using biometrics in the Scheme, including 
disputable international obligations, resulted in 
government actors not being able to 
persuasively and coherently articulate why the 
proposed biometrics were needed. Over the 
course of the Scheme, their vision 
encountered considerable resistance in 
discourse arenas such as the media. The 
master frame of ‘uniqueness’ was repeatedly 
employed to combat these counter-discourses 
and help legitimize biometrics, but by itself it 
did not offer a compelling policy justification for 
the technologies. 
This result was partly due to the 
large number of officials 
speaking on behalf of the 
Scheme, who felt it necessary to 
discursively link biometrics with 
a wide range of policy dilemmas. 
The result also reflects a level of 
distrust in the messenger (i.e., 
government officials). Proposals 
for a system with more 
trustworthy spokespeople, or 
one with a more narrowly 
specified and convincing 
purpose for biometrics, may 
have been better at legitimizing 
their use. 
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Mobilization The government was unable to mobilize the 
extended network of actors in the case, 
including commercial parties, public sector 
organizations (that were intended to adopt the 
government’s biometric systems), and 
members of the public. 
This is an artifact of the short-
lived development of the 
Scheme, which was terminated 
before major mobilization efforts 
began. Mobilization takes time, 
and politics cut short the 
government’s plans. There is, 
however, an outstanding 
question regarding whether 
mobilization is possible if the 
interpretive and legitimizing 
functions of an organizing vision 
remain unfulfilled. I explore this 
point in the next section. 
Table 8.1: Summary of outcomes of the government vision for biometrics in the Scheme 
 
8.4 Extending visions theory 
What can we learn from this episode that might offer a contribution to theory? 
A number of themes arose during the case study that merit further theoretical 
exploration. 
 
Incongruent discourses: There were multiple organizations motivating the 
National Identity Scheme. It was a Labour party policy, which the Home Office 
and IPS were responsible for implementing. The presence of several 
spokespeople (including both politicians and civil servants), who are 
responsible for jointly articulating and conceptualizing a coherent vision for a 
new technology, may lead to coordination problems such as those that we 
encountered in the case study. While Swanson and Ramiller acknowledge 
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that disagreements over a vision’s content may arise, the cases they present 
do not account for the complexities of coordinating and promulgating visions 
across multiple organizational contexts. 
 
Competing discourses: One of these contexts – arguably the most important 
and challenging one in the case – was the political sphere. We must also 
account for the role of politics in organizing visions, and in particular how 
politics lends itself to competing visions for new technology. 
 
A vision for the implementation of an ERP system in a bank may encounter 
resistance, which may even be political in the sense that the introduction of 
the technology alters institutional hierarchies and work routines, but it is 
unlikely to be tightly bound to notions of citizenship, freedom, and political 
identity. By contrast, as the result of ongoing counter-discursive work by 
activist groups and political opposition parties, the government’s proposals for 
biometric identity cards elicited considerable political distrust, fears of 
government tracking innocent citizens, and worries about unwarranted privacy 
intrusions and security risks, as was represented in the media reporting on the 
NIS. 
 
There is a qualitative difference between a vision for a corporate accounting 
system, for example, and a government-sponsored national identity system. 
 338
The former is a solution to a perceived problem. The latter is a political choice 
about how society should be organized, where the search for a solution may 
precede the event of a problem (as was demonstrated by the government’s 
inability to successfully legitimize biometrics in the Scheme). Where the 
impetus for such a large effort seems the stuff of choice and not necessity, 
political opposition is difficult to surmount. Not surprisingly then, the 
government’s proposals became highly politicized over time as the urgency 
that supposedly underpinned them grew more and more elusive. Resistance 
originated in different arenas, including civil society and opposition parties. 
Groups such as No2ID offered counter-discourses for biometrics in the 
Scheme, portraying them as expensive and invasive. 
 
When is a vision? Finally, organizing visions theory takes for granted that 
discourses about a new technology assemble to form a vision, which then 
organizes actors and resources to innovate (or not). The success or failure of 
the organizational effort is the main focus, rather than the existence of the 
vision itself. It is largely assumed (or overlooked) that a vision exists. 
However, the government’s frustrated efforts to envision biometrics in the 
case force us to consider analytically the criteria of a vision for new 
technology. That is, when is a plan for new technology a vision (as opposed to 
merely a set of ideas)? What distinguishes ideas and visions and explains 
their varying capacity to facilitate innovation? 
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Swanson and Ramiller also accept that there may be different visions 
emanating from a discourse community that disrupt one another during 
innovation processes. However, in the case of the National Identity Scheme 
we encountered more than a simple inter-community contest of visions. The 
combination of the incongruous discourses emanating from the Home Office, 
the Labour party and its associates, the complexity and magnitude of the 
proposals for biometrics, and the politics of privacy and surveillance that 
emerged over time (fed by the counter-discourses of activists and opposition 
politicians), had a unraveling effect on the government’s proposals. Despite 
their best efforts, the Labour government could not recover control of their 
vision, nor could they refine it after certain key policy decisions, such as the 
eventual exclusion of iris recognition from the Scheme. These were 
developments that the organizing visions concept as originally conceived does 
not easily accommodate. We therefore need to account for these dynamics in 
a contribution to IS theory on visions and technological change. 
 
Therefore, in this section I juxtapose Swanson and Ramiller’s conceptual 
formulation with my own contributions to theory on technological visions, 
which are derived from the case study. This comparison is focused around 
three dimensions: the ontology of visions, temporality, and resistance to 
visions for IT innovation. 
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Ontology 
We must examine the basic relationship between ideas and visions. In their 
original paper, Swanson and Ramiller’s focus was on the capacity of visions to 
organize actors and resources to innovate using new information technology, 
but they did not define or theorize visions per se. They defined an organizing 
vision as “a focal community idea for the application of information technology 
in organizations” (1997, p. 460), but took for granted the ontology of a vision 
itself. According to their definition, visions are understood in terms of ideas, 
but not all ideas are visions. Swanson and Ramiller believed that a community 
must exist to adopt and develop an idea (or set of ideas) for it to become a 
vision. Visions are thus understood as shared ideas. But does the sharing of 
an idea necessarily constitute a vision? I argue that it does not. An idea 
shared by few individuals is in itself not a vision (cf. Dierkes et al. 2006), but 
Swanson and Ramiller did not provide a thorough account of what makes a 
vision. Organizing visions theory, therefore, insufficiently conceptualizes its 
core concept (i.e., the vision) and what distinguishes it ontologically from other 
phenomena, such as ideas. I argue that, before it can organize, an organizing 
vision must first actually be a vision, and not simply a mere idea, belief, or 
expectation (or collection thereof) about new technology. We must thus tease 
out the differences between these concepts. 
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Building on the ideas of Dierkes et al. (2006, p.104), I assert that a vision 
requires a) the presence of a potentially visionary idea, b) the development of 
this idea by a community, and c) the broadening of consensus around this 
idea beyond its original community. They argue that consensus is a 
“constituent element of visions” and that the “ideas of a few individuals, no 
matter how innovative or brilliant, obvious, captivating, fascinating, or logical 
they might be, are in themselves not visions” (Dierkes et al. 2006, p.101). 
These points provide a basis to theorize more thoroughly the vision concept. 
 
While the relative size of the community entertaining an idea is important for 
its development as a potential vision, I would argue that the essential feature 
distinguishing ideas from visions is agency. My suggestion is that an idea 
becomes a vision when it begins to assume its own agency, independent of its 
spokespeople. Without agency, a potential vision remains a loose collection of 
ideas about a new technology, and requires a group to continually nurture it in 
order to keep it active and sustain it. A vision, however, can temporarily exist 
independently of the community that defines and shapes it. Through its 
agency, a vision traverses the discursive arenas where innovation happens. 
Having become a vision, an idea can be taken for granted by the community, 
although not indefinitely – visions still require discursive work, specifically to 
keep them intelligible in light of technological and organizational change. A 
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vision’s agency is what provides its capacity to organize and mobilize. In fact, 
it requires it. But it does not last forever. 
 
This distinction makes way for an alternate theoretical explanation for why the 
government’s proposals for biometrics were unsuccessful. Rather than 
pointing out, according Swanson and Ramiller’s theory, that the plans for 
biometrics failed because the government’s vision was unable to provide a 
coherent interpretation and compelling legitimation for biometrics, we can 
conceptually distinguish between ideas and visions to explore whether the 
government was ever even able to develop a vision for biometrics. That is, 
instead of taking the concept of a vision for granted, as Swanson and Ramiller 
seem to do, we can instead seek it out empirically. Whereas visions may or 
may not organize people and resources to innovate, by definition ideas by 
themselves cannot due to abovementioned limitations of consensus, scale, 
and agency. 
 
The first step for a researcher, therefore, is to decide whether the innovation-
related phenomenon in question is best classified as an idea or a vision. To 
do so, one should determine whether there is relative consensus about the 
concept and, more importantly, study the organizational discourses that 
comprise visions for signs of agency. That is, does the phenomenon assume 
a ‘taken-for-grantedness’ by the community or does it require ongoing 
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discursive work to keep it active? If the former, then it is probably a vision and 
is more likely to facilitate and organize innovation, so long as the three 
functions of an organizing vision can be satisfied. If the latter, then it is likely 
merely an idea and its capacity to enable innovation will be severely limited. 
Importantly, just because spokespeople call their idea a vision (as was 
repeatedly the case in the case study) does not make it so. This fact must be 
discerned empirically by studying the relevant discourses. 
 
Temporality 
This leads us into a theoretical discussion on the temporality of visions. While 
Swanson and Ramiller discuss the ‘career dynamics of organizing visions’ 
(pp.468-469) to address how visions are successful or not in terms of enabling 
IT innovation, their account of the processes of visioning leaves a number of 
questions unanswered. 
 
Picking up on the previous section, the temporal processes through which 
ideas become visions are not discussed by Swanson and Ramiller. In their 
account, the life and career of an innovation begins with a vision – the vision’s 
pre-history is not studied. Nor do they explain how visions progress to become 
organizing visions. In the preceding section I provided a working hypothesis 
for how ideas become visions through their acquisition of agency, which 
allows them to assume an independent discursive existence, albeit 
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necessarily provisional. Once an idea matures into a vision, however, what 
processes are at work to enable it to aid innovation and how do these 
processes connect temporally? 
 
Focusing on the three functions of an organizing vision (interpretation, 
legitimation, mobilization) in particular, it is not entirely clear how they inter-
relate temporally in previous empirical accounts. It appears that Swanson and 
Ramiller did not view the functions as separate and distinct temporal phases 
that must conclude before the next starts (e.g., first interpretation, then 
legitimation, and finally mobilization). Instead, functions appear to operate in 
conjunction, with interpretation, legitimation, and mobilization sometimes 
occurring at the same time, depending on the innovation context. For 
example, it is often the case that visions provide degrees of interpretation and 
legitimation for new technology simultaneously, particularly when questions 
arise about a new technology’s purpose and capacity to solve a problem. Yet 
it is doubtful that mobilization can be successfully achieved if the interpretation 
and legitimation functions of an organizing vision are retarded. How would 
market actors mobilize without a reasonable understanding of what an 
innovation aims to achieve and why it is necessary? We encountered such a 
dilemma in the case study, in which mobilization efforts were stunted partly 
because the government’s project for biometrics remained uninformative and 
 unp
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The model depicts three main temporal stages of technological visions: 
 
The first stage represents the pre-history of a vision for the use of new 
technology, when it is merely an idea or set of ideas possessed by a single 
person or small number of people. At this stage, the potential vision lacks the 
discursive coherence required to be a vision and it is only a concern of a 
relatively small number of actors. 
 
As an idea develops into something that more people are interested in 
understanding and engaging with, and as it grows more compelling and self-
evident, it gradually matures into a vision. This is stage 2 of the temporal 
model for technological visions. Importantly, in this second stage the vision 
exists beyond the immediate community of actors involved in its development 
and maintenance (by virtue of its agency). It occupies a discursive plane 
where different parties are able to make sense of and interact with it. This is 
the ‘innovation chorus’. The more compelling and powerful the vision 
becomes, the lesser the control that any single individual or group has over it. 
It begins to take on a life of its own. For a vision to prosper at this stage, it 
must expose itself to the varying interpretations and discourses that are 
inevitable during technological change, and be capable of coping with 
disagreement from both within and outside the immediate discourse 
community (more on this in the next section). 
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During this stage, the core functions of interpretation and legitimation that 
comprise an ‘organizing vision’ in Swanson and Ramiller’s sense of the term 
are initiated. This is also the stage when the most intense discursive contests 
over the meaning and purpose of a new technology take place. Many visions 
for new technology will dwell in the second stage indefinitely, as their capacity 
to mobilize and legitimize an innovation weakens or unravels over time, in 
which case they are incapable of triggering the third function of an organizing 
vision. The barrier separating this stage and the next marks a threshold 
through which a vision passes into the mobilization stage of innovation. 
 
In this third stage, mobilization occurs. Importantly, these activities require 
more than simply discursive work. Mobilization necessarily entails material 
effort, which goes beyond discourse. However, the primarily discursive 
functions of interpretation and legitimation continue into this stage, serving to 
explain and justify the technology to those involved in the mobilization project. 
 
Importantly, although this model depicts visioning in a linear fashion, it 
accepts that a vision may regress at any stage during the innovation process, 
in which case it may devolve back to an idea, belief, or hope. The model also 
accounts for the role of counter-discourses that emanate from outside the 
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immediate discourse community, which were evident in the case study. I focus 
on these communities and their discourses in the next section. 
 
Resistance 
Finally, the role of context remains under-theorized in Swanson and Ramiller’s 
treatment of visions. Specifically, they do not explore in depth how visions 
compete and encounter resistance, particularly outside of the community 
interested in innovating. While these external communities may not be 
particularly important in the context of IT innovation in business corporations, 
where the majority of IS research takes place, in our case study they played a 
significant role in derailing the government’s proposals. Similar dynamics are 
likely to arise in other government-sponsored or public sector-led innovation 
projects, especially those involving controversial science or technology (such 
surveillance systems), as was the case in this study. We must therefore 
attempt to theorize these observations for future research. 
 
For Swanson and Ramiller, the “discourse community consists of a variety of 
participants, united in their commitment to the innovation’s public 
interpretation, but differentiated by the interests that motivate them and the 
roles they play in the marketplace” (1997, p. 464). Theirs is thus a generally 
positive and inclusive notion of community, whereby conflict is understood in 
terms of market competition or standards development, as opposed to other 
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forms of social or political discord. This notion of conflict only accommodates 
inter-community disagreement over a vision’s content or meaning, and 
excludes more extreme forms of resistance that may arise from other 
domains, such as those outside the main discourse community. In the case of 
the National Identity Scheme, the technologies of biometrics were the subject 
of outright hostility by certain members of the political opposition and civil 
society, for whom, right or wrong, the technologies were entirely 
unacceptable. These actors are captured in Figure 8.2, in which a community 
(or communities) generates and communicates its own counter-discourses on 
a new technology. 
 
Despite Swanson and Ramiller’s suggestion, the discourse community 
surrounding many new IT innovations is not always open and equal. Some 
agents are not permitted access to the official venues and formal arenas in 
which meaning making around proposals for a new technology takes place.  
For example, many important actors in the case of the National Identity 
Scheme were not part of the policy and technology communities in which 
decisions were made about biometrics, but their discourses and activities 
were nonetheless significant to the project’s outcome. In particular, despite 
being officially banned from some public meetings on the NIS, No2ID’s 
sustained resistance to the government’s ID cards program, including the 
resistant discourses communicated not just to the public, but also Members of 
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Parliament and even business actors, were effective in debilitating the 
Scheme. Despite not being privy to official discourse channels, these actors 
were still heard. And their messaging was effective. 
 
Another previously unaccounted for community that arose in our case study 
includes those actors without a voice during an innovation project, such as the 
foreign nationals the government targeted for biometric enrollment. They were 
especially disempowered – forced to participate in the government’s 
biometrics program and unable to meaningfully dissent or resist, without being 
denied entry and leave to remain in the UK. Actors such as these are 
altogether missing from Swanson and Ramiller’s account of technological 
change, arguably due to the scope of the organizations that they were most 
interested in. But, as I have argued, we cannot ignore non-business 
organizational contexts as we devise theories to understand innovation, 
discourse, and resistance. While these often-silent actors may not directly 
affect a technology’s trajectory during innovation processes, they are no doubt 
affected by its outcome (cf. Darking and Whitley 2007 on the ‘absent other’). 
 
Based on the findings from the case study, this section has expanded on 
organizing visions theory to explore the constitution of visions, what 
distinguishes them from mere ideas about new technology, and their 
temporality. It has also re-theorized the context of organizing visions to 
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account for two additional communities involved in certain types of innovation: 
counter-discourse communities and the voiceless publics of new technology. 
Moving beyond considering IS theory on visions and technology, I now turn to 
further explore the concept of the publics of innovation from the critical public 
understanding of science perspective. 
8.5 Discourse, publics, and technological innovation 
Much like the talk about technology, discourses about the public and their 
understanding and acceptance of biometrics persisted throughout the case 
analysis. Taken literally and uncritically, these discourses are simply 
descriptions of public opinion and the eventual users of a new technology. 
However, these discourses can also be seen as simultaneously constructing 
the future users of a system. More than merely describing matters of fact, 
such talk about the public and its relationship to a new technology also serves 
to generate expectations and shape attitudes. In other words, these 
discourses are performative (Borup et al. 2006; Horst 2007). 
 
This section reflects critically on discourses about the public and its 
relationship to biometrics. The discussion first reviews the previously analyzed 
discourses about public understandings and acceptance of biometrics, then 
the discourses on future users themselves, before shifting to a more general 
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reflection on discourses about new technology and their capacity to construct 
publics. 
 
Acceptance misunderstood? 
Recall from the analysis how the government’s discourses on biometrics 
portrayed an unaware yet accepting public. The public were said not to fully 
understand biometrics (“the term was rarely known”), though surveys 
repeatedly showed, and government spokespeople often reiterated, that 
members of the public generally ‘approved’ of their use within the NIS. Indeed, 
public acceptance of biometrics was said to remain high over the course of 
the Scheme despite various ‘misunderstandings’.  
 
This correlation between poor understandings and high acceptance rates is 
interesting, if not odd. The commonly held sentiment within traditional 
research on public understanding of science (PUS) is that ‘undeveloped’ 
understandings of new science and technology are a barrier to the public’s 
acceptance of the innovation – that knowledge deficiencies breed bad 
attitudes (Bauer et al. 2007) – however this case reveals something different. 
This can arguably be attributed to the concept of ‘biometrics’ itself, which as 
we have discussed, is alien and ambiguous. Specific awareness of 
fingerprinting technologies, for example, would almost certainly have been 
much greater – with associations with criminality to be expected in many 
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contexts – than would the intricacies of iris photography. But it also has to do 
with the way in which the Scheme came about: as a government-mandated 
program for biometric national identity cards. In this context, acceptance takes 
on a very different meaning and so the PUS knowledge-approval dynamic 
proves especially complicated. 
 
Of course, perception studies on the NIS were loaded with assumptions about 
the technologies involved and their ‘certainty’. The science and technology 
were taken as steady and settled, as were their future applications within the 
Scheme. Certain studies of public perception claimed that people did not 
understand the simple ‘facts’ of biometrics. For example, people “tended to 
find it difficult to grasp that biometrics would only need to be provided once” 
(Cragg Ross Dawson 2004c, p.74), noted one study. In actuality, such ‘facts’ 
and others are provisional and still unsettled, with research ongoing to try to 
better understand these complexities (see, for example, Bowyer et al. 2009 
concerning the disputable permanence of iris biometrics). What is interesting 
is how government discourses on public understandings of biometrics glossed 
over and simplified much of this scientific uncertainty and technological 
complexity. 
 
Moreover, there was a subtle politics to the survey methods used to measure 
such understandings and perceptions. For example, the government’s own 
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longitudinal ‘Tracking Research’ (conducted by the COI) was serially 
inconsistent. Whereas the first and second surveys posed an open-ended (if 
not problematic) question regarding the public's ‘awareness and 
understanding’ of biometrics – “What do you think ‘biometric information’ is?” –
, the third survey asked a different question, also open-ended, about where 
people would be most ‘comfortable’ recording a particular biometric: “Where 
would you feel comfortable having your fingerprints recorded?” In the fourth 
survey respondents were asked a ‘yes/no’ question about whether they would 
be “happy” to have their fingerprints recorded (64% said ‘yes’), followed by a 
question asking them to choose from a set list of places where they would 
prefer to enroll their biometrics: “In which of the following locations would you 
consider having your fingerprints, photo, and signature recorded?” The fifth 
survey again posed a slightly different question: “Respondents were asked to 
choose from a list where they would not consider having their fingerprints, 
photo, and signature recorded”. The sixth, seventh, and eighth surveys 
avoided specific questions about biometrics altogether. At the very least these 
shifting goalposts make longitudinal tracking very difficult. It is notable that 
other questions from these tracking surveys were not subject to such regular 
changes. The questions on biometrics moved from exploring general 
understandings and interpretations, to asking whether respondents would be 
“happy” having their fingerprints taken, to not asking about them at all. 
Considering these frequent changes, it is not clear what was being tracked. A 
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skeptical interpretation of these reformulations might conclude that they were 
not accidental but rather carefully framed such that the Home Office could find 
evidence to justify its ongoing policy changes. 
 
Elsewhere, the Home Office argued that public understandings would improve 
as people began to record their biometrics: “Surveys have shown that people 
who have experienced the process find it convenient and understand the 
benefits of having the information recorded” (2005c, emphasis added). This 
formulation represents a strange and twisted logic whereby members of the 
public are sold on the merits of an innovation after having been mandated to 
use it. As mentioned, the Home Office’s acceptance contortionism upsets the 
traditional thinking about the relationship between knowledge and acceptance 
of new science and technology. Where it is commonly believed that better 
knowledge facilitates greater acceptance, the logic evidenced in this quotation 
from the Home Office implies that knowledge improves after adoption. This 
resembles a form of ‘understanding by doing’ and, importantly, ignores a raft 
of ethical and privacy concerns related to informing data subjects before their 
data are collected and processed. 
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Politico-understandings of biometrics 
The analysis also shed light on the extent of political decision-makers’ 
knowledge of biometrics. These are another important public in this case 
study, though as a group they are often neglected by PUS studies – most 
probably for methodological reasons. What is not entirely clear is the extent of 
parliamentarians’ actual ‘understanding’ of biometrics. Their discourses often 
revealed misunderstandings and confusion about the technology behind 
biometrics, but we must be careful not to equate discourse with understanding 
or belief. In politics, it is often hard to distinguish between the willfully ignorant 
and the naturally ignorant. For all we know, MPs knew more than they let on. 
As we saw, calculated misrepresentations of certain aspects of biometrics in 
policy documents and prepared speeches were common, such as when 
officials spoke of ‘international obligations’ for biometrics. It is very plausible 
that these were discursive strategies rather than knowledge gaps. However, 
there were also moments, particularly during parliamentary debates, when 
MPs (especially those on the backbench) did indeed seem puzzled or poorly 
briefed on the issues, such as when they posed odd and seemingly misplaced 
questions about the use of DNA information in identity cards, or when 
statements about the state of iris biometrics did not reflect current thinking in 
the Home Office. 
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It is nearly certain that there were experts within the Home Office who did 
understand the science and practice of biometrics well. However, I did not 
have direct access to these individuals – just their organizational knowledge 
as transmitted through carefully sanitized discourses in official policy texts. 
There is therefore an outstanding empirical question regarding the 
communication and reporting channels that exist between an organization 
such as the Home Office and those politicians responsible for making policy 
decisions and communicating policy changes to the public. It appears that the 
Home Office was not entirely forthcoming in its communications about 
changes to plans for biometrics. For example, the Home Office took several 
months, if not an entire year, before finally clarifying the role of iris biometrics, 
with both frontbench and backbench MPs appearing not to know the actual 
status of the technology in the Scheme. There are important implications for 
such uneven and inconsistent knowledge sharing and policy communication 
practices between those organizations responsible for system implementation 
(e.g., the Home Office) and oversight bodies (e.g., Parliament). These 
dynamics grow even more complicated as third parties – such as IT 
contractors – enter the picture. This topic demands further research and may 
require creative and opportunistic research approaches and methodologies. 
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Technologically-rendered publics 
Finally, I want to return to the issue of how discourses on new technology 
render different types of public. We first looked at these issues in chapter 6, in 
the context of biometrics. We discovered a recurring discursive distinction 
between those who were said to be capable of using biometrics  – what the 
Home Office termed the ‘able-bodied’ – and those who are not – what I called 
the ‘biometrically-challenged’. The major take-away from that phase of the 
analysis was that every innovation necessarily engenders a sub-population of 
users who are said to face problems with the technology. In the case of 
biometrics, this included a range of people that presented various challenges, 
including physiological ones (e.g., those with worn down fingers or people 
suffering from Parkinson’s disease, for whom holding still for an iris scan is 
difficult) or “life-style-related” ones (e.g., members of certain religions, 
homeless people, and transsexuals). In the case study, officials aimed to 
accommodate these users by pursuing specialist systems during the 
procurement phase. The idea was that these technology-induced ‘anomalies’ 
also had a techno-fix. 
 
However, the fate of the Scheme (with it ending the way it did, before any 
major roll-out of biometrics except for certain categories of non-EEA foreign 
nationals and refugees) meant that these pre-emptive measures were never 
tested. It remains to be seen whether the discrimination that is said to be 
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inherent in the use of biometrics can be resolved with better technology, 
capable of reading and recording an unknown number of ‘non-standard’ or 
‘non-compliant’ bodies. Until biometrics are actually employed on a national 
scale, we will not know the extent of their discriminatory effects, whether 
feasible remedies will emerge to mediate biometrics-related discrimination, 
how technology will contribute to those remedies, and what discursive 
dynamics will organize and maintain the sub-system for the biometrically- 
challenged.  Similar proposals for biometric national identity systems in 
Mexico and India provide another test bed for these technologies and their 
attendant discourses. 
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8.6 Reflections on the research approach 
Following the literature review in chapter 2 I called for an approach to studying 
new technology such as biometrics that avoids three different traps. A first 
trap that often catches technical studies involves ignoring the raft of political, 
social, organizational, and ethical aspects of introducing new technologies. In 
most technical studies, these issues are intentionally scoped out of research 
models and excluded from the questions that researchers pose. The focus is 
on technological improvement rather than concerns such as the motivations of 
the actors and organizations involved in deploying a new system or the ethics 
of building exceedingly accurate technologies to identify, profile, monitor, and 
track people. These oversights, I argued, ought to be addressed by my 
approach. 
 
A second trap catches many sociological treatments of biometrics, which lump 
together a wide range of different biometric methods and technologies in their 
broad critiques of the potential discriminatory or ethical consequences of the 
technology. The problem with such generalizations is that crucial differences 
in the technical artifacts are overlooked or ignored – differences that matter to 
the claims made by social scientists. By black-boxing technology in this way, 
important insights and nuances are missed. My approach, therefore, aimed to 
take technology ‘seriously’ by being attentive to the technical specifics of the 
government’s proposals. 
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A third trap afflicts IS research, which to date has been predominated by 
studies of user acceptance of biometrics. I argued that, beyond being 
normatively loaded, acceptance research is also misplaced in contexts such 
as the case of the National Identity Scheme. This is because it was not clear 
who was accepting the technology (politicians who voted to include them in 
the legislation, organizations that were expected to adopt them, citizens who 
were expected to use them, those foreign nationals who could not not accept, 
etc.) and what exactly they were accepting (i.e., there were no technical 
devices in place throughout the majority of the Scheme’s lifespan). I therefore 
proposed that the research instead focus on the discourses on biometrics 
attending public discussions and debates over the NIS, and in particular how 
these discourses were framed and the changes they underwent over time. 
 
This tailored approach allowed us to focus more carefully on the technologies, 
actors, and institutions involved in the proposals for the National Identity 
Scheme and to appreciate how loosely aligned spokespeople attempted to 
form and propagate a vision for biometrics. It permitted us to explore the 
dynamics of this fragile vision – how it attempted to portray a plan for 
nationwide implementation of biometrics and how this vision unraveled as 
critical events transpired and an election neared. The critical discourse 
analysis was especially sensitive to changes in the government’s framing of 
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its proposals, particularly as the vision encountered resistance and 
unforeseen dilemmas. Motivated by debates from research on the public’s 
understanding of science, the research lens also highlighted how discourses 
on new technology render an array of publics. I suggest that this research 
model can be appropriated for future studies involving visionary technology 
projects that implicate various organizations, stakeholder groups, and users.  
8.7 Limitations of the study 
There are inescapable limitations to any research project, and this study is no 
different. While I believe the story I have told has provided important insights 
into the early life (and eventual demise) of proposals for an innovative, 
undoubtedly politics-laded government information technology, the arguments 
and findings presented here are naturally limited. 
 
Perhaps most obvious is that I only studied discourses around a new 
technology prior to its implementation, without observing and comparing the 
subsequent discourses following its introduction. Even if the biometrics 
component of the NIS had been developed as planned, the original research 
schedule for this dissertation would have precluded access to government, 
media, and public discourses about the fully operational Scheme. Suffice it to 
say I acknowledge the implications of my ‘time capsule’ approach, devoid as it 
is of extensive post-implementation data. 
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This thesis focused its analysis on publicly available discourses, as one must 
surely do with such a topical matter of public security provision where 
classification and industrial secrecy loom large. I would have liked to get 
inside the organizations responsible for delivering the NIS in order to access 
those individuals responsible for overseeing its creation, design, and 
implementation. These include civil servants in the Home Office and IPS, who 
I believe would have provided another interesting source of data. However, 
this was not possible for various reasons, the most obvious of which is the 
sensitivity of the project and institutional concerns about protecting what was 
said to be ‘commercially confidential’ and ‘security sensitive’ information 
regarding the program. Unfortunately, my attempts to approach these 
organizations to engage their members through interviews and other methods 
were fruitless.  
 
Likewise, I was also interested in systematically studying the supply side (i.e., 
vendors) of biometrics in the Scheme, much like Pollock and Williams (2008) 
have done with enterprise resource planning systems, but my access to these 
venues was similarly limited. I was able to attend biometrics industry 
conferences on a regular basis to get an informal feel for the discourses at 
work in these arenas and speak with players in the biometrics industry who 
sought contracts on the government’s identity cards program. These were 
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fascinating venues in which the business of expectations is bustling, though I 
must admit that it is difficult to convince people to talk on the record in these 
venues. In future I hope to study more systematically the role that these 
gatherings play in IT innovation dynamics (cf. Pollock & Williams 2010). 
 
Finally, this research project was a single case study, supplemented at times 
by informed observations from other, related cases. Under more liberal 
research parameters than those afforded to doctoral students, I would have 
undertaken a comparative case study of national biometric identity programs, 
to generate, as Pollock and Williams (2010) argue, a more complete 
biography of technology. Pollock and Williams encourage researchers to trace 
and compare the careers of numerous systems, rather than simply studying a 
single site. Notwithstanding the constraints of graduate study, the two other 
national programs for biometrics (namely, Mexico and India, which both aim to 
enroll multiple biometrics (including irises)) have just recently launched, and 
so the timing for a comparative study would have been somewhat awkward. 
However, a biography of large-scale biometrics programs may be assembled 
in future. 
8.8 Future research 
While I have alluded to different aspects of resistance that emerged in the 
case study, in future I wish to expand on these initial observations to provide a 
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fuller account of the resistance dynamics at play in the case. In particular, the 
role of politics in ending the Labour government’s plans for biometric identity 
cards (and the accompanying database) merits a focused and extended 
analysis of its own. This future research would be based on initial research 
that colleagues and I have already conducted relating to the actors and 
modes of resistance at play in the Scheme (Martin et al. 2009), which would 
need to incorporate a stronger understanding of the reasons for resistance. 
 
There are several similar large-scale projects underway in different countries 
with body surveillance technologies and identification systems at their core. 
Future research may apply my revised theoretical model and research 
approach to these implementations to better understand the public discourse 
framing processes that underlie sponsor actors’ visions for these 
technologies, how these discourses cope with and overcome counter-
discourses, and the role that the public plays in the discourses on 
technological innovation. 
 
For instance, the introduction of ‘advanced imaging technologies’ (abbreviated 
as AITs and known colloquially as full-body scanners) in airports worldwide 
offers an interesting case. These scanners are able to peer beneath clothing 
and generate what have been described as extremely intimate and revealing 
images of the subject’s body, including the genitalia region (see Appendix 8). 
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Resistance to the scanners is mounting, sparked by concerns about its 
intrusiveness, indignity, and potential radiation hazards, as well as concerns 
about their use on certain populations such as children (and whether this 
might violate child pornography laws in some jurisdictions (Travis 2010)).  
 
Unlike the case of biometrics in the NIS, which went through years of public 
consultation and deliberation before eventually dissolving by the currents of 
political change, the proposals for the use of AITs in US airports were put forth 
and implemented immediately following a thwarted terrorist attack on 
Christmas Day 2009, thereby short-circuiting public debate about their use. By 
December 2010 they had been introduced in over 70 airports in the US. It has 
been disclosed that the American public was not informed in advance about 
the details of the scanners’ roll-out due to concerns that doing so might 
provide a “roadmap or blueprint for terrorists” (Pistole as quoted in Pugh 
2010). The Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) has stated that its 
policy was to implement the scanners first, and then try to “educate” the public 
about their benefits (Pugh 2010).  
 
However as was the case in the NIS, these ‘benefits’ are as yet unknown, and 
presently unknowable. It is unclear how effective body scanners are at 
detecting dangerous material concealed below the clothing of the subject 
(DHS Office of Inspector General 2010; Strickler 2010). There are also 
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unanswered questions about the health risks posed by radiation exposure and 
little consideration given to the effects of repeated exposure of the kind 
frequent travelers would undergo (Cox 2010). One particular technology-
related controversy concerns whether the systems are capable of storing and 
saving the images, which some say would make them more privacy-invasive. 
Officials from the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) originally 
claimed that the systems are designed so that images cannot be saved locally 
and that all images are automatically deleted immediately after analysis. 
However, a Freedom of Information request by the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center (an advocacy group) revealed that the functionality to save 
images of scans does indeed exist. 
 
There are two sets of concerns related to the ‘publics’ of innovation, in 
particular, that future research could explore. First is a familiar methodological 
politics in the surveys being conducted concerning these systems, which are 
said to provide an unbiased scientific measure of public attitudes towards the 
technology. In its public relations efforts to respond to the outcry over the 
claimed invasiveness and inappropriateness of body scanners, the TSA has 
stressed that the public overwhelmingly approves of the use of AITs. One of 
the surveys was conducted just weeks following the failed Christmas Day 
bombing, and before any major roll-out of the technology. The poll found that 
78% of respondents said they approved of scanners, with 84% believing that 
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the technologies would help to prevent terrorists from bringing explosives on 
board. The (then) acting administrator of the TSA, Gale Rossides, interpreted 
these poll results as "demonstrat[ing] public understanding" of the need to use 
the scanners (as quoted in Frank 2010). Such ‘understanding’ had been 
arrived at before the technology was in widespread use, before any 
conclusive, independent testing or analysis had been carried out to determine 
the systems’ effectiveness in preventing dangerous objects from being snuck 
onto airplanes, and in the absence of any substantial public knowledge base 
about the social or ethical benefits and drawbacks of full-body scans.  
  
If we are to believe the poll results, which are strikingly similar to those about 
biometrics in the lead up to the roll-out of the NIS, then they represent general 
public acceptance of an innovation about which public knowledge and 
experience is limited and zero, respectively. However, if we critically question 
these discourses on acceptance, other explanations may arise. Future 
research could study these poll results through the lens of the sociology of 
expectations, which encourages us to view such statements as a means to 
condition future expectations about technology. Theorizing discourses on 
public acceptance in this way resonates with Law’s remarks on method: 
“Method is not, I have argued, a more or less successful set of procedures for 
reporting on a given reality. Rather it is performative. It helps to produce 
realities” (Law 2004, p.143). It also draws our attention to the ‘reactivity’ of 
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public measures such as opinion polls, and the extent to which they create 
social worlds; that is, whether they are self-fulfilling prophecies or 
commensurating mechanisms (Sauder & Espeland 2007). That is not to say 
that these discourses on public opinion deterministically produce the publics 
they seek to represent, but rather that future research should analyze the 
extent of their agency. 
 
A second issue for future research concerns how the use of these 
technologies is turning certain members of the ‘travelling public’ into problem 
subjects; that is, how they discursively engender standard and non-standard, 
or compliant and non-compliant, users. Whereas in the case study biometrics 
were never given a chance to speak for themselves as a practical reality of 
daily life (despite the discourses that tried to address these concerns), body 
scanners are now in relatively widespread use in airports in the US and 
abroad. Certain religious leaders have raised concerns about the use of AITs, 
including Muslim leaders, some of whom have endorsed a fatwa against the 
technology (Stanglin 2010), and even the Pope, who spoke on the topic of 
body scanners to an audience of aerospace industry representatives, stating 
that “the primary asset to be safeguarded and treasured is the person, in his 
or her integrity” (Hooper 2010). Such warnings, combined with other concerns 
such as the perceived health risks or usability issues (such as for 
menstruating women wearing thick panty liners that obstruct the scanner’s 
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view of certain parts of the body (GladRags 2010), or for those who wear 
medical devices which appear suspicious during scans), have resulted in a 
situation in which many people are opting for what are termed ‘enhanced’ pat-
downs by security officers. These secondary measures unevenly affect certain 
types of travelers (Cate 2010). 
 
Security agents who perform this work form another technological public. 
While they are the ones often facing ridicule from upset travelers, they are not 
responsible for the policy decisions mandating the procedures. Many of them 
say they do not enjoy such humiliating, degrading, and demoralizing work 
(Masnick 2010). As such, they may prove to be a very important point of 
resistance whereby the surveillance mission set by policy-makers is not 
enforced or is altered to accommodate shared notions of right and wrong (cf. 
Gilliom 2001 on similar dynamics in the US related to welfare surveillance). 
 
A grassroots movement of emergent privacy activists has attracted sustained 
public attention to these incidents in recent months, forming their own counter-
discourses against the technology. So a sustained controversy is likely to 
continue as the TSA adapts, modifies its processes, learns from its 
experiences as an organization, and begins to accommodate the multiplicity of 
bodies it encounters. As the controversy unfolds, it offers many exciting 
avenues for research. 
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And finally, a much more critical analysis of the discourses of ‘innovation’ that 
persisted in this case study is desperately needed. By and large, this thesis 
has accepted that the biometrics proposed in the case where somehow new 
and innovative, based on the scale of the proposals and the technologies 
considered therein. However, as Pollock and Williams (2008) point out, the 
rhetorics of technology supply serve to delete certain past experiences which 
might otherwise show us how the innovation we often take for granted is, in 
fact, not so new or groundbreaking as first assumed. These discourses aim to 
reassure us that a new solution overcomes the shortcomings of its 
predecessors (p. 55), yet at the same time they rely on the old to generate 
meanings about the new. Future research on these discursive dynamics of 
innovation is urgently needed, to build on the critical studies of innovation by 
Suchman and others (see Suchman & Bishop 2000). 
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Appendix 1 
 
Focus group interview guide25 
 
Introduction 
Welcome the participants and thank them for attending the session and for 
agreeing to participate in a discussion of personal identity and biometric ID in 
the UK 
 
(Promise complete anonymity) 
 
Opening the frame (5 minutes) 
‘There has been a lot of coverage of personal identity in the press and on the 
television lately, including things like ID theft and the troubles with proving 
who you are on-line. Can you think of any situations in which you have had 
problems proving your identity or have been asked to provide more personal 
information that you’d like?’ 
 
Broaching the focal issue (5 minutes) 
‘One of the things I’m interested in is “biometrics”. Does anyone know what 
these are?’ (If not, then mention “fingerprints, eye scans and facial 
recognition”) 
 
Presenting the National Identity Scheme debate (6 minutes) 
‘The UK government has a plan to address some of the perceived problems 
related to identity by using biometric technologies. Let’s watch a video which 
discusses this plan.’ (If video facilities are not available, then use comics on 
biometrics as the substitute stimuli) 
                                            
25 Adapted from Focus Group Short Topic Guide in Gaskell & Bauer’s (2001) Biotechnology 
1996-2000 (see Appendix 2) and the TrustGuide Project’s Discussion Guide for Trust, 
Security and Privacy Issues, Version 3 (2007) (accessed through the authors, Hazel Lacohée 
and Andy Phippen) 
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Focusing on biometrics (15 minutes) 
‘Who here has previous experience using biometric technologies? How do 
they work?’ 
 
‘In your opinion, are biometrics a better means of verifying someone’s identity 
than, say, PINs, passwords or tokens? Why (or why not)?’ 
 
‘In your mind, what differences are there between biometric technologies used 
at home (e.g., to log into a laptop) or at work (e.g., to access the office 
building) and a national biometric ID scheme, if any?’ 
 
‘How do you think the government will a) collect, b) store and c) use biometric 
data?’ 
 
Evaluation of specific applications (8 minutes) 
‘In your mind, what problems does this Scheme help to solve, how will it work, 
and when will it be used? Do you imagine it will work like other systems you 
encounter daily?’ 
 
The alternate view (6 minutes) 
Present the German/CCC videos, depending on the tone of the discussion 
thus far 
 
Risk and morals (5 minutes) 
‘What do you see as the benefits of using biometrics? What things make you 
nervous or uncomfortable about them?’ 
 
‘Do you have any moral concerns with the government use of biometrics? If 
so, what are they?’  
 
‘Do you see biometrics as a positive or negative for personal privacy? How 
so?’ 
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‘Are there any surveillance capacities of biometrics that you can think of?’ 
 
Trust (5 minutes) 
‘Do you trust the government to handle your biometric information securely?’ 
 
‘What would the government need to do to prove that it is a) capable of and b) 
motivated to handle this information securely?’ 
 
Wrapping up 
‘Have your ideas about biometrics changed as a result of this discussion? If 
so, how?’ 
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Appendix 2 
 
Interview guide for ‘interviewing the moderator’26 
 
1. Group dynamics: How would you rate the group dynamics compared to the 
other groups? Was there a lack of group dynamics? 
 
2. Composition of the group: Who was who in the group?  
 
3. Go through the major questions: a) Definition and experience with 
biometrics; b) Role of biometrics in the Scheme; c) Benefits, risks, morals and 
trust 
 
4. Surveillance and privacy: What, if anything, did they mention about 
surveillance and privacy? 
 
5. Government: What, if anything, did they say about the government (as the 
sponsor of the Scheme)? 
  
6. Off the record: What did they talk about after the tape recorder was turned 
off? Did they ask the facilitator direct questions?
                                            
26 Adapted from the interview guide in Interviewing the Moderator: An Ancillary Method to 
Focus Groups (Traulsen et al. 2004, p.724) 
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Appendix 3 
 
Primary government policy statements (listed chronologically) 
 
Date__________Author_______________________Title__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
07/2002  Home Office   Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud: A Consultation Paper 
07/2002  Cabinet Office   Identity Fraud: A Study 
06/2003  Office of Government Commerce Gateway Review of Entitlement Cards 
10/2003  Home Office   Entitlement Cards Consultation   
11/2003  Home Office   Identity Cards: The Next Steps   
11/2003  Home Office   A Summary of Findings from the Consultation Exercise on Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud 
11/2003  David Blunkett   ID cards statement 
11/2003  Cragg Ross Dawson (for the HO) Public perceptions of identity/entitlement cards: Qualitative Research Report  
11/2003  Cragg Ross Dawson (for the HO) Identity Cards: Qualitative research on perceptions of cost 
11/2003  Home Office   Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud – the Government’s response to the consultation points 
01/2004  Office of Government Commerce Gateway Review of Identity Cards   
04/2004  N/A    Draft Identity Cards Bill   
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04/2004  Home Office   Legislation on Identity Cards: A Consultation   
04/2004  David Blunkett et al.  Identity Cards: Home Office PLP Briefing  
07/2004  Home Affairs Committee  Identity Cards   
08/2004  Cragg Ross Dawson (for the HO) Public perceptions of identity cards: Qualitative Research Report 
10/2004  Home Office   The Government Reply to the Fourth Report from the Home Affairs Committee: Identity Cards 
10/2004   Home Office   A Summary of Findings from the Consultation on Legislation on Identity Cards   
11/2004  David Blunkett   Identity Cards Speech   
11/2004  Home Office   Identity Cards Bill: Regulatory Impact Assessment   
12/2004  Central Office of Information Identity Cards 2004 
12/2004  House of Commons  Research paper on the Identity Cards Bill   
12/2004  Cragg Ross Dawson (for the HO) Identity Cards – People with special issues: Response to the proposed customer experience 
12/2004  Cragg Ross Dawson (for the HO) Identity Cards – The public’s response to proposed customer propositions 
01/2005  Joint Committee on Human Rights Report on the Identity Cards Bill   
03/2005  FCCC    A response to the introduction of identity cards 
04/2005  Labour Party   Manifesto 2005 
05/2005  Atos Origin (for UKPS)  Biometrics Enrollment Trial: Management Summary   
05/2005  Atos Origin (for UKPS)  Biometrics Enrollment Trial: Report   
05/2005  Home Office   Updated Regulatory Impact Assessment for the Identity Cards Bill   
 420
05/2005  Home Office   Identity Cards Bills: Race equality impact assessment  
05/2005  Home Office   Identity Cards Briefing   
06/2005  House of Commons  Research paper on the Identity Cards Bill   
06/2005  Home Office   Identity Cards Scheme Benefits Overview   
06/2005  Home Office   Identity Cards Trade-off Research: Interim report   
07/2005  Home Office   Response to the London School of Economics’ ID Cards Cost Estimates & Alternative Blueprint 
09/2005  Office for National Statistics Citizen Information Project Risk Status Paper   
10/2005  Home Office   Assessment of awareness and demand for the Identity Cards Scheme   
10/2005  UK Passport Service  Procurement Strategy Market Soundings [presentation] 
10/2005  Joint Committee on Human Rights Legislative scrutiny: First Progress Report (drawing special attention to the Identity Cards Bill) 
10/2005  Home Office   Identity Cards Programme Procurement Strategy Market Soundings [questionnaire] 
10/2005  Lords Constitution Committee  Identity Cards Bills: Report with Evidence   
11/2005  Cabinet Office   Transformational Government: Enabled by Technology   
11/2005  KPMG (for the HO)   Cost Methodology & Cost Review Outline Business Case Review: Published Extract 
11/2005  Home Office   P50: 05.11.08.HO.Summary of work in progress KPMG review  
11/2005  House of Lords   Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report on the Identity Cards Bill   
11/2005  Andy Burnham   CityForum speech: Identity Cards – Economy, Efficiency, Effectiveness 
11/2005  Andy Burnham   Letter to Professor Ian Angell   
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11/2005  Home Office   Identity cards in other countries (1) 
11/2005  Home Office   Identity cards in other countries (2) 
12/2005  N/A    Identity Cards Bill [as amended in Committee] 
12/2005  Home Office   Assessment of awareness and demand amongst foreign nationals for biometric residence permits 
12/2005  Home Office   Draft code of practice on civil penalties 
12/2005  Home Office   Identity matters for stakeholders newsletter (December 2005) 
01/2006  N/A    Identity Cards Bill [as amended on report] 
02/2006  Andy Burnham   Note on the costs of ID cards 
03/2006  Andy Burnham   Identity Cards Bills Update [letter]  
03/2006  Cabinet Office   Transformational Government: Implementation Plan 
04/2006  Identity and Passport Service IPS corporate and business plans 2006-2016   
04/2006  Identity and Passport Service IPS framework agreement   
04/2006  N/A    Identity Cards Act   
04/2006  Office for National Statistics Citizen Information Project   
05/2006  Identity and Passport Service FoI response (3112) on biometric passport standards   
07/2006  Science & Technology Committee Identity Card Technologies: Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence 
07/2006  UK Passport Service  Annual report and accounts 2005-2006 
08/2006  Identity and Passport Service FoI response (3783) on biometric passport standards   
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10/2006  Identity and Passport Service First Section 37 Report to Parliament about the Likely Costs of the ID Cards Scheme 
10/2006  Home Office   Government reply to HoC Science and Technology Committee report on Identity Card Technologies 
10/2006  Joan Ryan   ID cards speech at Biometrics 2006 conference  
10/2006  Science & Technology Committee  Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making (Volume 1) 
10/2006  Science & Technology Committee  Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making (Volume 2) 
11/2006  Tony Blair   Identity Management: Why the UK needs a national ID scheme [presentation]   
11/2006  Identity and Passport Service FoI response (10316) on biometric passport malfunctions   
11/2006  James Hall   Web chat transcript  
11/2006  Cabinet Office   Identity Risk Management   
12/2006  Home Office   Strategic Action Plan for the National Identity Scheme 
12/2006  Home Office   Borders, Immigration and Identity Action Plan   
02/2007  National Audit Office  Identity and Passport Service: Introduction of ePassports 
02/2007  Central Office of Information NIS Tracking Research (February 2007)   
05/2007  Identity and Passport Service Identity Cards Scheme: Cost Report May 2007 
05/2007  Identity and Passport Service National Identity Scheme Procurement: Briefing Presentation   
05/2007  Biometrics Assurance Group Annual Report 2006   
06/2007  Liam Byrne   Securing our identity: A 21st century public good (speech) 
07/2007  Committee of Public Accounts Identity and Passport Service: Introduction of ePassports 
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07/2007  N/A    UK Borders Act 2007   
08/2007  Identity and Passport Service NIS Strategic Supplier Framework Prospectus   
09/2007  Identity and Passport Service Identity Service Proposition – A ‘joint venture’ with the Criminal Records Bureau 
09/2007  Identity and Passport Service Basic Passport Checks   
10/2007      Memo to update the government response to the Science and Technology Select Committee report  
10/2007  Central Office of Information National Identity Scheme Tracking Research Wave 2: October 2007 
11/2007  Identity and Passport Service Identity Cards Scheme Cost Report November 2007 
11/2007  Identity and Passport Service  Proof of Age Research   
12/2007  Home Office   Government response to PAC report on ePassports   
12/2007  Identity and Passport Service  NIS Delivery Strategy: Aligning strategy and delivery [presentation]  
01/2008  Gordon Brown   Interview on ID cards with the Guardian  
01/2008  Identity and Passport Service  NIS Options Analysis - Outcome [leaked document] 
02/2008  Borders and Immigration Agency Consultation on Compulsory Identity Cards for Foreign Nationals 
03/2008  James Crosby   Challenges and opportunities in identity assurance 
03/2008  Jacqui Smith   The National Identity Scheme – Delivery Plan 2008 [Demos speech] 
03/2008  Jacqui Smith   PLP Brief: Delivering the National Identity Scheme 
03/2008  Home Office    National Identity Scheme: Delivery Plan 2008   
03/2008  Cabinet Office   The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom 
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03/2008  Central Office of Information National Identity Scheme Tracking Research Wave 3: February 2008 
05/2008  ISAP    Annual Report 2007   
05/2008  Identity and Passport Service  Identity Cards Scheme Cost Report May 2008 
05/2008  Identity and Passport Service  Report on key projects implemented in 2007 
05/2008  Central Office of Information National Identity Scheme Tracking Research Wave 4: May 2008  
06/2008  UK Borders Agency  Results of the Consultation on Compulsory Identity Cards for Foreign Nationals  
06/2008  UK Borders Agency  Results of the Public Consultation on Compulsory Identity Cards for Foreign Nationals  
06/2008  Home Office   Code of Practice about the Sanctions for Non-compliance with the Biometric Registration Regulations 
06/2008  UK Borders Agency  Equality Impact Assessment (for identity cards for foreign nationals) 
06/2008  Home Office   Impact Assessment of Identity Cards for Foreign Nationals - Student and Marriage Categories 
06/2008  Biometrics Assurance Group Annual Report 2007   
06/2008  Identity and Passport Service  Annual Report and Accounts (for the year ended 31 March 2008) 
07/2008  Home Office   Government reply to HAC report on a surveillance society 
08/2008  UK Borders Agency  A Strong New Force at the Border 
08/2008  Identity and Passport Service  mylifemyID Research Programme 
08/2008  Central Office of Information National Identity Scheme Tracking Research Wave 5: August 2008 
09/2008  Identity and Passport Service  Passport Validation Service: Financial Services Industry   
09/2008  UK Borders Agency  Identity cards for foreign nationals: General guidance – Level 1 
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10/2008  Identity and Passport Service  Identity Cards Scheme Cost Report November 2008 
11/2008  Identity and Passport Service  Identity and Passport Service: Front Office Services Prospectus 
11/2008  Identity and Passport Service  Introducing the National Identity Scheme   
11/2008  Jacqui Smith   Making identity cards a reality [speech at the Social Market Foundation] 
11/2008  Identity and Passport Service  National Identity Scheme Delivery Plan 2008: A response to consultation   
11/2008  Meg Hillier   Passport Validation Service [presentation] 
11/2008  Duncan Hine   Passport Validation Service [presentation] 
11/2008  Identity and Passport Service  Identity Cards Act Secondary Legislation: A Consultation 
11/2008  Central Office of Information National Identity Scheme Tracking Research Wave 6: November 2008 
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Appendix 4 
 
Hansard debates on biometrics in the NIS (selected around the ‘critical 
moments’ in the Scheme)  
 
Date Venue Subject 
13 June 2005 House of Commons Including DNA in ID cards 
20 June 2005 House of Commons Including DNA and medical 
information on the National 
Identity Register 
30 March 2006 House of Commons The questionable reliability of 
biometrics 
15 January 2007 House of Lords Obtaining iris scans and 
fingerprints from people in 
remote places for the new 
passport interview regime 
31 January 2007 House of Commons Whether iris biometrics would 
be included on new passports 
20 November 2007 House of Commons How biometrics would prevent 
the an HMRC-like data 
breach in the NIS 
21 November 2007 House of Commons How biometrics would provide 
identity fraud (post-HRMC) 
26 November 2007 House of Commons The revocability of biometrics 
28 November 2007 House of Commons The plausibility of ‘card-not-
present’ biometric checks 
against the NIR 
17 November 2008 House of Commons The likelihood of on-line 
biometric checks against the 
NIR 
17 November 2008 House of Commons Whether the Home Office had 
estimated the number of false 
matches likely if fingerprint 
biometrics alone were used 
for the biometric verification in 
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the Scheme 
17 November 2008 House of Commons On exception handling and 
fingerprint biometrics of 
elderly people 
20 November 2008 House of Commons About Home Office 
discussions with the police on 
the use of (fingerprint) 
biometric templates versus 
biometric images obtained via 
the Scheme 
24 November 2008 House of Commons On the government’s 
reasoning behind collecting 
10 fingerprints from foreign 
nationals as opposed to 2 (as 
directed under European 
Commission regulations) 
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Appendix 6 
 
Raw codes from the analyzed government communications about biometrics 
in the National Identity Scheme (listed in order of frequency27, starting with the 
most frequently used)28 
 
Fingerprints 276 
Biometric information 188 
Biometric passports 145 
Recording biometrics 130 
Costs of biometrics 126 
Enrollment 114 
Biometric data 86 
Biometric checks 77 
Storing biometrics 74 
Biometrics as unique 73 
Biometric visa 70 
Foreign national biometric ID documents 55 
International motivation for biometrics 54 
Biometric identifiers 53 
Verification 50 
Facial image 48 
Biometrics 44 
Biometrics as securing identity documents 41 
Digital photograph 39 
Biometrics as preventing multiple identities 38 
Enrollment centers 38 
Biometric immigration documents 37 
                                            
27 As this part of the analysis was focused around certain dimensions from Orlikowski and 
Gash’s (1992) framework, the frequency of particular codes is only an approximate indication 
of their importance. 
28 I list these codes as documentation of my analysis, which is a quality criterion for qualitative 
research (Flick 2008; Bauer & Gaskell 2000, p.346) 
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National Identity Register 36 
Biometric technology 35 
Fingerprint biometrics 35 
Reliability (or unreliability) 34 
Biometric readers 34 
Biometrics in other countries 33 
Biometric checks against the NIR 32 
Iris patterns 32
Police access to biometrics 30 
Infrastructure required for biometrics 30 
Biometric residence permit 29 
Temporal aspects 29 
Asylum seekers' biometrics 29 
Photo biometric (face) 29 
Iris biometric 29 
Other biometric information (i.e., not fingerprints) 27 
Registering biometrics 27 
Biometric standards 26 
Facial recognition 26 
Biometric details 25 
Identity fraud 24 
Public acceptance 24 
Signature biometrics 23 
Biometrics as strengthening identity checks 22 
EU 22 
Matching biometrics 21 
Facial biometrics 21 
Biometrics as "secure" 21 
Awareness of biometrics 21 
Biometric errors 20 
Second-generation biometric passport 20 
Biometric ID card 20 
What biometrics is 19 
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Biometric technology trial 19 
Technology pilots 18 
Identity theft 18 
Data security 18 
Biometric database 17 
Biometric enrollment requiring in-person meeting 17 
ICAO 17 
Examples of biometrics 17 
Face biometrics 16 
Public "understanding" 16 
Online check 16 
Biometrics as innovation 16 
Religious aspects of biometrics 16 
Iris image 16 
Biometric identity cards 16 
Benefits of biometrics 15 
Biometric services 15 
Cost-effectiveness of biometrics 15 
Biometrics as the link between an identity (record) and a person 15 
Disabled people 15 
Scalability problems 15 
Definition of biometric information 15 
Convenience 14 
Biometrics Assurance Group 14 
Practicalities 14 
Number of fingerprints taken (10) 14 
Problems with enrollment 14 
Security of biometrics 14 
US-VISIT 14 
Performance 14 
Different types of biometrics 14 
Biometric product 13 
Biometrics as making it "easier" to prove identity 13 
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Marketing biometrics 13 
High value transactions 13 
Photograph biometrics 11 
Creating a marketplace for biometric enrollment 11 
US visa waiver program 11 
Taking biometrics 11 
Financial services and biometrics 11 
Biometric enrollment services 11 
Visual check 11 
Public perceptions 11 
Biometrics as preventing identity theft 11 
Biometrics as a link 11 
Biometrics as a physical characteristic 11 
Spoofing biometrics 10 
Biometric chip 10 
Mobile biometric readers 10 
Intrusiveness 10 
Accessibility of biometric stations 10 
Enrollment trial 10 
Biometrics training for staff 10 
False negatives 10 
Technological maturity 10 
Expertise 10 
Privacy 10 
Biodata 9 
Police fingerprint databases 9 
Iris recognition 9 
Biometric checks by police 9 
DNA as a biometric 9 
Learning lessons about biometrics 9
Criminal connotations 9
Arguments against biometrics 9 
Biometric e-Passport 9 
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Allow himself to be photographed 9 
Biometric cards 9 
Effectiveness of biometrics 8 
Iris photograph 8 
Vision 8 
Iris scanning 8 
Iris recognition immigration system (IRIS) 8 
Expectations of biometrics 8 
Biometrics as securing identity 8 
Fingerprint scan 8 
Risks of biometrics 8 
Government data sharing of biometric data 8 
Fingerprint images 8 
False positives 8 
Principles 8 
Finger scans 8 
Crime scene matching of NIS fingerprints 7 
Cultural objections 7 
Comfortability of biometrics 7 
Biometrics as "personal" info 7 
Elderly's problems with fingerprinting 7 
Uses of biometrics 7 
Biometrics as protecting identity 7 
Exception handling 7 
Facial photograph 7 
Procurement 7 
Iris biometrics as a *possibility* 7 
Biometrics as inevitable 7 
Biometrics as individuating 7 
Accessibility of biometric data by employers or other agencies 7 
Biometric ID 6 
Biometric procedure 6 
Mobile units 6 
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Biometric fingerprints 6 
Privacy advocates' views 6 
Biometric pilot 6 
How biometrics work 6 
Schengen area 6 
Biometric travel documents 6 
Biometric identity documents 6 
Irises 6 
Impermanence (mutability?) of biometrics 6 
Biometric records 6 
Accuracy 6 
Biometrics as "identifying information" 6 
Biometrics as increasing degree of assurance when proving identity 6 
Offline check 6 
Biometrics as personalised identifiers 6 
Biometric driving licenses 6 
Biometrics enabling Government to deal w/ threats to national security 6 
Biometrics as a *possibility*, not a certainty 6 
Operational aspects 6 
One-to-one 6 
Biometric capture 6 
Complexity of recording biometrics 6 
Interviews 5 
Perceived effectiveness of biometrics 5 
Accountability 5 
Eye biometrics ("any other part of the eye") 5 
Resistance to biometrics 5 
Biometrics as securing link between document and holder 5 
Secondary biometric (for travel docs) 5 
Biometric image 5 
Vulnerable groups 5 
Biometrics as personal information 5 
Primary biometric (for travel docs) 5 
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HMRC 5 
Biometrics as making crime more difficult 5 
Biometrics as linking people to a single identity 5 
Photos as 'old' biometric 5 
False identities 5 
Biometrics as preventing duplicate identities 5 
Fingerprint data 5 
Biometrics as physical characteristics 5 
Feasibility of doing biometrics 5 
Biometrically-enabled 5 
LSE 5 
Biometric documents 5 
Limitations of FRT 5 
Encryption 5 
Biometrically-challenged 5 
Robustness 5 
Biometrics as a "new" technology 5 
Biometrics as "specific" identifiers 5 
DNA as not an option 5 
Definition of iris 5 
Collecting biometrics 5 
Level of assurance 5 
One-to-many 5 
"Plain" biometric identity cards 5 
Ethnic differences in biometrics acceptance 5 
Usability 4 
Forgeability of biometrics 4 
Biometric residence cards 4 
System failure 4 
Civil rights 4 
Forensic applications of fingerprints 4 
Biometrics as securing identity information 4 
Biometric photographs 4 
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Biometrics as a "lock" 4 
Biometric registration certificates 4 
Biometrics as tackling illegal immigration 4 
The "public" 4 
Transsexuals 4 
Biometrics as preventing false identities 4 
Eye, the use of 4 
Biometrics as identifying information 4 
Biometrics as preventing fraudulent use of public services 4 
Biometric systems 4 
Facial recognition technology 4 
Public approval 4 
Fingerprint reader 4 
Voice biometrics 4 
Biometrics as unable to prevent terrorism 4 
Biometrics as preventing illegal working 4 
Expert opinion 4 
Biometric capability 4 
Iris scans 4 
Biometric identity 4 
National biometric identity service 4 
Human rights 4 
Relationship between the card, NIR and biometrics 4 
Safety of iris scanning 4 
How FRT works 4 
Medical conditions 4 
Biometric partners 4 
Physical contact as problem with fingerprint systems 4 
Able-bodied people 3 
Biometric-based 3 
Secondary usage 3 
Environmental factors 3 
Iris features 3 
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Biometric technology demonstration 3 
Failure to acquire rates 3 
Outsourcing biometrics 3 
Biometrics as helping fight terrorism 3 
Biometrics as relating to external characteristics 3 
Restricting access to biometric data 3 
Face recognition as unreliable 3 
Retina 3 
International sharing of biometric data 3 
Interoperability 3 
Digital facial image 3 
Usefulness 3 
Digital fingerprints 3 
Consent 3 
Uncertainty about biometrics 3 
Definition of "fingerprint" 3 
Biometrics as "data about his external characteristics" 3 
Demand 3 
Creating a market for biometrics 3 
Quality of biometrics 3 
National fingerprint register 3 
Public communication 3 
Efficiency 3 
Biometrics as a safeguard of identity 3 
Non-unique digital representations of biometrics (Crosby) 3 
Legal dimensions of fingerprint analysis 3 
UK Borders Act 3 
Safety of biometrics 3 
DNA profile 3 
Children's biometrics 3 
e-Borders 3 
Problems with the pilot 3 
Health risks of biometrics 3 
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Photograph of his head and shoulders 3 
Suppliers 3 
Biometric scanners 3 
Hygiene 3 
Information comprised in a fingerprint 3 
Biometrics as possibly making identity theft worse 3 
Biometric sensors 3 
Human resources 3 
Biometrics as linking card holder and identity owner 3 
Biometrics as making it easier to check the age of customers 3 
Availability of biometric stations 3 
How iris works 3 
Biometrics as making identity checks faster 3 
Biometrics as helping reduce abuse of public funds 3 
Reading biometrics 3 
Age-related differences in biometrics acceptance 3 
Biometrics as helping to prevent crime 3 
Familiarity with biometrics 3 
Biometrics as key to accessing personal record on register 3 
Penalties 3 
Biometrics as overkill (or not) 3 
How fingerprint biometrics work 3 
Fingerprint checks 3 
Forensic v. civil systems 3 
Biometric characteristics 3 
NBIS contract 2 
Biometrics as a "tie" 2 
NIS SSF 2 
Biometrics as not foolproof 2 
Biometrics as link between your name and your NIR entry 2 
Biometric enabled passport 2 
Biometrics as not a new technology 2 
Biometrics as "protecting" identity 2 
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Biometric ID as part of transformational government 2 
When to use biometrics, or not 2 
Misidentification 2 
Biometrics as making financial fraud more difficult 2 
Data ownership 2 
Customers 2 
Safeguarding biometric data 2 
Biometrics as "strange" 2 
Contracts 2 
Potential of biometrics 2 
Compulsion 2 
Cost of biometric checks against a database 2 
Public service delivery 2 
Biometrics as making it more difficult to register false identities 2 
Biometrics as making it easier to detect attempts to record duplicate 
identities 2 
Biometric element 2 
Public reaction 2 
Biometrics as difficult to lose 2 
Requirements 2 
Biometrics as difficult to steal 2 
Attitudes towards biometrics 2 
Number of fingerprints taken (4) 2 
Photograph (as identifying information) 2 
Biometrics as difficult to forge 2 
Biometrics as fixing a person to a single identity 2 
Biometrics as preventing people attempting to "defraud the system" 2 
Ownership of biometric data 2 
Biometrics as fixing identity 2 
Biometrics as discriminatory 2 
Biometrics as strengthening verification procedures 2 
Biometrics as enhancing the integrity of ID docs 2 
Organizational experience 2 
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Regulating biometrics 2 
Biometrics staff 2 
Biometrics requiring face-to-face transactions? 2 
Biometric checks as acceptable when doing "applications" 2 
Biometrics as a replacement to PINs 2 
Card-not-present biometric check 2 
Refugee biometric ID 2 
Blind people (and their problems w/ iris biometrics) 2 
Biometrics as attributes 2 
Biometrics as increasing confidence of identity checks 2 
Biometrics Centre of Expertise 2 
Number of fingerprints stored on passport (2) 2 
Biometrics precluding online applications 2 
Biometrics as an element of identity 2 
Biometrics make it easier to detect attempts to record duplicate 
identities 2 
Biometrics making it easier to re-document and deport people 2 
Data Protection Act 2 
Local authorities to do biometric recording 2 
Long-term uses of biometrics 2 
Facial digital photograph 2 
Facial data 2 
Specialist expertise required for biometrics 2 
Technology refresh 2 
(In)convenience of fingerprinting 2 
Fingerprints as *optional*? 2 
Strength of biometrics 2 
Discrimination 2 
Biometric support 2 
Fingerprint visa 2 
Malfunctions with biometrics 2 
Ease 2 
Immigration and Asylum Fingerprint System 2 
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Biometric identity systems 2 
Eye scans 2 
Exclusion 2 
Biometric measures 2 
Integrating biometrics 2 
Fingerprint biometrics for asylum seekers 2 
Second class (i.e. non-biometric) passports 2 
Ethnicity as a biometric detail? 2 
Approach to trialing biometrics 2 
Biometric identities 2 
Providing biometrics 2 
Fingerprint identifiers 2 
Biometric solution 2 
Fingerprint pattern 2 
Facial measurements 2 
How iris biometrics are enrolled by computers 2 
Unfamiliarity 2 
Heat radiation 2 
Facial recognition image biometric 2 
Something you are 2 
State-of-the-art 2 
Differences in performance for different biometrics 2 
Design specifications 2 
Biometrics as "certain" 2 
Mastering biometric technology 2 
Differences in enrollment for different biometrics 2 
Designer contact lenses interfering w/ iris 2 
Hand geometry 2 
Statistical probability 2 
Digitized facial image 2
Identification 2 
Biometrics (in ID cards) as helping to deter crime 2 
Uniqueness 2 
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(Im)maturity of biometric technology 2 
Digitized photograph 2 
STORK 2 
Digital representations of biometrics (Crosby) 2 
Facial structure 2 
Dead people's biometrics 2 
Digitalized photograph 2 
Administrative support required for biometrics 2 
Biometrics as facilitating the passage of legitimate passengers and 
trade 1 
Biometric marker 1 
Biometrics as helping catch and deport foreign criminals 1 
Biometrics as guarding identity 1 
Biometrics as helping prevent multiple identity records 1 
Biometrics as helping lower risk 1 
Biometric as "a digital record" 1 
Airside workers 1 
Biometrics as linking an individual and his/her biographic information 1 
AFIS 1 
Biometrics as increasing security 1 
Biometric scans 1 
Awkwardness 1 
Biometric passport chip malfunctions 1 
Biometric pods 1 
Biometric assets 1 
Biometric recording equipment 1 
Biometrics as identity data 1 
Biometric passport cards 1 
Algorithms 1 
Biometrics as helping verify the identity of the holder against the 
document 1 
Biometric data as "sensitive" 1 
Biometric security 1 
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Biometric search 1
Audit trail 1
Biometric software 1 
Biometrics as improving integrity of enrollment process 1 
Biometrics as facilitating aliases for those in abusive relationships 1 
Biometrics (in ID cards) as helping to detect crime 1 
Biometrics as a form of protection 1 
Biometrics 'stay with us continually' 1 
Arguments against the use of fingerprints 1 
Biometrics as a characteristic 1 
Biometrics as a feature 1 
Biometric ID register 1 
Biometrics as a service 1 
Biometric upgrade test 1 
Biometrically verified 1 
Biometric ID management 1 
Biometrics as a physical process 1 
Biometric functionality 1 
Biometric features 1 
Biometrics as "carried" by ID cards 1 
Biometrics as "concept" 1 
"Some form of recorded biometrics" 1 
Biometrics as "locking down" identity 1 
Biometric feasibility study 1 
Biometrics as a "bind" 1 
Biometric EU travel documents 1 
"Reducing" biometrics to a barcode 1 
Biometrics as 'added protection' 1 
Biometrics are 'always with us' 1 
"A third biometric" (iris) 1 
Biometric lock 1 
Biometrics as electronic records 1 
Biometric-only check 1 
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Biometrics as detecting illegal immigrants 1 
Biometrics as difficult to forget 1 
Biometrics as external identifiers 1 
Best practice (and what it means) 1 
Biometric database as central to NIS 1 
Biometrics as essential 1 
Biometrics as excessive 1 
Achievements 1 
Biometrics as an unnecessary complication 1 
Biometric identity register 1 
Biometrics as barcoding 1 
Biometric identification 1 
Biometric testing (i.e., enrollment) 1 
Biometrics as an emerging technology 1 
Biometrics as countering identity fraud 1 
Biometrics as creating efficiencies in public service delivery 1 
"Customer experience" of biometrics 1 
Biometrics as binding personal info to its owner 1 
Atos Origin trial 1 
Biometrics as clean 1 
Media reportage 1 
Mandating biometrics 1 
Making biometrics work 1 
Modern v. ink fingerprinting systems 1 
Minimal disclosure 1 
Merits of biometrics (in the context of fingerprinting 6 year olds) 1 
Justification for collecting biometrics 1 
Joining-up biometric systems 1 
Irrevocability 1 
Iris imaging 1 
Large scale v. specialised biometric systems 1 
Large-scale systems 1 
Non-biometric details 1 
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Non-biometric cards 1 
Need to test biometrics before system is given final approval 1 
Objectives of biometrics pilot 1 
Number for fingerprints to be recorded on the ID card (2) 1 
NPL Feasibility Study 1 
National biometric identification service 1 
Multiple biometrics 1 
Morality of biometrics 1 
Need for universal biometrics 1 
Necessity of a "definitive" database 1 
National biometric identity scheme 1 
Irreplaceability of compromised biometric images 1 
Guarantees about biometrics 1 
Gordon Brown 1 
Giving biometrics 1 
High volume transactions (making DNA an inappropriate biometric) 1 
Hand biometrics 1 
Gun crime 1 
Front-end biometric services 1 
Fingers 1 
Fingerprints not mandatory (ICAO) 1 
Geographical issues 1 
Gender aspects 1 
Future-proof 1 
Iris picture 1 
Iris digital photograph 1 
Iris camera 1 
Iris scan data 1 
Iris recognition data 1 
Iris readers 1 
Inclusivity 1 
Hospitals 1 
Homeless 1 
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Intelligence services 1 
Integrity (of the application process) 1 
Innovations in iris biometrics 1 
Strategic Action Plan 1 
Stability of biometrics 1 
Specific identifiers 1 
Technology tests 1 
Technological development 1 
Technical challenges 1 
Screening biometrics 1 
Royal Mail 1
Risks 1 
Sophistication of biometric databases 1 
Service innovation 1 
Security of biometric technology 1 
Vagueness of legislative language 1 
Use of biometrics limited in early stages of the scheme 1 
Unique confirmation of identity 1 
Volume 1 
Video conferencing for remote communities 1 
Validating biometrics 1 
The process will be quick, easy and safe 1 
Test population 1 
Terrorism 1 
Uncertainty 1 
Thumbprint 1 
The technology "works" 1 
Retrieving biometrics 1 
Portable fingerprint readers 1 
Police biometric "services" 1 
Plain fingerprint biometrics 1 
Private sector organizations 1 
Potential for fraud during enrollment 1 
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Potential for costs of biometrics to increase 1 
People with "complex lives" 1 
Passport Agency Support System (PASS) 1 
Overconfidence in biometrics 1 
Picture (biometric) 1 
Physical process 1 
Physical appearance as a biometric 1 
Reducing fraud 1 
Real-time biometric verification 1 
Public understanding of science 1 
Retinal patterns 1 
Relationship between biometric passport and biometric ID 1 
Regional offices 1 
Proportionality 1 
Probabilistic biometric matching technologies 1 
Private sector use of biometrics 1 
Public interest 1 
Public engagement 1 
Psychological effects 1 
Biometrics as stronger proof of identity 1 
Biometrics as strengthening integrity of passports 1 
Biometrics as strengthening authentication processes 1 
Biometrics as the real step change 1 
Biometrics as the most secure way to fix an individual to a unique 
identity 1 
Biometrics as the best proof of identity 1 
Biometrics as securing identity records 1 
Biometrics as securing financial transactions 1 
Biometrics as saving police administrative costs 1 
Biometrics as something the government must do "a duty" 1 
Biometrics as simplifying verification 1 
Biometrics as securing online transactions 1 
Biometrics permitting automation of immigration controls 1 
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Biometrics of dead people 1 
Biometrics learning curve 1 
Border control philosophy 1 
Biometrics support 1 
Biometrics reducing the social and economic costs of crime 1 
Biometrics as what secures an identity system 1 
Biometrics as untried 1 
Biometrics as the riskiest part of the scheme 1 
Biometrics industry 1 
Biometrics in other HO systems 1 
Biometrics can only be registered to one identity 1 
Biometrics as required to establish a person's "core identity" 1 
Biometrics as permitting physical identification 1 
Biometrics as part of a "triple ring" of border security 1 
Biometrics as one of multiple modes 1 
Biometrics as physical evidence 1 
Biometrics as personal features 1 
Biometrics as personal behavioral traits 1 
Biometrics as non-sensitive 1 
Biometrics as measurable 1 
Biometrics as making it incredibly difficult to steal someone's identity 1 
Biometrics as offshoring borders 1 
Biometrics as nothing new 1 
Biometrics as not preventing illegal immigration 1 
Biometrics as proven technology 1 
Biometrics as protecting personal information 1 
Biometrics as protecting legal migrants 1 
Biometrics as relating to physical features 1 
Biometrics as quick 1 
Biometrics as proving one's "bona fides" 1 
Biometrics as preventing illegal migration 1 
Biometrics as preventing identity exploitation 1 
Biometrics as possibly replacing a password 1 
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Biometrics as protecting against identity theft 1 
Biometrics as preventing asylum grantees from creating additional 
identities 1 
Biometrics as preventing others from using one's ID card 1 
Enhanced passports 1 
Empowerment 1 
Embarrassment 1 
Ethical issues 1 
Establishing identity with biometrics 1 
Enrollment pilot 1 
DNA analysis requires specialised skills 1 
Digitally enlarged photograph appearing on a computer screen 1 
Digital photographic image 1 
Do biometrics work? 1 
DNA as invasive 1 
DNA as better than other biometrics 1 
Eurodac 1 
Fingerprint scanner 1 
Fingerprint records 1 
Fingerprint recognition 1 
Fingerprinting by video conference 1 
Fingerprint templates 1 
Fingerprint technology 1 
Facial characteristics 1 
Face biometric as the only one required for biometric passport 1 
Face (biometrics) 1 
False matches 1 
Failure to enroll 1 
Facial hair 1 
Competition (among biometric service providers) 1 
Comparing biometrics 1 
Commercial viability of biometric enrollment services 1 
Consultation 1 
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Conflicting evidence 1 
Complexity of biometric checks against a database 1 
Capturing 1 
Business volumes 1 
Brandon Mayfield (?) 1 
Complexity of multiple biometric databases 1 
Claims of biased biometrics expertise (Mansfield) 1 
Civil liberties 1 
Database size 1 
Data minimization 1 
Data integrity 1 
Difficulty of explaining biometric systems 1 
Different types of fingerprint readers 1 
Delays 1 
Customer satisfaction 1 
Continuity of biometric services 1 
Contest of experts 1 
CRB checks 1 
Customer experience 1 
Criteria for using biometrics 1 
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Appendix 7 
 
Raw codes from the analyzed media communications about biometrics in the 
National Identity Scheme (listed in order of frequency29, starting with the most 
frequently used)30 
 
 
Fingerprints 108 
No mention of biometrics 81 
Biometric passports 51 
Biometric data 46 
Iris scans 37 
Costs 36 
Biometric details 27 
Storing biometrics 27 
HMRC and NIS 26 
National Identity Register 26 
Biometric information 21 
Biometrics and the HMRC data breach 20 
Security 16 
FNIDs 16 
Reliability 14 
Biometric technology 13 
Biometric ID cards 13 
Facial scans 13 
Temporal aspects 12 
DNA 12 
                                            
29 As this part of the analysis was focused around certain critical events in the Scheme’s 
history, the frequency of particular codes cannot be said to represent all newspaper coverage 
of the NIS. 
30 I list these codes as documentation of my analysis, which is a quality criterion for qualitative 
research (Flick 2008; Bauer & Gaskell 2000, p.346) 
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Taking biometrics 11 
Iris 11 
Number of fingerprints (10) 11 
Photograph 11 
Royal Mail 10 
NIS SSF 10 
Ethnic differences in biometrics performance 9 
Biometric pilot 9 
Number of biometrics 9 
Biometric database 9 
Fingerprinted 9 
Face scans 8 
Failure rates 8 
Enrollment 8 
Enrollment centers 8 
Biometric scans 8 
Biometrics trial 8 
International obligations 8 
Readers 8 
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